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Abstract 
 
 
The thesis is an exploration of the elections and governance in a contemporary Chinese 
village. It is a qualitative case study of one village in Shandong Province, China, using 
in-depth  interviews  with  villagers,  village  candidates,  township  officials  as  well  as 
national,  provincial,  township  and  village  documents.  It  reveals  how  the  clientelist 
system functions in and shapes the process of the village elections and governance.     
 
Drawing upon the qualitative data and empirical evidence collected in the field site, the 
thesis challenges the liberal-democratic view that the implementation of direct village 
elections and self-governance, which is generally considered to be “village democracy”, 
has empowered villagers to resist the state and may mark the beginning of a bottom-up 
democratization in China. In contrast, it argues that even procedurally “free and fair” 
village elections largely fail to deliver meaningful results, and that village governance, 
although in the name of self-governance, actually continues to be dominated by the 
Chinese  local  state.  This  is  because  clientelist  structures,  embodied  in  vertical 
patron-client alliances between political elites and villagers, have strongly influenced 
the actors and functioned to facilitate and supplement the authoritarian control of the 
state.   
 
The  thesis  also  contests  interpretations  of  village  elections  and  self-governance  that 
stress  the  state’s  formal  administrative  capacity  over  controlling  and  manipulating 
village politics. While it shows some of the formal mechanisms by which township 
government control village affairs, it demonstrates also that after the implementation of 
the “village democracy” the state is still able to maintain its authoritarian capacity by 
taking advantage of the informal clientelist interaction between local state officials and 
the village elites.       iii 
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   1 
1 Introduction 
 
 
 
Understanding village elections and governance in contemporary rural 
China 
 
Villagers’  committee  (hereafter  VC)  elections  and  villagers’  self-governance
1,  as  a 
policy adopted by the central Chinese party-state, is considered to be one of the main 
substantive  and  continuing  political  reforms  in  rural  China  following  the  1989 
crackdown, and therefore has received a great deal of attention in the past decade and a 
half. As one scholar has put it: since very few developments can be regarded as having 
moved  the  Chinese  regime  towards  democracy  since  June  1989,  “village 
self-governance, of which village election is the foundation as well as the salient feature, 
stands  out  prominently”  (Louie  2001:  135).
2  For  those  who  hope  for  China’s 
democratization,  village  elections  and  villagers’  self-governance  represent  the  major 
positive indicator that even if full-scale democracy is not in prospect in the foreseeable 
future, small steps in that direction can be taken.     
 
When initially passed in 1987 with great controversy among Chinese legislators, the 
Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committee of the People’s Republic of China (Zhonghua 
renmin  gongheguo  cunmin  weiyuanhui  zuzhifa),  which  defines  and  validates  VC 
elections  and  villagers’  self-governance,  had  only  “provisional”  status  (hereafter  the 
                                                        
1  The overwhelming majority of west literature on Chinese village politics has applied the term “village election” or 
“village self-governance” when referring to cunmin weiyuanhui xuanju or cunmin zizhi, which, if literally translated, 
should  be  “villagers’  committee  (VC)  election”  or  “villagers’  self-governance”.  In  this  thesis,  the  term  “village 
election” is used interchangeably with “VC election” and it is the same for “village self-governance” and “villagers’ 
self-governance”.           
2  The quoted description here about the relationship of villagers’ self-governance and VC elections is consistent with 
the Chinese official definition, according to which, VC election is actually part of the content constituting villagers’ 
self-governance system. The villagers’ self-governance is claimed to have four constituents: “democratic elections, 
democratic  decision-making,  democratic  management  and  democratic  supervision”.  See  Zhonghua  renmin 
gongheguo minzheng bu (Ministry of Civil Affairs of the PRC): (1994) and article 2 of the Revised Organic Law. For 
clarification purpose, this thesis, however, take village election and (self-)governance separately in some places.               2 
provisional Organic Law). It was only ten years later that the “provisional” label was 
removed  and  the  Law  was  finally  fully  promulgated  in  1998  (hereafter  the  revised 
Organic  Law  or  the  Organic  Law).  Since  1998,  VC  elections  and  villagers’ 
self-governance  have  been  implemented  throughout  rural  China  with  the  central 
government’s  backing,  and  VC  elections  in  particular  have  been  seen  as  the 
“largest-scale and most influential political activity in contemporary rural China” (He, 
Wu, and Tong 2001). Nowadays, “competitive elections have become an important part 
of  village  life,  arousing  much  interest  and  excitement”  (Bernstein  2006:  32).  Some 
scholars even hold that village elections and villagers’ self-governance are “a genuine 
revolution, whose impact and influence cannot be less than any transformation in the 
Chinese modern revolutionary history” (Liu 2002: 8). As a result, in the past decade, 
Chinese  village  elections  and  self-governance  have  attracted  considerable  academic 
attention  from  both  Chinese  domestic  and  overseas  researchers.  What  is  more,  the 
western media and politicians
3  have also shown great enthusiasm for the VC elections, 
which  are  considered  to  be  a  way  going  along  with  the  “trend  of  international 
democratic  politics”  (Chen  2000:  9-10).  Also,  a  number  of  international 
non-governmental  organizations  such  as  the  Ford  Foundation,  Carter  Centre, 
International  Republic  Institute,  National  Democratic  Institute,  United  Nations 
Development  Program  and  European  Commission  have  been  involved  by  providing 
research funding, training Chinese electoral officials as well as offering other support of 
various forms (Shelley 2000). Village elections and self-governance have become a very 
hot topic in Chinese studies, resulting in a large number of scholarly works.           
 
The key reason that contemporary Chinese village elections and self-governance have 
attracted so much academic attention and enthusiasm is that they have been closely 
associated  with  or  even  directly  labeled  by  many  scholars  as  “democracy”  or 
“democratization” in an authoritarian party-state, something new and unexpected. Terms 
like “grassroots democracy”, “village democracy”, “democratic elections”, “electoral 
                                                        
3  For example, in 1997 and 1998, Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton both lauded village elections in discussions with 
ranking Chinese officials. See O'Brien and Li (2000): 484.     3 
democracy”, “bottom-up democratization” have  been widely used to refer to village 
elections  and  self-governance  by  these  China  observers  (e.g.,  Brandtstadter  and 
Schubert 2005; Kennedy 2002; e.g., Lawrence 1994; Li 2002; Li 2003; Manion 2006; 
O'Brien 1994; Pastor and Tan 2000; Pei 1995; Shi 1999b; Zweig and Fung 2007). This 
thesis, however, challenges the view that “democratic village elections” and “grassroots 
democracy” have been gradually developing and flourishing and may make a significant 
contribution to China’s democratization from the “bottom up”. It also challenges the 
arguments of those who have rejected the view that village elections are somehow a 
form  of  training  ground  for  democracy  in  China  by  emphasizing  the  party-state’s 
authoritarian control of village administration. Instead it argues that the “authoritarian” 
approach does not adequately address the interaction between the authoritarian state and 
villagers who are supposed to have been empowered by village elections and reforms of 
village governance.   
 
This thesis is a qualitative study based on the in-depth investigation of one Chinese 
village.  I  argue  that  the  majority  of  scholarship  focusing  on  the  formal  rules  and 
institutions of village elections and governance overlooks the “invisible rules” or social 
institutions, notably informal personal (patron-client) ties and networks and their role in 
village elections and governance. Despite decades of reform, Chinese villagers today 
are  still  largely  dependent  on  their  informal  social  networks.  Ordinary  villagers  in 
particular are still dependent on various patrons who can claim their votes in elections, 
even when those elections are conducted in a way that is formally and procedurally free 
and fair. Similarly, effective village self-governance and grassroots democracy (if it can 
be  called  “democracy”)  have  been  undermined  by  clientelism.  As  a  result,  village 
elections  are  not  leading  to  what  Lawrence  called  “democracy,  Chinese  style” 
(Lawrence  1994)  or  bottom-up  democratization,  but  may  even  be  discrediting 
democratic institutions.   
 
This chapter first reviews in detail the current approaches to studying contemporary 
Chinese  village  politics.  It  then  elaborates  the  clientelist  perspective  adopted  in  the   4 
thesis and discusses the research methodology that has been used.   
 
Approaches to analyzing Chinese village elections and self-governance   
 
The current literature analyzing contemporary Chinese village elections and governance 
can  be  divided  into  three  approaches:  liberal-democratic,  authoritarian  and 
developmentalist. 
 
The Liberal-democratic approach: bottom up democratization? 
Scholars favouring this approach either argue or assume that direct village elections and 
villagers’  self-governance  in  contemporary  rural  China  are  moving  in  a 
liberal-democratic direction (Brandtstadter and Schubert 2005; Hong 2006; Kennedy 
2002; Lawrence 1994; Manion 2006; O'Brien 2001; Pei 1995; Tan 2004; Wang 1997). 
These  scholars,  who  often  use  concepts  like  “village  democracy”,  “electoral 
democracy” or “democratic elections” when referring to village elections or governance, 
tend to emphasise a strengthening civil society. They argue that “democratic” elections 
and governance in Chinese villages are the result of state retreat from society with the 
liberalization of both economy and political control. Villagers, grouped in their village 
communities, are conceived as an emerging and empowered civil society, which has 
increasing bargaining power for a “collective good” (Brandtstadter and Schubert 2005: 
804)  against  the  state.  Kevin  O’Brien  (2001:  416)  argues,  for  example,  that  village 
elections, as a “breeding ground for citizenship rights”, have encouraged and promoted 
villagers’ sense of citizenship. Thus he predicts that Chinese villagers have begun to 
claim  a  more  complete  “citizenship  from  below”  (2001:  423).  Brandtstadter  and 
Schubert (2005) echo this view. They suggest that “grassroots democracy” has enabled 
villagers to resist the state in a “full scale” if their “rightful” demands are not met (2005: 
801). Similarly, Li and Manion find that “electoral democracy” can promote villagers’ 
political efficacy
4  (Li 2003) and trust in their elected village leaders (Manion 2006). Li 
                                                        
4  By  political  efficacy,  Li  means  external  efficacy,  which  he  defines  as  “beliefs  about  the  responsiveness  of 
governmental authorities and institutions to citizens’ demands”. See Li (2003): 650.   5 
goes even further to conclude that a higher level of efficacy may result in villagers’ 
more active political participation, which may lead to political restructuring in Chinese 
villages and a change of villagers’ understanding of political legitimacy (2003: 660). 
Wang (1997) also agrees that “grassroots democracy” has empowered the society, but at 
the same time he argues that the empowered society may largely cooperate with rather 
than challenge the state. 
 
A major contribution of the liberal-democratic approach is to spotlight and emphasize 
the role of civil society by focusing on villagers’ collective action, community autonomy, 
or the emerging civic culture in Chinese rural society. However, analysts taking this 
approach, by almost always using concepts denoting liberal-democracy, clearly assume, 
although  sometime  implicitly,  that  political  institutional  reform  in  rural  China  is  a 
process  of  political  transition  leading  to  liberal-democracy,  in  other  words, 
democratization.   
 
This  approach  has  two  prominent  weaknesses.  First,  in  highlighting  civil  society,  it 
largely downplays, or even ignores the role of the authoritarian party-state in the process 
of  village  elections  and  especially  in  day-to-day  governance.  To  advocates  of  this 
approach, with decollectivization and market reform the Chinese party-state at the rural 
grassroots level has been largely in “a state of collapse” and unable to “perform [its] 
normal duties” (Pei 1995: 73). Thus with reduced power the state has no choice but to 
retreat from the rural grassroots. Or alternatively, the Chinese central government, with 
the primary intention of supervising and disciplining the local state and its agents, has 
allied  with  the  peasantry  by  pushing  through  grassroots  democratic  reform.  In  both 
cases, the context of rural Chinese society in reform era has therefore created strategic 
space,  at  least  in  village  level,  where  “sprouts  of  democracy”  (Brandtstadter  and 
Schubert 2005: 802) can grow.     
 
While it is apparent that the Chinese party-state has retreated in part from rural society 
with the ongoing decollectivization and marketization, this does not necessarily mean   6 
that the state is becoming too weak to govern and cannot play a role in village politics. 
On the contrary, the state in fact has been still in a strong position especially when 
carrying out “crucial policy issues” like maintaining local social and political stability, 
economic development, and population control (Zhong 2003: 130-136). As one scholar 
has pointed out: “the liberalized institutions of rural society are bestowed by the state 
and, in fact, the state has not reduced the sphere of control in rural society but merely 
changed  the  form  of  control  upon  village  communities—at  most,  it  has  reduced 
redundant and over-direct intervention. The state may ignore what it does not want to 
control, but it can resume control at any time if it wants to” (Mao 1998: 14). 
 
Although some scholars taking this approach may be aware of the existence of local 
state and its intervention in village elections and governance, they seem to assume that 
since village “democracy” is bestowed and supported by the central government, the 
empowered villagers therefore have been able to strategically make use of the central 
policy to confront the local state through “rightful resistance”, which may significantly 
contribute  to  the  peasants’  “growing  right  consciousness”  and  the  strengthening  of 
social  interests  (O'Brien  1996).  This  view,  however,  may  underestimate  the  local 
government’s  powerful  role  by  risking  overestimating  the  potential  of  peasants’ 
“rightful resistance” and the divergence between the central state and its local agents. 
While the central government may support and push through “grassroots democracy” on 
the one hand, it also demands local governments to carry out “crucial policy issues” 
(Zhong 2003: 130-136). It may intend to discipline and supervise its local agents by 
drawing in villagers, but it is also reluctant to grant them wider political power (O'Brien 
and Li 1999: 181), which may endanger “stability” or the monopolistic power of the 
Party.  Thus,  local  governments  can  always  employ  strategies,  such  as  “feigned 
compliance” (Kelliher 1997: 84) or “selective policy implementation” (O'Brien and Li 
1999) to resist central policies which do not suit their local situation.       
 
By emphasizing the peasantry or the society’s empowerment by “grassroots democracy”, 
those taking the liberal-democratic approach downplay the role of the authoritarian state   7 
in village politics and therefore are more inclined to see bottom-up democratization 
underway. However, if the authoritarian state can still exert power on crucial issues, 
how far can so-called bottom-up democratization go?   
 
Second,  the  liberal-democratic  approach  has  failed  to  recognize  both  the  inequality 
between villagers and the informal power relations that connect them. Advocates of his 
model,  when  portraying  Chinese  villagers  as  citizens  empowered  by  “democratic” 
institutions,  often  see  them  as  free,  equal  and  able  to  defend  and  fight  for  their 
“collective good” based on village solidarity (e.g., Brandtstadter and Schubert 2005; 
O'Brien  2001).  When  taking  “Chinese  villagers”  or  “China’s  peasants”  as  a  unitary 
category,  these  scholars  have  largely  overlooked  or  obscured  the  huge  differences 
among Chinese villagers.   
 
Others or the same scholars in other studies have differentiated between villagers in 
their research. O’Brien and Li for example, in earlier research on villagers’ efforts at 
lodging complaints, have argued that villagers are actually divided into two groups: a 
“handful” of activists of lodging complaints and “shunmin”, or compliant villagers, who 
are “the vast majority” in the village they have studied. They have also noted that some 
compliant villagers may be either followers of incumbent cadres or supporters of the 
complainants  (1995:  767,  771,  772  and  781).  In  subsequent  research  on  peasant 
resistance,  they  categorize  Chinese  villagers  into  three  types:  compliant  villagers, 
recalcitrants, and policy-based resisters (1996). Nonetheless, when writing on village 
elections, O’Brien does not make such distinctions, talking instead simply of “Chinese 
villagers” who actively fight for their “citizen rights” may achieve “a more complete 
citizenship” (2001: 426) in the future.   
 
Similarly, Brandtstadter and Schubert (2005) argue that the “sprouts of democracy” can 
be found in village lineage institutions (temples or ancestral halls), which both represent 
the “rightful collective” (p. 808) and “stand for the idea of a unified group of essentially 
equal brothers” (p. 814). According to them, the lineage formations of Chinese rural   8 
society  in  the  reform  era  can  contribute  to  the  democratization  process  because, 
according  to  them,  villagers  can  “generalize”  the  sense  of  “collective  good”  and 
“equality” to their lineage by “thinking (and acting) beyond the village boundaries” 
(2005: 816). 
 
These studies, while helping deepen our understanding of village politics, also raise 
important questions. Why  are only a “handful” of villagers more conscious to their 
“citizen rights” while the overwhelming majority of them not? Why do some villagers 
choose  to  be  followers  of  incumbent  cadres  while  others  support  the  complainants? 
Why some villagers fear the retaliation from the cadres but some do not? If, according 
to Brandtstadter and Schubert, the lineage really represents the idea of a group of “equal 
brothers” (men), then where is the role of “sisters” (women)? What’s more, even within 
the group of men, can age, wealth or social status function to privilege some members 
while disprivilege others? Have the patriarchal authority and filial devotion by which 
the traditional Chinese family and lineage are ordered (Hsu 1963: 28 ff.) now evolved to 
value equality?     
 
In short, by downplaying the state while overstating civil society and peasantry, studies 
taking the liberal-democratic approach have downplayed the power of the authoritarian 
state and has tended to see village society or villagers as an unitary group empowered 
by village democracy (and where it has differentiated among villagers has not explained 
what underpins differences in villagers’ actions relating to the state).   
 
The Authoritarian approach: bringing the state back in   
A few scholars, who are critical of the liberal-democratic approach, have tried to “bring 
the  state  back  in”  to  the  analysis  of  village  politics.  Unlike  those  taking  a 
liberal-democratic approach, these scholars have switched their focus from the society 
back  to  the  state.  They  particularly  stress  the  top-down  authoritarian  party-state 
structure and its dominant role in village elections and governance. They tend to hold 
that village elections are highly mobilized and manipulated by the local state (Zhong   9 
2000),  village  governance  is  still  dominated  by  administrative  power  rather  than 
self-governing or autonomous logic (Alpermann 2001; Mao 1998), and elected village 
officials, or, the village community as a whole, are largely subject to the authoritarian 
control of the state (Bai 2000; Bernstein 2006; Guo and Bernstein 2004). It is worth 
noting that scholars taking this approach do not deny that, as a matter of fact, the state 
has partially retreated from the rural society in the reform era (Louie 2001: 150) and its 
governing power or capacity of control has declined (Zhong 2003: 182). However, they 
do not maintain, as do those taking the liberal-democratic approach, that the partial 
retreat and decline in the power of the state will largely lead to the empowerment of 
rural  civil  society.  Rather,  they  tend  to  see  it  has  more  likely  resulted  in  poor 
implementation of state policies and even paralysis of village governance (Zhao 2006: 
82; Zhong 2003: 178-182). Against such background, the local state has no choice but to 
further tighten up its administrative control over villages so as to maintain its capacity 
of  effectively  mobilizing  the  rural  society.  As  a  Chinese  scholar,  Zhao  Shukai,  has 
observed: “while the vigorous launch of direct village elections… [which is] initiating a 
process  of  democratization,  township  party  committees  and  governments  are 
concurrently  promoting  a  process  of  intensified  administrative  control  over  village 
organizations. … And as village socioeconomic life is becoming increasingly market 
oriented  and  self-determined,  organizations  of  public  power  within  the  villages  are 
increasingly  controlled  by  higher  administrative  levels”  (Zhao  2006:  91).  From  this 
perspective, therefore, direct village elections or “grassroots democracy” have neither 
promoted  the  growth  or  empowerment  of  civil  society/peasantry,  nor  made  any 
substantial difference to the authoritarian/administrative control of the state.   
 
While the authoritarian approach is revealing in highlighting the role of the authoritarian 
local party-state and stressing its powerful control over village elections and governance, 
it tends to discount the role of civil society and conceives of peasants as atomized, 
powerless and politically apathetic. In particular, scholars taking this approach would 
regard village cadres and village organizations as part of the state rather than part of the 
empowering civil society—even after the arrival of direct village elections. Yang Zhong,   10 
for example, argues: 
 
Even  though  village  authorities  are  not  a  formal  level  of  government  in  the  PRC 
(according to the Chinese Constitution), they are, in reality, perceived, treated, and 
utilized  as  part  of  the  state  organ.  Village  cadres  thus  function  as  foot  soldiers  in 
carrying  out  state  policies.  …  The  recent  experiment  with  election  of  a  villagers’ 
committee has yet to create a genuine self-governing or autonomous body working for 
the villagers due to a series of institutional constraints (the village Party secretary’s 
dominant  power,  subjugation  of  the  villagers’  committee  to  township/town 
governmental  authorities,  and  the  restricted  and  flawed  nomination  and  election 
processes) in many villages. Village officials are bound … to provide service for the 
state authorities (Zhong 2003: 190). 
 
The authoritarian approach seems to be more persuasive when applied to the places 
where village elections are merely controlled, rigged, or intentionally ignored by local 
state. But in places where elections are carried out in accordance with the law, it exposes 
its  weakness.  This  is  because  it  cannot  countenance  any  interaction  between  the 
authoritarian  state  and  elected  village  cadres.  Do  elected  village  cadres  who  are 
supposed to serve their constituents passively accept the arbitrary power of state? If so, 
how can they seek to be re-elected in the next round of elections? If they choose to 
challenge the state on behalf of its constituents, what will the state’s reaction be? In 
short,  advocates  of  the  authoritarian  approach  have  failed  to  give  an  adequate 
explanation of this question: why and how do popularly elected village cadres in what 
are considered to be procedurally “free and fair” (Li 2003) village elections still largely 
side with the local state rather than serve villagers. By discounting the role of civil 
society and peasants, the authoritarian model loses sight of the interaction between state 
and society.         
 
The Developmentalist approach 
Some scholars, by adopting a developmentalist approach, have attempted to explore   11 
why village electoral reform have been implemented more successfully in some places 
or areas than others in China. They are inspired by “classical” modernization theory in 
seeing a direct correlation between democratization and economic development, making 
the former a consequence of the latter. However, the scholars who adopt this approach 
have far from reached a consensus.   
 
Some argue that economic development can promote the implementation of democratic 
village  elections  and  the  Organic  Law  has  been  carried  out  more  successfully  in 
economically developed areas than backward ones (eg., Hu 2005; O'Brien 1994). For 
example,  in  an  often  quoted  article  of  1994,  Kevin  O’Brien  connected  the 
implementation success of the provisional Organic Law directly to the material wealth 
in  the  villages  or  the  townships/counties.  Things  were  going  smoothly  where  local 
cadres did not have to fear sanctions of the electorate for their management and control 
of the collective economy. It was they who had led the village to prosperity and who 
used  the  income  from  the  collective  economy  to  benefit  the  village  population,  for 
example by investments in local infrastructure or by paying obligatory levies to the 
township  government  without  charging  the  peasants.  Consequently,  they  not  only 
substantially enhanced the possibility of their (re-) election; they became also interested 
in “clean” elections themselves, because these helped them to gain political legitimacy. 
In villages in poor areas, however, local cadres not only failed to provide satisfactory 
public services for villagers but also had to come to villagers for economic extraction. 
This led to very tense relations between local cadres and peasants. Therefore, village 
cadres in poor areas, who had to offend villagers in extracting funds from villagers and 
faithfully carrying out tough state policies, had no confidence in winning elections. As a 
result,  local  officials  in  poor  areas  either  choose  to  ignore  the  Organic  Law  or 
manipulate elections so as to keep those loyal village cadres in office.                     
 
Contrary to this view, some scholars have found that village elections are carried out 
more  successfully  in  poorer  areas  rather  wealthy  ones.  Based  on  their  single  case 
investigation, both Lawrence (1994) and Hong (2006) argue that village elections have   12 
been  organized  more  successfully  in  economically  underdeveloped  villages.  Jean  Oi 
(1996) has gone so far as to argue that there is a negative correlation between the level 
of economic development on the one hand and the degree of electoral implementation 
on the other. She found that “high levels of economic development do not necessarily 
bring enthusiasm for implementing democratic reforms” (ibid., p137). In rich villages, 
the  powerful  party  secretaries  have  become  powerful  entrepreneurs  who  control  the 
villages’  financial  resources.  Whereas  the  introduction  of  direct  elections  makes  the 
village head accountable to the village population, the party secretary usually is not 
touched by such an arrangement. His privileged access to the local collective economy 
enables him to substantially limit the VC’s authority. Based on this empirical finding, Oi 
concludes that there is an “inverse relationship between level of economic development 
and progress in the implementation of democratic village rules” (ibid., p141).   
 
Other  researchers  have  suggested  a  more  complex  relationship  between  economic 
development  and  electoral  implementation  in  rural  China.  Based  on  empirical  data 
gathered from a nationwide survey, Shi (1999a) argues that the relationship between 
economic development and village elections appears to take the shape of a concave 
curve.  According  to  him  economic  development  leads  to  a  higher  probability  of 
semi-competitive  elections.  But  then  growing  prosperity  translates  into  a  declining 
probability after a certain point is reached, so that villages in middle-income areas are 
the most likely to have free and fair elections. In contrast to poor villages, rural income 
here is above the subsistence level. The peasants have to deliver money to the state and 
find  themselves  in  a  position  of  relative  deprivation  against  the  economically  more 
advanced villages nearby. As a consequence, they are very critical of local cadres who 
have not contributed enough to the material well-being of the village. At the same time, 
the  cadres  face  great  pressure  because  they  lack  financial  resources  -  the  village’s 
collective industry is not developed enough – to win over the villagers or persuade their 
superiors to manipulate elections and keep them in power. This weak position results in 
the township and county governments’ determination to implement the Organic Law, 
because they hope that this will generate new political legitimacy to help carry through   13 
their policies in the villages, push modernization and development, bringing personal 
benefits to township and county politicians in the long run. According to Shi, in poor 
villages  the  peasants  are  totally  absorbed  by  survival  or  migrate  to  the  rich  coastal 
provinces  and  they  are  simply  not  interested  in  political  participation  in  their  home 
villages. In rich villages the motivation to implement true semi-competitive elections is 
reduced again: The village heads use the financial resources for ‘buying’ their superiors 
who manipulate the elections. At the same time, the economic success of village cadres 
make township government and party branches want to keep them. And the villagers are 
ready to renounce to clean elections, as long as clever village heads pay their duties and 
taxes to the state and even redistribute profits of the local collective economy to the 
villagers. 
 
In an empirical study of the competitiveness of village elections, Oi and Rozelle (2000) 
also suggest that the nature of the economy in a given village is much more important 
for  the  competitiveness  of  its  village  elections.  They  first  find  that  where  peasant 
income is predominantly attached to the cultivation of the land, the degree of political 
participation and electoral competitiveness is high because of the special importance of 
land issues in local politics (for example land distribution, irrigation and environmental 
protection). Second, in industrialized villages the degree of participation and electoral 
competitiveness  is  low  because,  they  argue,  village  cadres  are  more  interested  in 
perpetuating their privileged position and therefore work against the Organic Law; and 
because the rural population is comparatively well-off it does not see any particular 
reason to demand more direct participation in local politics. Third, however, the degree 
of  competitiveness  rises  in  those  villages  that  extract  surplus  revenues  out  of  the 
collective economy. According to the authors, this was an effect of exactly the same 
reasons  that  Shi  Tianjian  put  forth  to  explain  the  implementation  successes  of  the 
Organic  Law  in  middle-income  areas:  economically  successful  cadres  do  not  fear 
elections, but consider them useful fortifiers of their legitimacy. They can influence the 
outcome  of  elections  through  offering  material  favours  without  compromising  their 
formal  procedures.  And  they  are  more  likely  to  transfer  the  responsibility  for  local   14 
policies to the VC as long as they keep control over the local economy.  Fourth, in 
villages  with  a  high  percentage  of  out-migrants,  participation  and  electoral 
competitiveness are declining because villagers who seek employment away from the 
village have less interest in village elections. In other words: the higher the degree of 
integration of the village economy into the external economy, the lower the degree of 
local political participation. Finally, the more private entrepreneurs there are in a village, 
the  higher  the  competitiveness  of  local  elections.  According  to  Oi  and  Rozelle  this 
might be due to the fact that entrepreneurs - especially those without party membership 
- see in village elections a means to defend their interests against the cadre bureaucracy 
that is often sceptical, if not openly antagonistic towards the private economy. 
 
A  developmentalist  approach  is  taken  by  these  China  researchers  to  explore  the 
relationship between economic development and the implementation of VC elections. 
But the conclusions, based on empirical data from a range of different localities, are 
often contradictory. More importantly, by focusing on economic development measured 
by people’s income level, all these scholars have paid less attention to the nature of 
social relationships, which may not necessarily  change with the development of the 
economy.   
 
Toward a clientelist analysis: the interaction between peasant and state 
 
Clientelism,  as  a  widespread  phenomenon  and  important  political  concept,  refers  to 
relationships  between  “patrons”  and  their  “clients”.  A  patron-client  relationship,  as 
defined by Lande (1977: xx) “is a vertical dyadic alliance, i.e., an alliance between two 
persons of unequal status, power or resources each of whom finds it useful to have as an 
ally someone superior or inferior to himself”. Clientelism, in the view of many scholars 
(eg. Powell 1970: 421; Scott 1972b: 93) contains three elementary factors that define 
and differentiate it from other kind of power relations. First, it is a relationship between 
people of unequal status. Second, it involves reciprocity in the exchange of different   15 
kinds of goods and services between the two parties. Finally, it involves intimate (face 
to face) contact between the two parties. 
 
Although it has been identified in a variety of social contexts, clientelist politics may be 
dominant in some societies while marginal in others. Based on his research in Southeast 
Asia, James Scott (1972b: 101) has argued that three conditions may account for the 
ascendancy of patron-client structure: first, the existence of prominent inequalities in the 
control of wealth, status, and power; second, the absence of impersonal institutions that 
provide personal security; and third, the failure of the kinship unit to offer personal 
security  of  advancement.  Similarly,  Rouquie  (1978:  26)  points  out  that  the  social 
context  in  which  clientelism  thrives  may  exhibit  three  characteristics:  “insecurity, 
isolation and the privatisation and concentration of power”. 
 
Clientelism, which has been established to analyze political associations cutting across 
horizontal groups, such as class, has proven particularly useful in analyzing politics in 
developing countries. As Scott points out, clientelist analysis can be especially relevant 
in studies of small local communities where informal interpersonal relationships are 
salient and may even subvert formal institutional arrangements (Scott 1972b: 92).     
 
The  first  and  most  prominent  work  to  apply  clientelism  to  modern  Chinese  village 
politics is Jean Oi’s State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy 
of Village Government (1989). In her stimulating study on Chinese village governance 
during  both  commune  and  post-commune  era  (1956-1985),  Oi  argues  that  “village 
politics in China is best described as clientelist” (1989: 7). According to Oi, to a large 
degree,  it  is  informal  patron-client  ties,  rather  than  formal  institutions  or  official 
channels,  that  link  the  cadres  and  peasants  together  at  the  village  level,  and  which 
enables  both  the  bureaucratic  control  of  the  party-state  and  individual  villager’s 
participation in and influence over the political system. Clientelist interaction between 
village cadres and ordinary villagers, she suggests, makes a significant contribution to 
understanding the state-society relationship in communist rural China.     16 
 
Oi believes that the clientelist nature of Chinese village politics does not come from 
Chinese culture or tradition. Rather, it is rooted in a socio-econimic structure that is 
“characterized by a scarcity of goods, a centralized distribution system, and unequal 
access to and personalized control over allocation of goods and opportunities” (Oi 1989: 
10).  She  holds  that  so  long  as  these  characteristics  persist,  marketization  and 
decollectivization  in  the  post-commune  era  are  unlikely  to  eradicate  the  clientelist 
nature of village politics, though it may transform it. Although her macro-level analysis 
focusing  on  “the  political  economy  of  village  government”  means  that  she  did  not 
elaborate on the dynamics of village clientelist politics, Oi’s clientelist perspective on 
Chinese village politics and state-society relation made a very significant contribution to 
the study of contemporary Chinese rural politics. 
   
At the time of her research in the early-to-mid-1980s, Oi could not, of course, foresee 
that  village  elections  would  be  introduced  by  the  Chinese  central  government  and 
finally implemented throughout rural China one and half decades later. However, as Oi 
has correctly argued, as long as the key underpinnings of clientelism endure in China, 
clientelism will remain important to the understanding of Chinese village politics today 
even if formal political institutions change. Yet few analysts have paid attention to the 
role of clientelism in village politics since the introduction of village elections. Even Oi 
herself,  when  writing  more  recently  on  village  elections  and  government,  has 
abandoned  the  clientelist  perspective  on  Chinese  village  politics  that  she  once  so 
eloquently defended (see Oi 1996; Oi and Rozelle 2000).   
 
I argue that it is time to bring patron-client analysis back in to village politics in China 
today. The workings of village elections and post-election village governance can best 
be  explained  using  the  concept  of  clientelism.
5  This  thesis  emphasizes the  informal 
dyadic alliances between individuals, especially those between people of unequal status. 
                                                        
5  Unger (2000: 77-78), Brandtstadter and Schubert (2005: 808-809) have noted that patrons, factions and patronage 
play a role in village elections and governance today, but they do not pursue this analysis in depth.       17 
In  a  challenge  to  the  liberal-democratic  approach,  which  focuses  on  formal 
“democratic” institutions relating to village elections and governance, this thesis will 
show how informal personal ties shape political processes and subvert formal rules and 
institutions.  I  argue  that  rather  than  being  empowered  by  “democratic”  rules  and 
horizontally grouping themselves to fight for a “collective good” or “citizenship rights”, 
Chinese  peasants
6  today  still  often  pursue  their  individual  interests  by  intentionally 
entering  into  or  creating  particularistic,  informal  personal  alliances.  Vertical 
patron-client  association  remains  the  most  convenient,  simple,  effective  strategy  for 
peasants  to  protect  themselves  against  risks  and  maximize  their  individual  interests. 
Village direct elections have not changed the long-standing underpinnings of clientelism. 
Rather,  clientelism  has  become  much  more  overt  and  pervasive  with  the  arrival  of 
village  elections:  voting  for  a  particular  candidate  in  an  election  may  be  enough  to 
enable a voter to become a client, and thus all voters may have potential opportunities to 
access a patron’s favoured treatment (See Piattoni 2001: 202-203). Meanwhile, village 
elections have also led to the competition between patrons with different resource bases 
within the village community, who are under pressure to enlist as many clients or voters 
as possible so as to win elections. Village electoral competition, to the extent it exists, 
has become a contest enrolling personal followers among patrons who are now standing 
as candidates in elections.     
 
In contrast to the authoritarian approach, which spotlights the powerful and effective 
administrative control of the party-state, the clientelist perspective shows how informal 
interactions  between  state  officials  and  village  elites/villagers  may  constitute  an 
important dimension of the power relationship between state and society. Clientelism 
reminds  us  that  in  the  context  of  an  authoritarian  state  with  significant  distributive 
capacity, it is individual state officials who actually monopolize a wide range of scarce 
resources, like job opportunities, market channels, various business licenses and so on. 
The  monopoly  of  these  critical  resources  means  local  officials  remain  in  an  ideal 
                                                        
6  In this thesis “Chinese peasants” are referred broadly to those with rural household registration in China. The term 
is not defined as people who work in the agricultural sector.       18 
patron’s position to ensure obedience from those who wish to access these scarce goods. 
Patron-client relationships between local state  officials  and village elites has largely 
defused the potential conflict between elected village leaders and township officials and 
makes the village elites, especially the elected village cadres, more inclined to privilege 
cooperation with township officials over serving their constituents. At the same time, to 
win compliance and exercise control state officials nowadays often use patronage rather 
than the administrative coercion that is highlighted by the authoritarian approach. 
 
Bringing under closer scrutiny examination of the nature of social relationships might 
help  explain  the  apparent  inconsistencies  in  the  developmentalist  explanations  of 
differences  in  the  implementation  of  village  elections.  The  clientelist  perspective 
indicates  the  need  to  probe  beneath  the  surface  of  apparently  competitive  village 
elections, since even elections that comply  with the letter of the law  and adhere to 
formal procedures can be undermined in practice by patron-client relations that may not 
be immediately identifiable to researchers. Though further study is needed to determine 
empirically  the  prevalence  of  clientelism  in  rural  China  and  its  effects  on  village 
elections and governance in the 21
st century, I argue that it is highly likely to be found 
across rural China regardless of level of economic development. If clientelism and its 
impact on the conduct of village elections and governance is not found in all villages, 
the question is then under what conditions it does flourish. 
 
Finally,  although  based  on  the  study  of  only  one  village,  that  village  is  one  with  a 
relatively good level of economic development, and this suggests that clientelism can 
persist  even  when  villages  have  escaped  conditions  of  economic  scarcity.  This 
challenges  the  conventional  explanations  of  clientelism  as  developed  by  Scott  and 
Rouquie, which sees scarcity or poverty as an essential pre-requisite. This is something 
to which I will return in the concluding chapter of the thesis. 
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Methodology: A case study of one village community   
 
Why a case study? 
The choice of research strategy was shaped by my research questions and the nature of 
the information I need for my analysis. I chose a qualitative case study approach for 
three reasons.   
 
First,  the  unique  strength  of  the  case  study  approach  in  discovering  questions  and 
puzzles is particularly important for this project. Compared to quantitative methods, 
which  usually  use  large  samples  and  examine a  limited  number  of  and  quantifiable 
variables,  the  qualitative  case  study  method  involves  an  in-depth,  longitudinal 
examination of a single instance or event. It offers a systematic way of exploring events, 
collecting data, analyzing information and interpreting phenomena. As a result, the case 
study  method  enables  a  researcher  to  gain  a  sharpened  understanding  of  why  the 
instance  happened  as  it  did  and  what  might  become  important  to  look  at  more 
extensively in future research (Flybjerg 2006; Yin 2003).   
 
Due to the complexity of China’s rural transition process and limited knowledge of the 
subject under examination, a variable-oriented approach, which in most cases starts by 
specifying the relevant variables, matching them to theoretical concepts and collecting 
information  on  these  variables,  is  unsuitable.  As  Zweig  and  Fung,  who  although 
themselves employed a quantitative method in their inquiry of Chinese village elections, 
have  frankly  confessed  that  “good  indicators  of  democracy,  stability,  economic 
development  or  good  governance  are  not  easy  to  collect”.  They  add:  “though  few 
analysts confess to the limitations of their data, because it would call into question their 
findings,  surveying  rural  China  on  political  variables  is  costly  and  very  difficult.” 
Therefore,  they  suggest  analysts  of  Chinese  rural  politics  “should  not  give  up  case 
studies, or in-depth interviews” (Zweig and Fung 2007: 43). This is not, however, a 
sufficient reason to do case study research in rural China. In terms of case studies in   20 
village  China,  in-depth  survey  and  information  collecting  can  be  as  difficult  as 
quantitative research, if not more (See Friedman 2006). In terms of Chinese village 
politics,  the  real  problem  with  quantitative  surveys  in  my  view  is  not  difficulty  in 
collecting data of “good” indicators but difficulty in identifying those “good” indicators. 
In other words, quantitative analysts often fail to choose proper indicators at the very 
beginning  due  to  lack  of  detailed  understanding  of  the  villages  under  survey.  For 
example,  in  their  study  on  village  elections,  Jean  C.  Oi  and  Scott  Rozelle  take  the 
villagers’  participation  rate  as  an  important  indicator  to  measure  the  villagers’ 
enthusiasm of choosing their village leaders (Oi and Rozelle 2000). However, my study 
shows  that  villagers’  high  participation  rate  can  be  due  to  either  government 
mobilization (by paying money to villagers who vote) or by mobilization of village elite 
(by using the influence of personal relationships). This demonstrates that without full 
understanding  of  various  variables  and  the  relationship  between  them,  large-scale 
quantitative survey and analysis may lead to inaccurate results. The unique strength of 
qualitative  research,  which  enables  the  use  of  different  methods—interviews, 
observations  and  secondary  materials,  is  that  it  can  help  identify  questions,  select 
measurement indicators, and develop questions for further quantatiative research.       
 
Second, the great regional and socioeconomic diversity of rural China justifies a refined 
and  focused  approach.  In  contemporary  rural  China,  there  is  great  regional 
differentiation and huge socioeconomic diversity. For example, Bernstein and Lu (2003: 
241) argue that to understand the complexities of China’s countryside, it is essential to 
differentiate  between  three  rural  Chinas:  industrializing  rural  China,  middle-income 
agricultural China and low-income western China. According to the village economic 
context, Oi and Rozelle (2000) differentiate between industrialized villages, agricultural 
villages,  villages  with  more  (fewer)  out-migrants,  villages  with  more  (fewer) 
self-employed. Despite these efforts to reflect the huge diversity of China’s countryside, 
when analyzing village elections and governance, they are far from enough. In terms of 
population, there are big villages with several thousand villagers, small villages with 
only  several  dozen  villagers  and  also  middle-sized  villages  with  several  hundred   21 
villagers  (Shen  2004:  part  1);  in  terms  of  geographical  location,  there  are  remote 
villages in mountain areas, suburban villages and villages enclosed by urbanization; in 
terms  of  clan  background,  there  are  villages  dominated  by  one  single  clan,  villages 
dominated by two or more big clans and villages without any clan background; in terms 
of  economic  development,  there  are  agricultural  villages,  industrialized  villages, 
villages with strong collective economy as well as villages without collective economy 
at all. China’s countryside is like a kaleidoscope composed of numerous diverse villages. 
Even in the township where I conducted my fieldwork, villages have very distinctive 
characteristics. With the coming of the national policy on elections and governance, 
dramas performed in these various village arenas will be by no means similar. Thus, an 
intensive exploration of a single case can provide in-depth analysis and fully reveal the 
political dynamics. 
 
Third,  there  is  a  further  benefit  to  qualitative  method:  interviews  instead  of 
questionnaires  are  a  much  better  way  to  get  at  the  issues.  Quantitative  surveys  are 
desirable in those circumstances where respondents have no difficulty in understanding 
questions and expressing themselves freely. But the nature of the data needed for this 
research on village politics does not fit well with these requirements. On the one hand, 
due to the low educational level in Chinese countryside, many villagers can either be 
illiterate or have difficulty in correctly understanding the meaning of the questions on 
questionnaires. On the other hand, a traditional “culture of fear”, though much relaxed 
now,  may  still  deter  people  from  expressing  their  true  ideas  when  answering 
questionnaires. Long interviews, however, can provide substantial room for interviewers 
to explain confusions and clarify misunderstandings for the interviewees. Interviews can 
also  provide  additional  advantage  of  capturing  the  true  information  from  the 
interviewees’ body language, expression in their eyes, tone as well as their implications. 
Meanwhile,  interviewees  may  get  familiar  with  the  interviewer  during  a  period  of 
prolonged  fieldwork  and  then  feel  free  to  express  their  views  to  the  interviewer, 
especially on some politically sensitive issues.       
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Of course, generalizations made from a detailed case study of one single village may 
not  be  applicable  to  other  villages.  But  it  can  be  used  to  generate  hypotheses  and 
comparative  material  for  further  investigation.  This  is  the  soundest  way  to  obtain 
scientific  generalizations.  As  some  scholars  have  pointed  out,  “the  rural  grassroots 
politics and intricate patterns of development and change in China’s villages can most 
fully be understood and appreciated through detailed microstudies”(Chan, Madsen, and 
Unger 1992: 2). 
 
Why B village? 
To  choose  a  village  for  qualitative  research,  practicalities  are  very  important 
consideration. It would have been extremely difficult to carry out an intensive study in a 
Chinese village relating to politics as an outsider. That is why I firstly confine my case 
within my native place, where I own some unique advantages. As a native, I can start 
with  a  linguistic  advantage.  Differences  in  Chinese  dialect  are  one  of  the  practical 
difficulties in carrying out field investigation. Being a native of the district, it was not 
necessary for me to spend time in learning the local dialect. And because I spoke the 
same dialect, people seemed to see me as a native of the same district, enabling me to 
penetrate into more personal lives without arousing much suspicion. Meanwhile, as a 
native, I could fully use the personal connections (guanxi) to facilitate my study.
7                 
 
In fact, personal connections played an indispensable role in facilitating my fieldwork. 
One  of  my  relatives  is  a  government  official  of  my  hometown  Yantai  City.  At  my 
request,  he  introduced  me  to  an  official  of  Longkou  City,  which  is  one  of  the 
county-status cities under the jurisdiction of Yantai City. The leader of Longkou City 
then  introduced  me  to  the  Party  secretary  of  Xinjia  Township,  which  is  under  the 
jurisdiction of Longkou City. Thus, I was accepted by Xinjia Township, where I was 
able to carry out my fieldwork. During my stay in Xinjia Township, an office in the 
township government building was specially allocated to me. Being able to stay in the 
                                                        
7  Actually, in order to do solid investigation and collect reliable data, it is not uncommon for some China analysts to 
carry out fieldwork in places where they have personal connections. For example, see Yang (1994), Wang (2003: 12 
and13), Yan (1992: 2) and Yin (2004: 239).     23 
township government allowed me to contact and observe the township officials as an 
“insider” rather than an “outsider”, which could make the information collected much 
more reliable.   
 
After settling down, I started to consider which village to choose as my case. There are 
a  total  of  28  villages  under  the  jurisdiction  of  Xinjia  Township.  I  first  tried  to  get 
familiar with as many villages as possible by reading some official documents about 
each village. Then, I tried to get a direct impression of the village by visiting each one 
and interviewing the respective village cadres. Finally, I also discussed and consulted 
with township officials so as to gain more background or inside information about the 
individual villages. The process was by no means a simple one. The villages were very 
different  across  social,  political,  and  economic  dimensions.  But  among  the  different 
villages, I finally selected B village.     
 
B  village  is  located  in  the  middle  of  Xinjia  Township.  A  motorway  leading  to  the 
Longkou City centre just passes the main entrance of the village. It takes no more than 
15 minutes by bus to get the Xinjia Township government and around 25 minutes to 
arrive the Longkou City centre (town centre) from the village entrance. So the traffic is 
actually quite convenient for the villagers of B village and the mobility of the villagers 
is rather frequent. 
 
B village is an administrative village consisting of four villagers small groups (cunmin 
xiaozu). According to the figure for 2002, B village has a total of 316 households, 909 
villagers, among whom there are 700 eligible voters.
8  By 2002, B village has a total of 
820 mu
9  farmland, and it is 0.9 mu per villager by average. It is said that B village once 
had around 1,400 mu farmland (about 1.5 mu per villager) in the beginning of 1980s 
                                                        
8  This  figure  was  according  to  B  village’s  household  registration.  Namely,  only  the  people  whose  household 
registrion was in B village were legally considered villagers of B village. By 2002, there were about 40 people who 
resided in B village but had no B village household registration. These people included relatives of some villagers, 
outsidey workers employed by some villager entrepreneurs as well as some villagers who owned urban household 
resigstion but still resided in B village.                   
9  1 mu = 0.1647 acres = 0.0667 hectares.   24 
(Interviews 32 and 50). However, over the last 20 years, hundreds of mu have been 
either confiscated by the government for public construction (like road construction) 
and industrialization or turned to industrial use by the village collective. B village once 
had been one of only a few industrialized villages in Xinjia Township, with a strong 
collective economy. From the early 1980s until the middle of the 1990s, a number of 
village owned enterprises had been created and run by the village collective. However, 
all these collective-owned undertakings had eventually become bankrupt. During the 
late 1990s, all these collective-owned enterprises were either closed down or sold to 
private owners in line with the government’s privatization policy. By early 1999, shortly 
before the first direct VC election, B village’s last collective enterprise, a hennery, was 
privatized. Since then, the collective income of B village has been derived mainly from 
renting out collective land or property, which earns around 15,000 Chinese yuan
10  a 
year (Interviews 52 and 55). 
 
Although the village collective economy is stagnant, the average living standard of the 
villagers of B village actually is much better than that of most rural dwellers in the 
inland rural areas of China. The average annual net per capita income of B village in 
2004 is RMB 3,500, according to Xinjia government figures.
11  Most of the village’s 
young and middle-aged villagers have chosen to seek paid employment jobs outside the 
village, which makes a significant contribution to village per capita income. But unlike 
their counterparts in the inland rural areas, who have to migrate from their native places 
to find jobs in the developed eastern coastal areas, the overwhelming majority of young 
and middle-aged villagers in B village can easily find off-farm jobs within the area of 
their native township or city and therefore still reside in the village.   
 
Quite a few villagers also have their own private businesses, such as repairing vehicle 
tyres,  handy  shops,  restaurants,  henneries,  small  factories  and  so  on.  Income  from 
cultivating farmland is only a small share of most villagers’ total. Even in terms of 
                                                        
10  100 Chinese yuan is equal to approximately 6.67 pounds sterling by the exchange rate in 2004.     
11  Whereas the national average figure in 2004 is 2936. See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia tongjiju (National 
Statistics Bureau of the People's Republic of China) (2005).   25 
cultivating farmland, many villagers in B village nowadays prefer to grow commercial 
crops, such as ginger, leeks and garlic, rather than corn or grain. Thanks to a big food 
processing factory invested in and established by a South Korean company in Xinjia 
Township,  villagers  can  sell  their  crops  directly  to  it  at  a  good  price.  Thus,  the 
comparatively higher incomes of B village residents is largely due to its location in the 
eastern  coastal  area  of  China  where  the  economy  development  and  industrialization 
have been undergoing rapid development since reform (Jing 2006). 
 
B village is a single lineage village. The overwhelming majority of the households (over 
95 percent households) belong to one big lineage with the surname Qu. It is said that 
during Qing dynasty one family moved to B village and settled down and this is the 
source of the Qu lineage today.  But the whole  Qu lineage is subdivided into seven 
lineage branches (interviews 47 and 50). So, although all the Qu families of B village 
can  be  traced  back  to  the  same  ancestry,  they  nowadays  belong  to  seven  different 
lineage  branches.  Unlike  many  villages  in  other  Chinese  rural  areas,  particularly  in 
southern  China,  where  lineage  organizations  have  played  an  active  role  in  village 
politics (e.g. see Tsai 2002), in B village lineage-based organizations are absent today. 
Although  it  is  said  that  the  Qu’s  lineage  temple  and  lineage  activities  existed  in  B 
village’s history, after the takeover of the communists all these were banned. During the 
Cultural Revolution, the Qu’s lineage temple was pulled down. Since then, no effort has 
ever been made to revive the lineage institutions in B village. Today, only a few older 
villagers remember the Qu’s lineage organizations and activities before 1949. 
 
B village was finally chosen as my case for three reasons. First, VC elections in B 
village had apparently been highly competitive. By the time of my first fieldwork in 
March 2004, two rounds of direct VC elections had been held in B village. Both rounds 
had been competitive in the sense that they had resulted in a change of leadership. In the 
1999 election, the incumbent VC cadres (old factions) were ousted by the challengers 
(new factions); However, in the 2002 election, the candidates of the “old faction” won 
back office and supplanted the “new faction” (B village’s elections based on factional   26 
contests will be discussed in Chapter 4). The competitiveness of elections makes the 
case of B village much more interesting than others and perhaps made it a more likely 
example of democratic elections. Quite a few villages in Xinjia Township had barely 
changed VC leaders from elections because, for example of the dominant role of big 
clans, no strong opposition challenging the incumbent or lack of willing candidates. 
Unlike those villages, the politics in B village had seemed to be dynamic and attractive, 
which greatly aroused my curiosity.             
 
Second, B village had developed an industrialized collective economy during 1980 and 
1990s. But that collective economy had collapsed and privatized economy developed 
just at the time of the implementation of direct VC election. The relationship between 
economic development and VC elections and governance has been a controversial topic. 
B village would provide a good field for the analysis of this problem.   
 
Finally, B village is more information-accessible to me. To base my research on a single 
case, information accessibility is of great importance. The township government official 
responsible  for  B  village  (the  “village  guarantee  cadre”,  see  Chapter  7)  is  an 
experienced official who has worked in Xinjia township for more than twenty years. He 
is also a very nice and accessible person, who was willing to help me with my research. 
Also, the cadres of B village during my first trip were all easily accessible.
12  What is 
more, since there have been two “factions” running for power in this village, I found 
that each faction was eager to defend itself while attacking the other. Compared to many 
other villages that are in a style of the ruling village elites vs. the silent masses, this 
village would be a better field for me to collect, judge and compare data.         
 
Sources of the study 
The sources of this study come from three parts: field visits and in-depth interviews, 
non-participant observations and official documents and published materials.   
                                                        
12  In quite a few villages, those village cadres also run their own businesses or act as the managers of the village 
collective enterprises. I found that those cadres were usually too busy to be bothered. However, none of the cadres of 
B village at that time had had such burdens. So they had been more free to talk to me or help me.         27 
 
Field visits and in-depth interviews   
A total of three field visits were made for this research project (1 March to 7 May 2004, 
12 November 2004 to 10 January 2005, and 8 November to 17 November 2005). During 
my  three  research  trips,  I  conducted  qualitative  interviews  with  more  than  fifty 
interviewees. The interviewees include ordinary villagers, village cadres, village elites 
and government officials. In addition, in the course of my writing up this thesis, I had 
also conducted a number of follow up interviews by telephone.   
 
The interviews with government officials were made through personal contact by me. 
The interviews with those incumbent or former village cadres were arranged by the 
Xinjia Township officials. Some average villager interviewees were introduced by the 
village cadres. And the rest villager interviewees were randomly chosen according to 
the village household registration and then I approached them with the introduction of 
the  village  cadres.  All  interviews  were  conducted  confidentially  by  me  alone.  I 
explained to all the interviewees that the interviews were for academic purpose and they 
were also given the option of anonymity and confidentiality.     
     
Non-participant observations   
During my first research trip (18 March to 7 May 2004), I was able to observe (as a 
researcher) the administrative activities in B village, such as the VC meetings, villagers’ 
representative meetings, Party members meetings and activities of villagers’ financing 
small team (VFST). During my second trip (12 November 2004 to 10 January 2005), I 
observed the 8
th session of VC elections in Xinjia Township. I observed a total of 15 VC 
elections including B village.
13  I also participated the election preparation meeting of 
Xinjia Township, the election of villagers’ representatives in B village and the villagers’ 
representatives’ meeting for electing villagers’ financing small team of B village.  In 
addition, I attended the handing over and taking over procedure between the step-down 
                                                        
13  There are a total of 28 villages under the jurisdiction of Xinjia Township. I could not observe all 28 elections 
personally because in a few cases two electoral meetings were hold simultaneously in two villages.       28 
and newly elected VCs.     
 
Official documents and published materials   
During my fieldwork I systematically collected official documents, especially from the 
village  committee,  township  and  county  governments.  These  documents  include  the 
government circulars, local policies and regulations, official speeches, various meeting 
records and so on. A significant portion of these is “internal documents” (neibu wenjian), 
i.e. materials which are restricted to the administration only. Meanwhile, the relevant 
published materials, such as newspapers, magazines, books, were used extensively as 
well.   
 
Structure of the thesis   
 
The rest of the thesis will be divided into seven Chapters.   
 
Chapter 2 starts with a detailed introduction of the historical and institutional context for 
village elections and governance in rural China. Both the national and local institutions 
concerned  are  discussed.  Special  attention  is  paid  to  the  changes  after  the 
implementation of direct VC elections in 1999. This serves for setting a historical and 
institutional background for the further detailed inquiry of the case village.   
 
Chapters  3,  4  and  5  explore  VC  elections  in  B  village  by  analyzing  three  different 
political  actors  respectively,  namely,  the  voters/villagers  (Chapter  3),  the 
candidates/village  elites  (Chapter 4), and the local state officials (Chapter 5). These 
three chapters attempt to reveal how different actors behave and why they choose such 
strategies  in  the  course  of  direct  VC  elections.  Chapter  3  deals  with  the  ordinary 
villagers/voters. It argues that, rather than having a strong empowering effects, direct 
VC elections have far from changed the fact that ordinary villagers today remain in the 
position of client, who are dependent and therefore subject to the influence of a few   29 
patrons in their village community. With the coming of elections, the villagers’ votes are 
actually largely captured by their patrons through the clientelist networks. Despite the 
“free  and  fair”  elections,  villagers  are  virtually  locked-in  voters  in  their  village 
community. Chapter 4 mainly focuses on the strategies of the candidates for winning the 
VC elections. It reveals that that, as patrons and middlemen, the village candidates/elites 
capture votes largely by taking advantage of their patronage resources and clientelist 
network.  During  an  election,  candidates  reach  villagers/clients  to  claim  their  votes 
mainly on the basis of past, current or future particularistic benefits or favours rather 
than certain common concerned issues. In order to facilitate vote soliciting, opposing 
factions formed and consequently village election is largely the factional contest based 
on factional/clientelist networks. Chapter 5 elaborates the role of local state officials in 
village elections by concentrating on their strategies to influence or even manipulate the 
electoral results. It shows that as the policy implementer, the local state officials have 
skillfully  developed  some  strategies,  particularly  the  clientelist  strategy,  to  strongly 
influence the electoral results for their advantages on the one hand but without violating 
the “letter” of the law on the other. These three chapters as a whole attempt to explain 
why and how “free and fair” VC elections have been largely subject to the clientelist 
control in reality.   
 
Chapters 6 and 7 deal with post election governance in the village community. It aims to 
find out whether after direct VC elections the mechanism of “grassroots democracy” has 
actually  worked  in  the  village.  Chapter  6  examines  how  the  specially  designed 
“democratic” institutions actually work in reality. It reveals that “grassroots democracy” 
has  been  far  from  functioning  properly.  The  “democratic  rules  and  institutions”  are 
either not implemented at all or are overwhelmed by factional/clientelist considerations. 
Rather than bringing harmony or legitimacy, “grassroots democracy” risks triggering 
conflicts within the village community. Chapter 7 discusses the local state’s efforts and 
strategy  to  handle  “grassroots  democracy”  and  maintain  its  control  over  village 
governance. It argues that local state officials’ direct, administrative and, more and more 
indirect, clientelist control has supplanted the “grassroots democracy”.   30 
 
The thesis concludes with Chapter 8, which further clarifies the clientelist nature of 
village politics today. It ends with an evaluation of village politics and a discussion of 
the prospect for China’s rural political future. 
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2  The  social  and  system  background  of  villagers’             
self-governance 
 
 
 
The system of villagers’ self-governance in rural China has been in place for nearly 
three decades since a few Guangxi villages decided to elect their own village leaders in 
late 1980 and early 1981. What began as a stopgap effort to fill a political vacuum with 
the  dismantling  of  the  commune  system  has  developed  into  one  of  China’s  most 
talked-about political reforms. This chapter aims to provide a general background to this 
system, particularly in terms of the formal institutions, so as to facilitate analysis in the 
subsequent chapters on how and why those formal “democratic” institutions have been 
largely subverted by clientelism in B village.       
 
The discussion will start by reviewing the origin of villagers’ self-governance in rural 
China  in  the  early  1980s.  Then  I  will  describe  the  national  legislation  (provisional 
Organic Law) and local regulations for villagers’ self-governance before 1998. Finally, I 
will discuss the revised Organic Law and the related local regulations issued after it was 
enforced in 1998.               
 
The origin of villagers’ self-governance 
 
The dismantling of the people’s commune system   
Villagers’  self-governance  germinated  and  developed  on  the  ruins  of  the  people’s 
commune system. Since the end of the 1950s, with gradual collectivization, the people’s 
commune system was established throughout China. The structure of the commune was 
such  that  households  were  organized  into  production  teams  (shengchan  dui),  then 
production  teams  formed  production  brigades  (shengchan  dadui),  and  production 
brigades formed the commune.     32 
 
Under the commune system, the commune controlled all resources and the peasants 
were tied tightly within it. Peasants had to take part in unified, collective production 
activities and distribution. With the household registration system carried out from 1958 
the whole population was divided into two parts, namely urban households (chengshi 
hukou)  and  rural  ones  (nongye  hukou).  Without  the  approval  of  the  commune 
organization, peasants had no way to leave this organization. The peasantry was highly 
organized  through  the  commune,  the  Party  organization  and  the  other  organizations 
subject to the party-state. Through this system, the state realized its totalitarian control 
of the peasants and was able to extract the maximum surplus from the countryside (See 
Chen and Ridley 1969; Ling 1997; Shen 2003b; Shen 2004; Zhang 1998; See Zweig 
1989).   
 
However, its function completely depended on state coercion, which led to extremely 
inefficient agricultural production and popular pauperization (Song 2002: 20-21; Xiao 
2002a).  With  the  death  of  Mao  Zedong,  the  new  Chinese  Communist  Party  (CCP) 
leaders were determined to reform.   
 
The emergence of Villagers’ Committees (VCs) 
VCs emerged with the collapse of the commune system. Since 1980, confirmed by the 
third plenary session of the eleventh Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, the 
household  contract  system  was  established  and  spread  throughout  rural  China. 
Decollectivization freed peasants from the tight control of the commune (brigade) while 
bestowing upon them the right to take the initiative regarding decisions concerned with 
production. Indiviual households became the accounting units, replacing the production 
teams  set  up  under  the  commune  system.  As  a  result,  peasants,  with  their  newly 
bestowed autonomy over production, were much more willing to produce, and the rural 
economy grew quickly. However, with the dismantling of the commune system and the 
retreat of the state from village communities, a serious “political vacuum” (Hu 2001: 18) 
appeared in the countryside. On the one hand, the dismantling of the commune system   33 
had left village (brigade) cadres with unclear authority and limited resources; on the 
other hand, in many villages, since previous village cadres were able to take advantage 
of the new economic opportunities afforded by decollectivization, they were inclined to 
leave  their  positions  of  leadership  and  focus  on  their  own  family  production. 
Consequently,  some  public  services,  such  as  social  security,  public  facilities, 
community welfare, and irrigation infrastructure were neglected and rural China was in 
a state of potential crisis (Chen 2000: 34-37; Song 2002: 21-23; Xiao 2002a: 35-36). 
 
In order to fill the political vacuum formed by the retreat of state power, in some places 
peasants established village level management organizations by themselves. The earliest 
villagers’  committees  (VCs)  emerged  in  Yishan  and  Luocheng  counties,  Guangxi 
Province, in late 1980. Take, for instance, the example of the first VC to be established 
in China, Guozuo VC of Yishan County. After the implementation of the household 
contract system, the production brigade stopped functioning and the brigade leaders lost 
their authority to lead. Meanwhile, unlawful behaviour such as theft became rampant in 
the village and public facilities such as irrigating aqueducts and village lanes were in a 
poor condition. As a result, it became urgent to find someone who could stand out and 
organize the scattered peasants and take charge of public affairs. In February 1980, a 
former production team leader suggested establishing an organization to manage village 
public affairs, which was subsequently named the villagers’ committee (VC). In order to 
gain enough authority, the sponsors called for a household representative meeting of the 
whole village, producing the VC members by anonymous voting. Then the VC worked 
out the regulations and rules for villagers (cungui minyue) and started to manage village 
public  affairs.  With  the  establishment  of  the  VC,  village  order  resumed  and  public 
affairs were carried out effectively (Chen 2000: 34-37; Song 2002: 22). 
 
Guozuo village set an example for other places. With the recommendation of local Party 
leaders, VCs were established throughout the region (Chen 2000: 36). At the same time, 
similar organizations were created in the rural areas in provinces including Shandong, 
Sichuan,  and  Henan.  The  names  of  these  village  organizations  were  not  uniform,   34 
although they were usually called “leadership group for village public security” (cun 
zhi’an lingdao xiaozu) or “village management committee” (cun guan hui). Initially, the 
function  of  those  organizations  was  keeping  social  order  and  maintaining  irrigation 
facilities.  Later,  these  functions  gradually  extended  to  the  self-governance  of  rural 
grassroots social, political and economic affairs (O'Brien and Li 2000). 
 
Peng Zhen’s pushing and the Constitutional confirmation of VCs 
The popularization of VCs received great attention from the CCP senior leader Peng 
Zhen,  who  was  then  vice-chairman  of  the  National  People’s  Congress  Standing 
Committee (NPCSC) and secretary of the CCP Central Politics and Law Committee. He 
believed that VCs were the creation of the masses and represented grassroots democracy 
in practice. He immediately instructed the NPCSC and Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA) 
to investigate carefully in order that it might be spread throughout the country (Song 
2002: 22). 
 
Why was Peng  Zhen so enthusiastic about the creation of VCs in rural China? His 
“singular enthusiasm for grassroots elections and villagers’ committees can be traced to 
the  era  before  the  foundation  of  the  PRC,  when  the  communists  had  organized 
grassroots elections of various forms affording peasants the right to choose their cadres 
in the rural areas under their control” (O'Brien and Li 2000: 467-469). Peng, as major 
leader, at that time had clearly expressed his support for such institutions. After the PRC 
was founded, Peng continued to show interest in grassroots mass organizations and it is 
said that his later experience as one of the first victims of high level officials in the 
Cultural  Revolution  particularly  reinforced  his  commitment  to  gradually  build  up 
“socialist  democracy”  in  China.  In  relation  to  the  VCs,  he  said  that  through  the 
construction of VCs Chinese peasants would be able to get “democratic training”, and 
after they became qualified in managing their own villages, they might then move on to 
govern townships and counties (Cai 1989; O'Brien and Li 2000: 40).     
   35 
Mainly because of Peng’s support (Bai 1995: 284-285), the central government gave its 
endorsement to VCs in the 1982 Constitution, which stated that “VCs are the mass 
self-governance  organizations  of  grassroots  countryside;  the  Chairpersons  and 
Vice-Chairpersons of VCs are elected by the villagers” (Article 111). According to this 
article, all village level management organizations were given a uniform name, VC, and 
it also confirmed that VCs’ status should be “self-governance organizations” at the rural 
grassroots level.   
 
In  October  1983,  the  CCP  Central  Committee  and  the  State  Council  issued  “The 
notification on carrying out separation of government and commune and establishing 
township government” (guanyu shixing zhengshe fenkai jianli xiang zhengfu de tongzhi), 
declaring the end of the commune system and paving the way for establishing VCs 
throughout the country (Song 2002: 22). By February 1985, the task of establishing VCs 
in the whole country had basically been completed, with the number of VCs totaling 
948,629  (Wang  and  Tang  1994:  1).  By  estimation,  97  percent  of  VCs  were  just 
established by the scope of former production brigades. Among them, 47 percent of 
VCs  were  formed  on  one  natural  village;  51  percent  were  based  on  several  natural 
villages; and 2 percent were formed by the division of large natural villages (Liu 1994: 
54). 
 
The transition proceeded so smoothly because, at that stage, it was “little more than a 
change in name” (O'Brien and Li 2000: 472): the communes were simply replaced by 
township governments; brigades were converted into villages and production teams into 
village small groups (See table 1.1). And the constitutional provision for “electing” VC 
members had not been  put into effect in subsequent  years. Most of the VC leaders 
throughout the country were still appointed as were during the commune era rather than 
being democratically elected (Ibid.). 
 
Table 1.1 Commune organization and post-commune division   36 
Commune Organization  Post-Commune Divisions 
County  County 
Commune    Township   
Production brigade    Village 
Production team  Villagers’ small group 
Households    Households   
 
The  legislation  for  village  self-governance:  the  provisional  Organic 
Law and relevant local regulations before 1998 
 
A controversial legislative start, 1984-1987 
Though Article 111 of the 1982 PRC Constitution confirmed the legal status of VCs, 
from the very start the legislation on VCs has been a source of great controversy. The 
process  of  more  fully  legislating  of  VCs  started  since  1984,  when  VCs  had  been 
established around most of the country. The Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA), which is 
the ministry in charge of villagers’ self-governance, dutifully drafted the law on VCs. 
However, there were divergent views on how to draft the law. The legislation on VCs 
had stimulated the “hottest debate in the legislation history of the PRC” (Shen 2004: 
part 2).   
 
The debates were mainly focused around the following issues. First, was the timing 
“ripe” for applying democratic self-governance to backward rural areas? Second, should 
the relationship between townships and VCs be one of leadership or guidance? To what 
degree  should  the  VCs’  autonomy  be  allowed?  Would  village  autonomy  hurt  the 
enforcement of state policy? Third, what kind of electoral approach should be applied to 
produce VC leaders? Fourth, what kind of relationship should there be between the VC 
and village party branch (VPB) (Kelliher 1997; O'Brien and Li 2000: 470-475)? 
   37 
Due to the great controversy, the Bill had been amended repeatedly before it was finally 
presented to the fifth session of the sixth National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 
1987. When discussing the Bill, Peng Zhen had to make a long and enthusiastic speech 
to persuade the NPC members to support the passing of the Bill (Chen 2000: 63). Peng 
argued that “grassroots democracy” in rural China was a matter of “life or death” for the 
Party.  He  acknowledged  that  self-governance  might  “make  rural  cadres’  life  a  little 
harder”,  (that  is,  it  might  complicate  policy  implementation  in  the  short  term),  but 
insisted  that  it  would  not  “produce  chaos”  because  “the  masses  accept  what  is 
reasonable” (O'Brien 1994: 474). Despite Peng’s impassioned efforts, opposition voices 
were still strong. For example, delegates of Fujian Province held that social conditions 
were not ripe to put the law into practice immediately; delegates of Shandong Province 
suggest putting off the approval of the law; delegates of Guizhou Province proposed 
making the VCs a level of governmental authority since if the VCs were stipulated as 
autonomous organizations the township governments’ management job would be very 
difficult  and  state  interests  would  be  very  hard  to  guarantee.  Most  opponents 
recommended that the draft be revised; some even went so far as to advise that the 
Constitution should be amended so that VCs were converted into government organs 
whose  leaders  were  appointed  by  the  government  (Bai  1995:  282-309).  With  time 
running out, the NPC presidium thought it was improper to force through the draft law 
and instead recommended approval of it “in principle” and authorized the NPCSC to 
make further revisions before promulgating it. NPC deputies accepted this advice. Eight 
months  later,  in  November  1987,  after  further  opinion  soliciting  and  debates,  the 
Organic Law (provisional) was passed and came into force on 1 June 1988 (O'Brien and 
Li 2000: 475). It should be noted that because the Organic Law was passed with only 
“provisional” status, this opened a backdoor for some places where the conditions had 
not been “ripe” to not implement it. 
 
The provisional Organic Law (See appendix 2) has a total of only 21 articles, which 
stipulate such things as VCs’ nature, status, functions and power, organization settings, 
electoral  principles,  office  tenure  and  working  regulations,  as  well  as  the  need  for   38 
villagers’ meetings. The law finally realized Peng’s intention, defining VCs as villagers’ 
self-governance organizations. The key spirit of the law is: the relationship between the 
township government and the VC is not that of leading and being led, rather, the former 
gives guidance, assistance and help to the latter’s work; VC cadres are directly elected 
by villagers and take their duties on a part-time basis without being released from their 
own production work. To the supporters of the villagers’ self-governance policy, the 
approval of the provisional Organic Law marked an “historic stage for the legalized 
operation of villagers’ self-governance” (Chen 2000: 65). 
 
Irresolution and implementation of the provisional Organic Law at the central level: 
1988-1998 
The provisional Organic Law was in place for a full decade before the formal revised 
version was finally passed in 1998. Although the ten-year trial was considered to be a 
period  of  “establishing  and  perfecting”  laws  and  regulations  for  villagers’ 
self-governance (Song 2002: 29-31), doubt and resistance coming from both the central 
and local officials had persisted.     
 
After  the  suppression  of  the  1989  protest  movement,  views  on  villagers’ 
self-governance diverged more severely at the central level. Some opponents reiterated 
that the provisional Organic Law had been divorced from rural China’s reality and it 
was  “far  ahead  of  its  time”.  Some  even  labeled  the  Law  “bourgeois  libertarianism” 
condoned by purged Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang (Tang 1992: 44). Opponents 
demanded that the Law be revoked (Bai 2000). To determine whether the Law should 
essentially be scrapped, the NPC, the Central Organization Department, the MoCA and 
the  Ministry  of  Personnel  dispatched  a  team  of  investigators  to  report  on  the 
performance  of  village  level  organizations.  However,  the  team  could  not  reach  a 
consensus. Only a small minority favoured continuing implementing the Law, while the 
majority suggested that VCs be replaced by government administrative offices (Li 1994: 
69-72).   
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At this crucial juncture, Peng Zhen, who was nearly 90 years and retired, once again 
exerted his influence and strong political prestige as a Party senior to defend the Law, 
on which he had placed so much effort. He privately summoned the minister of MoCA 
and pressed him to take a firm stand on villagers’ self-governance policy (Bai 1995: 
223-224;  Li  1994:  72).  It  is  also  reported  that  Peng  even  summoned  (unnamed) 
opponents in private, complaining about their foot-dragging on the implementation of 
villagers’ self-governance (Shi 1999b: n.37; White 1992: 277). 
 
Another  crucial  reason  for  the  survival  of  villagers’  self-governance  was  the 
intervention and support coming from a second Party elder, Bo Yibo, who was a close 
ally of Deng Xiaoping and one of a few most influential Party seniors. After reading a 
MoCA report praising villagers’ self-governance, Bo gave his backing to this policy, 
which  proved  to  be  “decisive”  for  its  survival  (O'Brien  and  Li  2000:  477;  also  see 
Thurston 1998: 11-12; Wang 1998: 244).       
 
Largely  due  to  Peng’s  insistency  and  Bo’s  support,  the  responsible  CCP  Politburo 
Standing Committee member Song Ping finally ended all the indecision. He instructed, 
at a conference for nationwide village-level organization construction in August 1990, 
that the Law be implemented rather than debated (Li 1994: 73). The central government 
stopped  the  debate  by  issuing  Central  Committee  Document  No.  19  (1990),  which 
decreed that each of China’s counties should establish “demonstration villages” (shifan 
cun) for villagers’ self-governance in areas that had “good working conditions” (O'Brien 
and Li 2000: 478). Only weeks after the endorsement of the Centre, the MoCA issued a 
document (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzhengbu 1990), calling for establishing not 
only demonstration villages but also demonstration townships and counties nationwide. 
 
In 1994, MoCA issued another document, systematically stipulating the aim, tasks and 
measures for the demonstration activity. For the first time, it raised “four democratics” 
of village self-governance, which are democratic elections, democratic decision-making, 
democratic  management  and  democratic  supervision  (Zhonghua  renmin  gongheguo   40 
minzhengbu  1994).  This  document  considerably  accelerated  the  implementation  of 
villagers’ self-governance. After the issue of this document, 63 demonstration counties, 
3,917 demonstration townships and 82,266 demonstration villages were established all 
over  the  country  by  the  end  of  1995.  It  is  said  that,  with  the  influence  of  these 
demonstration units, “the villagers’ self-governance has kept developing and relevant 
democratic procedures have further improved in the countryside” (Song 2002: 31). 
 
Local  regulations  for  implementing  the  provisional  Organic  Law  and  villagers’ 
self-governance: 1988-1998   
Responding to the Centre’s decision to implement the provisional Organic Law, local 
governments also gradually issued their corresponding regulations and rules in relation 
to the implementation of the provisional Law. From 1988 to 1995, 24 provincial level 
governments had issued their implementing measures for the provisional Organic Law. 
And by 1997, the overwhelming majority of provincial governments had issued their 
rules and regulations for implementing villages’ self-governance (Chen 2000: 65-66). 
Following the issuing of provincial level regulations for the provisional Organic Law, 
many lower level governments (municipal, county and township) had also worked out a 
number of detailed rules and regulations for implementing villagers’ self-governance in 
their locales. It has been said that during that period a “legalized and institutionalized” 
system for villagers’ self-governance was created from the Centre to each level of local 
government (Ibid.: 66-67).                   
 
However, the timing of local regulations and implementing the provisional Organic Law 
varied significantly in different places. For example, shortly after the provisional Law 
took  effect  in  1988,  Fujian  and  Zhejiang  provinces  swiftly  passed  “Measures  for 
implementing the Organic Law (Provisional)” in their own provinces. At the same time, 
provinces including Yunnan, Guangdong, Hainan and Guangxi did not carry out the 
system of villagers’ government nor make any corresponding local regulations until the 
revised Organic Law took effect in 1998 (Yu 2002: 186-191). To serve the purpose of 
this thesis, I will only focus on local regulations and rules applicable where B village is   41 
located.   
 
Four years after the provisional Organic Law took effect, on 10 May 1992, the Standing 
Committee  of  the  People’s  Congress  of  Shandong  Province  passed  Measures  for 
Shandong  Province  Implementing  “PRC  VC  Organic  Law  (Provisional)” 
(Shandongsheng  shishi  “zhonghua  renmin  gongheguo  cunmin  weiyuanhui  zuzhifa 
(shixing)” banfa) (hereafter the 1992 Measures), setting out supposedly detailed rules 
and regulations for implementing the provisional Organic Law.   
 
On VC elections 
The 1992 Measures have only a total of 15 articles on VC elections, which at best set 
out some basic principles and regulations. They generally provide regulations on four 
major  issues:  election  management,  voter  registration,  candidate  nomination,  and 
electoral meetings. First, the management and organization work of VC elections is 
undertaken  by  the  Village  Election  Committee  (VEC)  “under  the  guidance  of 
township/town government” (Article 26). VEC is composed of 3-5 persons who are 
selected by villagers’ meeting (Article 26). Second, voters must register before the VC 
election  and  the  electoral  roll,  the  date  and  venue  of  elections  must  be  publicized 
(Article 26). Third, VC candidates are recommended by each villagers’ small group
14. 
The number of VC candidates should be one third to double more than the number of 
available VC positions. VECs should publicize formal candidate list five days before the 
election day. The order of candidate names appearing on the list is sorted according to 
the number of character strokes in their names (Article 28). Finally, electoral meetings 
should be held to elect VC cadres. Electoral meetings are presided by VECs and the 
electoral  meeting  is  not  legal  unless  more  than  two  thirds  of  eligible  voters  attend 
(Article 29). A voter who can not attend the electoral meeting may, with the consent of 
the VEC, entrust another voter in writing to vote on behalf of him/her (Article 31). 
Roving ballot boxes are allowed to use for those old, weak, sick and disabled voters 
                                                        
14  Villagers’ small groups (cunmin xiaozu) are derived from former production team. A village comprises several 
groups, each is made up of about 30-50 households and 150-200 villagers.       42 
who can not walk to the electoral meetings (Article 31). Candidates must win more than 
half the votes cast by voters to get elected. If there are more candidates winning more 
than half the votes than VC posts, the one who gets more votes wins (Article 33). 
 
Due to the looseness and vagueness of the 1992 Measures and, more importantly, due to 
the doubt and resistance of local officials, VC elections and the 1992 Measures were 
carried out in name only in most places of Shandong before 1998 (Xiao 2002b: 63). For 
example,  a  1989  survey  in  Shandong  Province  revealed  that  over  60  per  cent  of 
township leaders disapproved of villagers’ self-governance (Yang and Sun 1989: 113). 
Some county leaders in Shandong even claimed that they had the authority to decide if 
their  counties  were  ready  for  VC  elections  (O'Brien  and  Li  2000:  479).  As  far  as 
Longkou City (county status) and Xinjia Township are concerned, VC elections were 
not  seriously  implemented  at  all  before  1998,  just  as  elsewhere  in  the  province 
(Interviews 1 and 33). I was unable to find a single government document in Xinjia 
Township on implementing VC elections before 1998. 
 
In Xinjia Township, VC candidates were usually nominated by the village party branch 
(VPB) (the role of VPB will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6) with the permission of 
the township government, or directly handpicked by the township government. Rather 
than holding an electoral meeting, if an election was organized, only roving ballot boxes 
were used. Usually the incumbent village cadres appointed two election workers from 
each villagers’ small group to carry a roving ballot box and ballots to each household of 
their  village  small  group  in  order  to  let  villagers  vote.  The  election  workers  would 
instruct villagers whom to vote for and after the voting finished, all roving ballot boxes 
were sent to the VC/VPB office and votes were counted by village cadres and election 
workers in private (Interviews 1 and 33).
15  To a large degree, this was nothing but a 
mere formality. VC candidates, or to be precise VC cadres, had actually been decided 
before the election.
16  As a former VC cadre of B village told me: 
                                                        
15  Roving ballot boxes were also widely applies in other provinces. See Pastor and Tan (2000: 498). 
16  For local officials’ tactics of rigging VC elections elsewhere before 1998, see Ma (1994: 19-20) and Fan (1998: 
14-15).   43 
 
Before  (direct  elections),  elections  in  our  village  were  just  a  formality.  The  VPB 
secretary usually recommended the VC candidates to the township government before 
the election. If the township government approved them, this usually meant that the VC 
cadres had been decided. On election day, the village cadres would arrange a few of their 
trustworthy  persons,  coming  to  villager’s  house  with  roving  ballot  box  and  ballots. 
Those persons holding ballot boxes of course knew who were the ‘right’ candidates on 
the ballot. They would indicate villagers whom to vote for. Villagers knew it was a mere 
formality and they were not serious about it at all. Some villagers simply asked those 
persons to write for them. In the end, the ballots were just counted by village cadres 
privately in their office. In some other villages, I heard that village cadres even ignored 
the formality by filling all the votes by themselves (Interview 47). 
 
On village self-governance 
Regarding village self-governance, the 1992 Measures set out some basic regulations on 
duties  and  functions  of  village  general  meetings  (VGMs),  villagers’  representative 
assemblies  (VRAs)  and  VCs.  The  VGM  is  supposed  to  be  the  supreme  power 
organization of village self-governance. According to the 1992 Measures, a VGM is 
formed by villagers over 18 years of age or by household representatives. According to 
it (Article 6), VGMs have the following powers:   
 
·to scrutinize and approve the social and economic development strategy and annual 
plan of the village; 
·to elect and recall VC cadres;   
·to discuss and approve rules and regulations in the village;   
·to hear and examine the VC annual work report;     
·to discuss and approve the extraction and usage plans of village collective fees; 
·to discuss and decide the division and adjustment of farmland;   
·to change or revoke the improper decisions made by the VC;   
·to scrutinize village financial affairs;   44 
·to discuss the allocation and usage of housing plots;   
·to discuss and approve other issues relating to the interests of villagers. 
 
According to the 1992 Measures (Article 7), the VRA is a “supplementary form” of 
VGM in villages where the population is too big to convene a VGM. VRA members are 
recommended  and  elected  by  each  villagers’  small  group  on  the  basis  of  one 
representative in 10-15 households and the VRA assumes some of the power that the 
VGM has (item 5-10 of the above mentioned power of VGM).   
 
An  elected  VC,  according  to  the  1992  Measures,  has  the  duties  of  carrying  out 
self-governance issues such as managing collective property, dealing with public affairs, 
providing village welfare, organizing various cultural or spiritual activities for villagers, 
mediating  people’s  disputes,  and  reflecting  villagers’  opinions  and  demands  to  the 
government  (Article  13).  Although  a  VC  is  required  to  “assist”  the  township 
government in carrying out state policies, such as family planning, tax collecting, and 
conscription, according to the 1992 Measures (and the provisional Organic Law as well) 
it  is  responsible  and  must  report  to  the  VGM  (Article  13).  A  VC  must  carry  out 
decisions  made  by  the  VGM.  Village  spending  on  village  public  affairs,  villagers’ 
welfare as well as VC members’ pay must also be discussed and decided by the VGM 
(Article 16 and 17).                                       
 
Just as with VC elections, the 1992 Measures’ regulation on villagers’ self-governance 
had also merely stayed on paper and been simply ignored by subordinate county and 
township  governments  like  Longkou  county  and  Xinjia  Township.  I  found  no 
government  documents  or  circulars  issued  by  Longkou  or  Xinjia  governments  on 
convening  VGMs,  establishing  VRAs,  or  implementing  village  self-governance 
regulations set by the 1992 Measures before 1998. Interviews with both Xinjia officials 
and villagers also proved that rules and regulations relating to villagers’ self-governance 
had not been given attention before 1998 (Interviews 1, 3, 31 and 47). Actually, before 
1998,  except  in  a  few  demonstration  villages,  implementation  of  villagers’   45 
self-governance had been ignored in the overwhelming majority of villages throughout 
the country. As O’Brien (1994: 49) points out, since the provisional Law was vaguely 
phrased and the implementing regulations at the provincial and lower levels were still 
incomplete, local officials had no incentive to implement and so chose to ignore them. 
What happened in Xinjia Township during that period largely fits O’Brien’s description. 
 
Before  1998,  village  governance  in  Xinjia  Township  had  been  centred  around  and 
dominated  by  the  VPB,  which  was  appointed  by  and  directly  responsible  to  the 
township  government.  The  VC  was  by  and  large  treated  as  a  tool  and  immediate 
subordinate of the VPB, whose duty was to carry out orders from the township. Actually, 
the VPB and VC were commonly considered as one leadership group with two different 
names (Alpermann 2001: 46). The VC chair was usually appointed as the deputy VPB 
secretary and it was also common that other VC members concurrently served as VPB 
members. In terms of village governance, it is the VPB, rather than the VC, that is the 
governing  and  decision-making  body  in  a  village.  All  major  decisions  concerning 
village affairs have to be approved by the VPB before formal adoption by the VC. The 
power  of  the  VPB,  however,  was  concentrated  in  the  VPB  secretary,  who  was 
undoubtedly  the  most  powerful  village  cadre  (first  hand).  The  VPB  secretary  was 
appointed  by  and  responsible  to  the  township  government  (Zhong  2003:  163  and 
interview 5). Under this system, VPB/VC cadres were simply treated as implementing 
arms of the local state. Village affairs were often indistinguishable from township tasks. 
In  many  respects,  such  a  top-down  system  had  not  been  much  different  from  the 
commune  era  (O'Brien  1994:  54).  The  situation  of  B  village  before  1998  was  no 
exception. The VC and VPB were merged as one integrated village leading team headed 
by the VPB secretary Qu Sixiang. All village cadres were directly appointed by and 
responsible to the Xinjia Township government/Party Committee. Although, according 
to the provisional Organic Law and the 1992 Measures, the VGM or VRA was supposed 
to play a crucial role in the so-called village self-governance, in practice they did not 
exist except on paper.   
   46 
The revised Organic Law and relevant local regulations after 1998   
 
The revised Organic Law 
The efforts to work out a revised and formal Organic Law started from 1994 (Chen 
2000: 71). It is said that from 1994 to 1998, the MoCA, the State Council and the 
NPCSC carried out quite a lot “in-depth” and “careful” surveys and held many hearings 
on the nationwide practice of village self-governance. It was claimed that many people 
who were interested in it, from government officials and scholars to ordinary peasants, 
“involved  enthusiastically”  in  the  process  of  making  the  revised  Organic  Law  (Fan 
1998c). However, in the revision process, opponents’ of village self-governance still 
made  their  voices  heard.  Although  in  a  “minority”,  some  NPCSC  members,  when 
debating the revised Organic Law, still insisted that the nature of the VC should be a 
grassroots  administrative  organization  rather  than  a  mass  autonomous  organization. 
Opponents also suggested that township governments should “lead” rather “guide” VCs 
because VCs must implement state policies (Fan 1998b).       
 
This time, proponents of village self-governance managed to win support from the top 
leaders again. One of the successful tactics employed by proponents was, as Kelliher 
(1997: 77) puts it, trying to “use village self-governance to manipulate foreign opinion, 
and then use that foreign opinion to manipulate higher Chinese officials”. When the 
MoCA  arranged  for  foreigners  to  visit  models  of  self-governance,  it  attempted  to 
promote  a  specific  human  rights  image  outside  of  China.  For  instance,  then  deputy 
minister of MoCA, Yan Mingfu, made his point explicit at the end of a 1995 trip to 
Lishu  county,  the  village  self-governance  model  in  Jilin  Province  to  which  many 
foreigners  have  been  invited.  Upon  his  return,  Yan  said,  “Lishu’s  experience  has 
received worldwide recognition … and it has greatly aided the counterattack on Western 
accusations about human rights in China” (Kelliher 1997: 76). According to an article 
published in the newspaper affiliated to the MoCA, VC elections were considered to be 
the  key  to  positive  foreign  publicity.  Supposedly,  when  foreigners  witness  a  good   47 
election (preferably with competitive candidates and secret ballots), “the first emotion 
they feel is astonishment: it dawns on them that this is real democracy … and then they 
praise  it  to  the  skies.  …  Their  reports  and  commentaries  help  the  international 
community  to  understand  the  reality  of  democracy  and  human  rights  in  China. 
Objectively, they serve the function of aiding our propaganda” (Wu 1995).         
 
Particularly  realizing  that  VC  elections  and  self-governance  actually  functioned  to 
improved China’s international image in terms of human rights and democracy, the top 
central leaders after the Deng Xiaoping era, such as Jiang Zemin and Li Peng, had been 
prone  to  taking  a  supportive  stance  on  village  self-governance  (Kelliher  1997:  77; 
O'Brien and Li 2000: 484). For instance, on an inspection tour to Anhui Province in 
September 1998, then Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin sang high praise for village 
elections and self-governance, stressing that they are “fundamental issues” for Chinese 
peasants and “the practice of socialist grassroots democracy” (Jiang 1998). Li Peng, 
then Chair of NPCSC, during his visit to a county in Jilin Province known for its open 
nomination  procedures,  explicitly  stated:  “villagers’  self-governance  is  good”  (Fan 
1998c).               
 
Thus, with the top leaders’ favour, the marathon legislation for the Organic Law finally 
came to an end on 4
th November 1998, when the revised Organic Law (see Appendix 3) 
was finally approved by the fifth session of the ninth NPCSC. There is probably no 
other  law  that  has  arisen  through  such  harsh  and  prolonged  debate  in  the  PRC’s 
legislation history.   
 
As far as the nature of VC is concerned, the revised Organic Law not only confirms the 
provisional Organic Law’s provision that the VC is the “primary mass organization of 
self-governance, in which villagers manage their own affairs, educate themselves and 
serve their own needs”, but also adds that VCs “apply democratic elections, democratic 
decision-making, democratic management and democratic supervision” (Article 2).   
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In terms of VC elections, the revised Law, in contrast to the provisional Law, sets out 
more detailed regulations on election requirements and procedures. The provisional Law 
only  states  that  “the  VC  chair,  deputy-chair  and  members  are  directly  elected  by 
villagers”  (Article  11),  but  does  not  specify  how  or  through  which  procedures  the 
elections should be carried out. The revised Law, however, has seven articles that deal 
specifically with election requirements and procedures. There are several noteworthy 
added provisions. Article 9 specifies that the composition of a village committee should 
consist of three to seven members: a chair, deputy chair(s) and members. In response to 
the influence of township governments over candidacy and village elections, Article 11 
makes it clear that no organization or individual is permitted to “appoint, designate, 
remove or replace members of the village committee”. Article 14 is the most detailed 
legislation on village election procedures. It first stipulates that candidates are “directly 
nominated by eligible villagers” and their number should exceed that of positions to be 
elected, which is supposed to limit the possibility of township officials manipulating 
nominations. Then the winning requirement is written into the article—that an election 
is valid if the winner gains more than 50 percent of the votes cast (rather than 50 percent 
of the eligible votes), as long as more than 50 percent of those eligible cast their votes. 
The  article  also  specifies  that  secret  ballots  and  open  counting  be  adopted  in  the 
electoral process, and that private voting booths be set up during elections. Article 16 
further adds the procedures for villagers’ recalling incumbent VC cadres.                             
 
In  terms  of  village  governance,  the  revised  Law  confirms  the  provisional  Law’s 
stipulation that VCs are villagers’ self-governance organizations and defines the content 
of VC’s self-governance mainly as managing public affairs, undertaking village welfare, 
mediating disputes among villagers, reflecting the villagers’ opinions and demands to 
the government, and managing village collective economy and property (Articles 2 and 
5). Township government offers “guidance, support and assistance” to VCs, which in 
turn should also “assist” township governments to carry out state tasks (Article 4). In 
addition, the revised Law clearly defines the VCs’ “democratic” nature, stating that VC 
“applies  democratic  elections,  democratic  decision-making,  democratic  management   49 
and democratic supervision” (Article 2). In addition, it clearly stipulates that township 
government  “must  not  intervene  in  the  village  affairs  that  belong  to  the  sphere  of 
villagers’  self-governance  according  to  law”  (Article  4).  The  revised  Law  further 
specifies  the  VGM’s  working  procedures  and  its  duties  in  village  governance, 
stipulating that “the VC is responsible for and must report to the VGM” (Article 17-19). 
It also specifically endorses the legal status of VRA, which functions on behalf of VGM 
in village government (Article 21).               
 
However,  Article  3  of  the  revised  Law  also  specifies  that  VPB,  as  the  grassroots 
organization of the CCP in countryside, works according to the CCP Constitution and 
“exerts the effect of a leading core” in village elections and governance. This stipulation, 
as will be discussed later in this chapter and Chapter 6, causes serous confusion and 
conflict when the Law is enforced in practice.   
 
After the revised Organic Law was passed and put into practice in 1998, the central 
government  showed  determination  to  seriously  carry  out  village  elections  and 
self-governance in the Chinese countryside. By early 2000, villagers’ self-governance 
was  implemented  throughout  rural  China  (Wang  2002:  95).  However,  how  the  Law 
should be concretely implemented is a matter of local efforts. After the revised Law 
took effect, individual provinces made their own enforcement regulations one after the 
other. And in terms of provincial regulations on implementing the revised Organic Law, 
there have been differences among different provinces (Yu 2002). But I will still focus 
on the relevant regulations of Shandong province, where the fieldwork for this thesis 
was carried out.   
 
Institutional background in Shandong after 1998                 
On VC elections 
No more than three weeks after the revised Organic Law was approved by the NPCSC 
on 4th November 1998, the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of Shandong 
Province passed “Measures for VC Elections in Shandong Province (hereafter the 1998   50 
Measures)” (shandong sheng cunmin weiyuanhui xuanju banfa). This made Shandong 
the first province in the country to issue its new village electoral measures (Yu 2002: 
186). Thanks to the pushing by the provincial government, this new electoral regulation 
was carried out all over the province in the subsequent village elections since 1999 
(Shandongsheng renmin zhengfu bangongting 2001). And since then VC elections have 
been called “direct elections” (zhixuan).   
 
The 1998 Measures set out detailed electoral procedures and methods for VC elections. 
According to it the process of VC elections can be divided into four stages: election 
preparation, voter registration, primary election for candidates and formal election. 
 
The first stage is election preparation. Before holding village elections, the electoral 
institutions should be established first. The township government sets  up a  Leading 
Team  for  VC  Elections  (cunmin  weiyuanhui  huanjie  xuanju  lingdao  xiaozu),  whose 
duties are to 1) propagandize relative laws and regulations on VC elections, 2) work out 
and carry out the plans for VC elections, 3) decide the dates for elections, 4) train the 
election workers, 5) direct the affairs relating to the election or selection of VCs, VC 
sub-committees, heads of villagers’ small groups and villagers’ representatives, 5) be 
responsible for other issues in relation to VC elections (Article 6). 
 
Each village establishes a Village Electoral Committee (VEC), which will preside over 
the election-related work under the guidance of the township Leading Team for VC 
Elections. The VEC members, usually 5 to 9 persons, are elected by each villagers’ 
small group or the village general meeting (VGM). Members of the VEC elect one 
person among them to preside over the work of the VEC (Article 7). 
 
Stage  two  is  voter  registration.  The  VEC  is  responsible  for  voter  registration.  All 
villagers who are over the age of 18 have the right to vote and stand for election, except 
those  who  have  been  deprived  of  their  political  rights.  Voter  registration  should  be 
completed ahead of the election date. And the electoral roll should be publicized at least   51 
twenty days before the electoral date. Any villager who has objections to the electoral 
roll can make an appeal to the VEC, which should make an explanation for or correct it 
within three days (Article 8, 9 and 10). 
 
Stage three is primary election of candidates. VC candidates are directly nominated by 
villagers and formal candidates come out by primary election. The VEC should set up a 
polling station and secret voting booths for the primary election. The formal candidates 
come out according to the nomination votes they get from voters. The number of formal 
candidates should be one or two more than the number of VC posts subject to election 
(Article 11 and 12). 
 
Stage four is formal election. Article 14 regulates that an electoral meeting should be 
held when electing VC cadres. The election is not valid unless more than half of the 
eligible voters cast votes (including proxy votes) and the candidates can only get elected 
by winning more than half of the votes cast in an election. Secret voting booths must be 
set up and used by voters in election. Proxy voting is allowed, but the villagers who 
need to make proxy voting must apply and get approval from the VEC. A voter who is 
present at the election can only take on no more than three proxy votes (Article 15).   
 
Due to the fact that in rural areas it is quite difficult to summon an electoral meeting, 
Longkou, as with most of the places in Shandong Province, has chosen to merge the 
primary  election  and  the  formal  election  into  one  electoral  meeting.  Namely,  at  the 
electoral meeting, villagers first vote for formal candidates and then, after the formal 
candidates come out, vote for the VC cadres. In Xinjia Township, since 1999, direct VC 
elections  have  been  organized  and  carried  out  “carefully”  by  township  government 
officials, of course, only in terms of satisfying the letter of the concerned laws and 
regulations. Every key link and step, such as voter registration, secret voting, direct 
nomination, open vote counting and so on have been strictly carried out according to 
related  rules  and  regulations.  In  the  words  of  a  government  document  of  Xinjia 
Township: “every step and procedure of the VC elections must be carried out strictly   52 
according  to  the  stipulation  of  the  Organic  Law  and  the  1998  Measures  and  every 
stipulated step or procedure must not be omitted” (Zhonggong Xinjiazhen weiyuanhui 
2001).
17         
 
To examine “democratic” VC elections, numerous complicated details may need to be 
attended to in order to ascertain whether the elections are “free and fair”. However, it is 
not this thesis’ intention to discuss in detail the formal institutional rules and procedures 
of VC elections. It is sufficient to say here that since 1999 Xinjia Township government 
has not been able to manipulate VC elections by boldly violating the formal rules and 
procedures laid out by the laws. However, what I will try to argue in the subsequent 
chapters is that, even though the formal electoral procedures in Xinjia Township or B 
village are considered to be “free and fair”
18, VC elections in B village can also be 
largely manipulated by informal clientelist associations or networks. 
 
On village self-governance 
On 22 December 2000, the Standing Committee of Shandong People’s Congress passed 
another important regulation for implementing the revised Organic Law, which is called 
“Measures for implementing the PRC VC Organic Law in Shandong (hereafter the 2000 
Measures)” (Shandongsheng shishi “zhonghua renmin gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui 
zuzhifa” banfa). The 2000 Measures mainly specify rules and regulations on villagers’ 
self-governance.  The  content  of  the  2000  Measures  focuses  on  three  aspects 
respectively: 1) VGM and VRA, 2) VC and 3) transparency in village affairs.                 
 
First, on the VGM, it specifically stipulates that a VGM be convened at least once a 
year and that the VGM should assess and supervise the work of the VC (Article 5 and 6). 
VGM can also revoke or change VC and VRA’s improper decisions (Article 5). On 
VRA, it stipulates that a VRA must be convened at least once each quarter and that it 
                                                        
17  My personal observation of the 2004 VC elections in Xinjia Township confirmed that the VC elections had been 
organized and conducted strictly according to the stipulation of the Organic Law and the Shandong Measures.   
18  Li Lianjiang (2003: 653), for instance, considers VC elections as “free and fair” or procedurally “democratic” as 
long as four practices are applied: (1) direct nomination of candidates by villagers; (2) contested election of   
VC members; (3) anonymous voting; and (4) open count of votes.   53 
should discuss and decide on issues that are authorized by the VGM (the role of VRA 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6). If more than one thirds of representatives 
propose  it,  then  the  VC  should  convene  a  VRA  within  a  reasonable  time.  It  also 
specifies that the VC must inform villagers’ representatives of the issues to be discussed 
and decided three days before convening a VRA, and villagers’ representatives must 
seek opinions and recommendations from their constituents (article 9). Second, as far as 
the VC is concerned, it mainly sets out the duties of the VC, such as carrying out the 
VGM’s decisions and resolutions, managing village collective property, carrying out 
public services, and providing village welfare, as well as developing various cultural 
and entertainment activities (Article 13). Thirdly, it stipulates that the VC is committed 
to making village affairs open and transparent. The VC must ensure villagers’ “broad 
rights of being informed, participation and supervision” and it should be “subject to the 
inquiry and surveillance of villagers” (Article 25). The 2000 Measures also specify that 
the villagers’ financing small team (VFST), which can be recommended and elected by 
the VGM, checks and audits the VC’s financing account (the role of VFST will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6). The VFST checks the VC’s financing account at least 
once a month and every sum of expense can only be entered in the account after an 
audit by the VFST (Article 26). 
 
Apart from the above stipulations on self-governance, one important but problematic 
provision  should  be  particularly  noted.  Consistent  with  the  Organic  Law,  the  2000 
Measures also stipulate that the VBP is “a leading core” in village governance. But 
Article 3 of the 2000 Measures further specifies that “the VC must consciously accept 
the leadership” of the VPB (Article 3). So, a difficult problem arises here. As indicated 
previously, according to the 2000 Measures, the VC should be responsible to the VGM 
and carry out its decisions. However, according to the same regulation, VCs also need to 
“consciously accept the leadership” of the VPB. What would happen if the  VGM’s 
decision is different from the VPB’s decision? Whose decision should the VC carry out? 
Another related contradiction is the relationship between the township government and 
the  VC.  According  to  the  Organic  Law  and  the  2000  Measures,  the  township   54 
government can only “guide and assist” the VC to do its job, namely, the relationship 
between the two should be “guidance” rather than “leadership”. However, if the VC 
must accept the leadership of the VPB and, according to the CCP Constitution, the VPB 
must accept the leadership of the township government/Party committee, then how can 
it  be  guaranteed  that  the  township  government  does  not  intervene  in  the VC’s  job? 
Consider this imaginary example: according to law, the daughter-in-law (VC) enjoys the 
right of not being controlled by the mother-in-law (township government). But at the 
same time the law also stipulates that wife (VC) must obey her husband (VPB) and the 
husband  (VPB)  must  listen  to  his  mother  (township  government).  So  how  can  the 
daughter-in-law  (VC)  truly  enjoy  her  legal  right  of  not  being  controlled  by  her 
mother-in-law  (township  government)?  If  the  law  itself  is  contradictory,  its  practice 
must be problematic. (In chapter 6, I will discuss in detail the problematic VC-VPB 
relations in practice.) As I will examine in Chapters 6 and 7, these related regulations 
and rules on self-governance largely stay on paper in practice.             
 
Conclusion   
 
This  chapter  has  aimed  to  set  out  the  background  of  VC  elections  and  villagers’ 
self-governance in China and the institutional context for the case study of B village. 
With the dismantling of the commune system at the end of the 1970s, a potential crisis 
appeared in rural China arising from the paralysis of the long established social-political 
organizations. The situation at village level in general grew rather chaotic. Originally, as 
a means to tackle the political vacuum left by  the collapse of the commune and to 
resume law and order, VCs were established voluntarily in a few villages in Guangxi 
Province in late 1980. The phenomenon, however, greatly interested Peng Zhen, one of 
a few highly powerful CCP elders, who later exerted his strong influence to support and 
promote  the  establishment  of  VCs  throughout  rural  China.  Mainly  due  to  Peng’s 
influence and urging, VCs were written into the 1982 PRC Constitution as elected, mass 
organizations  of  self-governance  (Article  111)  and,  despite  strong  opposition,  in   55 
November  1987  the  provisional  Organic  Law  was  “forced  through”.  And  after  the 
crackdown of the 1989 movement, particularly with the support of another influential 
CCP elder, Bo Yibo, the Chinese central government finally decided to implement the 
provisional Organic  Law by setting up demonstration units in rural areas. Although 
Shandong  Province  enacted  the  Measures  for  implementing  the  provisional  Organic 
Law in 1992 (the 1992 Measures), Xinjia Township officials, like most of other places, 
had simply ignored the provisional policy of villagers’ self-governance. Before 1999, 
village cadres were largely appointed by the Xinjia Township government and were 
treated as implementing arms of state tasks. Self-governance institutions set out by law, 
such as VGM and VRA, had not been implemented even in form.   
 
Although the practice of the provisional Organic Law had been far from satisfactory, the 
top CCP leaders after Deng Xiaoping, particularly realizing that village elections and 
“village  democracy”  have  functioned  to  improve  China’s  international  image  and 
promote positive foreign publicity, endorsed the policy on villages’ self-governance. 
Therefore, in November 1998, despite persistent opposition, the revised Organic Law, 
which confirms the principles of “democratic” VC elections and self-governance, was 
finally approved and subsequently was implemented throughout the country. Shandong 
Province, like all other provinces, set out its own specific regulations on implementing 
the revised Organic Law within the province. As far as Xinjia Township is concerned, 
since 1999, VC elections have been carried out strictly to satisfy the letter of the related 
laws  and  regulations.  But  with  the  implementation  of  the  “free  and  fair”  electoral 
institutions, can the VC electoral processes be truly “free and fair”? What factors have 
influenced  the  VC  elections?  How  have  the  regulations  on  self-governance  been 
implemented in practice? Is it really “democratic”? After setting out the background, I 
will discuss these questions in the following chapters. 
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3 Villagers as clients and “locked-in” voters 
 
 
 
Prior to their urban counterparts, Chinese peasants nowadays have found themselves in 
the context of electoral politics, though this is confined within the boundaries of their 
village  communities.  With  the  implementation  of  “democratic”  village  elections, 
Chinese peasants are again under intense study by many political observers. How do 
Chinese rural dwellers (villagers) behave in the context of village electoral politics? To 
what degree have direct village elections changed their pattern of political behaviour? 
How do they respond to their “democratic” rights bestowed from above? Answers to 
these  questions  are  critical  for  the  understanding  of  contemporary  Chinese  village 
elections and governance. This chapter attempts to explore these questions.     
 
Advocates of the liberal democratic approach hold that Chinese peasants as a group 
have not only been “empowered” by “democratic” village elections but also started to 
take the form of “rightful resistance”(O'Brien 1996), fighting for their “collective good” 
(Brandtstadter  and  Schubert  2005)  or  “citizenship  rights”  (O'Brien  2001).  In  other 
words, they believe that “electoral democracy” has really made a difference to ordinary 
villagers’ lives as well as their political thinking and behaviour and this change in turn 
may further promote the grow up of democracy from grassroots level. Chinese peasants, 
according to them, are approaching “a more complete citizenship”(O'Brien 2001: 426) 
by skillfully making use of grassroots “democratic” institutions.   
 
However, I argue that direct or so-called “democratic” village elections have not made 
any  substantial  difference  to  ordinary  villagers’  lives:  it  has  had  little  effect  on  the 
village structure and the villagers’ behaviour. Securing relationships with more powerful 
patrons continues to be an appealing strategy for villagers and to shape the nature of 
village politics. And in the position of clients, villagers who are dependent on their local   57 
patrons cannot vote freely even when formal election procedures are “free and fair”. 
The  web  of  personal  relations  (especially  patron-client  ones)  that  are  so  dense  and 
crucial in villagers’ lives has helped candidates capture votes during elections. Villagers 
are largely mobilized through personal networks and are also “locked in” by them. In 
fact, in contrast to the view that village elections may “empower” villagers (Li 2003), I 
argue  that  they  may  even  risk  further  damaging  the  unity  and  harmony  of  village 
community and put ordinary villagers in a difficult position, and bring more problems 
than benefits to their lives.       
 
This  chapter  will  first  outline  the  socioeconomic  structure  in  which  villagers  find 
themselves during the reform era. I will evaluate the socioeconomic structure to show 
that although reform has improved villagers’ economic well-being, decollectivization 
has deprived villagers of collective welfare and safety nets which they enjoyed during 
commune era. The absence of a social security system and safety nets, increasing wealth 
gap and income inequality resulted from the development of a market economy, absence 
of free peasant associations, as well as peasant burdens and a strong and unchecked 
bureaucracy have made ordinary villagers largely insecure and vulnerable. The second 
part of the chapter will discuss the predominance and importance of informal social 
guanxi networks to villagers’ lives and how villagers value and are embedded in their 
social networks. This will lead to the third section discussing why villagers are inclined 
to become clients and depend on the power of various patrons, who, with the advent of 
direct VC elections, are able to “lock” them in and prevent free voting despite the fact 
that VC elections may be “free and fair” in terms of formal procedures.   
 
Villagers  in  the  reform  era:  the  socioeconomic  structure  of  rural 
society 
 
Improved economic well-being 
Chinese  peasants’  economic  well-being  has  been  dramatically  improved  even  in  the   58 
poorest regions since the economic reforms of the early 1980s (Cheng 2000; Oi 1999b; 
Unger 2002). As far as B village is concerned, this is also the case. Located in an area 
that Unger calls a “prosperous coastal region” (2002: 204), B village has undergone 
intensive industrialization over the past two decades. During 1980s and 1990s, a number 
of factories were established and managed by the village collective, although by the end 
of  1990s,  those  collective-owned  enterprises  had  either  closed  down  due  to  poor 
management or been privatized. However, thanks to the continual development of local 
economy  as well as the ongoing industrialization and urbanization, most  young and 
middle-aged villagers of B village can either find employment outside their villages or 
set up small businesses themselves. For most families in B village, the share of their 
income from cultivating farmland has fallen significantly. As a result, according to the 
township government official figure, the average annual pure per capita income of B 
village in 2004 was RMB 3,500 (Interview 3), whereas the national average figure for 
rural  China  in  2004  was  RMB  2936  (Zhonghua  renmin  gongheguo  guojia  tongjiju 
2005). 
 
According to B village’s own cadres, infrastructure networks of electricity, tap water, 
TV cable as well as telephone have reached and been used by almost every household 
within  the  village  and  consumer  goods  such  as  refrigerators,  mobile  phones  and 
motorcycles are also common in most (Interview 47 and 50). My personal visits to B 
village during my fieldwork confirmed this. Even without entering individual villagers’ 
houses, a visitor can see that there is a big difference between the B village and villages 
in poor, agricultural inland areas: the streets are cemented, the houses are decent and the 
environment is clean. Whereas B village is considered to an economically “average” 
among all the villages in Xinjia Township, one township government officials boasted 
to me, “look, here, our place really is the socialist new countryside” (Interview 12).     
 
Absence of a social security system and safety nets 
Improved  economic  well-being  and  higher  income  due  to  market  economy  and 
industrial development, however, is only part of the picture. Following the collapse of   59 
commune system and decollectivization, the collective welfare safety nets that protected 
villagers during commune era has been seriously eroded: education and health costs 
have  been  transferred  to  individual  villagers;  there  are  no  old-age  pensions;  and, 
although  waged  employment  is  prevalent  especially  in  the  coastal  districts,  rural 
dwellers working outside their villages are not entitled to labour insurance (Han and 
Luo 2007; Hussain 1994: 278). Social assistance provided in rural areas is primarily 
meant to relieve extreme poverty and is narrowly targeted (Liu, Rao, and Hu 2002). 
 
Longkou City, chosen as an experimental unit by the higher-level authorities, undertook 
in 2002 to establish a Cooperative Medical System (CMS). This has been regarded as a 
first step toward re-establishing the system of collectively-financed health services for 
villagers in rural China. However, the effects of the experimental policy have been far 
from satisfactory, if not a failure, in Longkou at least. According to the scheme, each 
individual peasant pays 10 yuan per year and the government gives 20 yuan subsidy per 
person each year. The peasant who joins such scheme may be entitled to claim a certain 
percentage  (25-50  per  cent)  of  the  their  medical  costs  if  they  suffer  from  a  serious 
disease. But the scheme has not been successful for two key reasons. First of all, the 
reimbursement does not cover the treatment and medicine cost of outpatients. In other 
words, only if a peasant is seriously ill and is admitted to a hospital as an inpatient can 
he/she  claim  some  reimbursement  of  the  cost.  Secondly,  there  is  an  upper  limit  for 
reimbursements. Each peasant can claim no more than 10,000 yuan per year and the 
excess has to be paid completely by the patients. Such a scheme has very limited effects 
on improving villagers’ sense of security. On the one hand, ordinary peasants still have 
to pay the whole medical costs for less serious illness in their everyday life; on the other 
hand, if they contract a serious illness, and, for example an operation is needed, they can 
only be reimbursed for less than 50% of the actual cost with an upper limit of 10,000 
yuan and the cost therefore is often still too heavy a burden (Interview 12 and 20). As 
one villager of B village told me:   
 
Nowadays we peasants are really afraid to go to hospital. Once we have to go there,   60 
the fees for various tests and examinations are terribly expensive, let alone the price 
for medicines and medical treatment. The hospital wants to make money. We simply 
cannot afford to get sick. So if a peasant gets small disease in their life, he usually 
either simply lives through or gets some medicine by himself at random. Therefore, 
some time the small disease gets more and more serious and finally becomes a very 
serious one, which needs a large sum of money to get treated. The life may be OK for 
a peasant if they do not fall ill, but once they do, it is a complete disaster for them and 
their family. But who can guarantee that he will never get sick? For instance, last year 
there was an old person in our village who got esophageal cancer. Since he could not 
afford the operation fees and his two children were also too poor to pay for him, he 
ended up dying at home just six months later (Interview 22).           
 
In short, although villagers’ incomes have risen since the economic reform period began, 
at  the  same  time,  they  have  lost  the  protection  of  their  collective.  If  they  suffer  a 
personal crisis or accident, such as serious illness or grave physical injury, or if they 
suddenly need a large sum of money, villagers are not able to count on their collective, 
their  government  or  any  other  impersonal  social  institutions.  As  a  result  ordinary 
villagers today are still extremely insecure. 
 
Market reform and the wealth gap 
Although  continued  market  reform  has  offered  more  opportunities  and  choices  to 
become better off, peasants also face greater uncertainty in an unpredictable market (Oi 
1999a; Oi 1989: 212; Unger 2000). Lacking information and knowledge about market 
demand, supply and prices, individual peasant and small family businesses are quite 
vulnerable in a free market. Even though more and more peasants have chosen to seek 
off-farm  wage  employment,  most  of  them  are  only  treated  as  “temporary  workers” 
without any job security (Unger 2002: 119-130).   
 
As a result of the market economy, the wealth gap between the rich and poor is also 
getting more and more serious. Former village cadres and those who own specialized   61 
knowledge, entrepreneurial skills, ability, and, maybe most importantly, those who have 
connections and privileged access to various scarce recourses and opportunities, have 
became rural entrepreneurs and the wealthy (Oi 1989: 213-214; Unger 2002: 140-143). 
Most  average  peasants  who  are  poorly  armed  to  deal  with  a  complex  market  and 
insecure life have to largely rely on and thus get dependent to those successful rural 
elites, no matter they are rural entrepreneurs, village cadres, or anyone who is able to 
offer jobs, contracts, loans, market opportunities or any assistances that are crucial and 
badly needed by peasants (Ibid.). 
 
In terms of the wealth gap, B village is no exception. A B village cadre told me about 
the different economic status of villagers within the village: 
 
Generally speaking, the villagers’ average living standard in our village is OK. There 
are almost no households that live in extreme poverty and are not able to clothe and 
dine themselves. However, the gap between the rich and the poor is huge. A few able 
persons who have successfully run their own businesses are really rich. In our village, 
among  those  most  wealthy  villagers,  some  run  hennery,  some  manage  electric 
welding  machine  factory  and  some  do  flower  business.  All  those  villagers  are 
wealthy private entrepreneurs. They often hire fellow villagers to work for them. 
Apart from those big bosses, some villagers with skills, knowledge or connections are 
engaged in some small business like repairing vehicles, making food oil, running 
restaurant,  selling  milk  and  so  on.  Most  young  and  middle-aged  villagers  in  our 
village seek employed jobs somewhere.  You know,  nowadays only depending on 
cultivating farmland is not enough for a living at all. But for most ordinary villagers, 
the income is not stable. Certain business can be prosperous this year, but stagnant in 
the following year. It is impossible to predict, isn’t it? Those villagers who do paid 
jobs often work on a temporary statue. When the employers don’t need you, you have 
to leave and find jobs somewhere else. The life is not easy for the ordinary villagers 
(Interview 48).     
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Absence of free peasant associations 
In Xinjia Township, as in elsewhere in rural China, voluntary villagers’ associations on 
the basis of political motivation are not allowed to form. As Bai Shazhou points out, 
“Although the population of Chinese peasants is huge, in the process of the Chinese 
Communist Party’s forceful social restructure, all the organizational strength beyond the 
Party had been absorbed or eliminated, as a result of which, seven or eight hundred 
million peasants have become the group of weakest social influence. In today’s rural 
society, except for kinship associations in some places which may exert very limited 
influence upon village elections, the sole organizational force is the Chinese Communist 
Party’s grassroots organizations” (Bai 2000). In the absence of peasant associations, the 
atomized peasants face the powerful state apparatus individually (Dang 2005: 9). The 
direct  outcome  of  villagers’  poor  organization  degree  is  that  villagers’  capacity  for 
self-protection is too weak, which makes it very difficult for them to resist the outside 
infringements upon their rights.   
 
Peasant burdens and official corruption 
The issue of peasant burdens has been a prominent problem in Chinese society for years. 
Since the mid 1980s, peasants’ financial burdens have been increasing. These financial 
burdens  of  peasants  mainly  refer  to  a  range  of  “unreasonable”  taxes,  fees,  fines, 
governmental expenses, administrative fund-raising and so on, which are imposed on 
peasants by the government (Bernstein and Liu 2003; Liu 1997). “Some of these were 
authorized; many were not; most had a dubious basis in law and official regulations. 
Most were bitterly resented by the peasants for their unpredictability and open-endness 
and the coercive manner in which they were collected” (Bernstein and Liu 2003: 1). 
These increasing taxes, fees and levies have taken a significant part of peasants’ income 
(Murphy 2005: 5).   
 
Although in recent years, the central government has kept making efforts to cut official 
taxes and fees imposed upon peasants and finally abolished all the agricultural taxes by 
2006 (Yang 2006), peasants’ financial burden has not been significantly relieved. As   63 
noted above, peasants nowadays have to pay a considerable and increasing amounts in 
medical  costs  and  school  fees,  which,  under  certain  circumstances,  may  very  likely 
result in “plummeting a household into destitution” (Murphy 2005: 5). Peasants’ burden 
is also exacerbated by increasing cost for buying production materials (fertiliser, fuel 
and tools), building houses, accumulating bride-prices and dowries, paying funeral fees, 
and buying consumer goods (Cheng 2005; Murphy 2005: 5). As a villager in B village 
commented:   
 
Nowadays it is so difficult for peasants to make money but there are so many things 
on which they need to spend money. After a whole year’s hard work, most common 
peasants can only save a little money. In recent years, you can hardly make money 
from digging fields. The price for agricultural products keeps changing and it is very 
likely that after all your hard work you find that your farm products are so cheap that 
you even lose money in the end or some times your products cannot be sold at all. In 
the countryside, only a few courageous and smart people are able to make money, 
while, for most dull peasants, it is not easy at all. But for peasants there are a number 
of  issues  to  spend  money  on:  giving  birth  to  children,  marriage,  funeral  and 
exchanging  human  feelings  [gifts]  as  well.  Money  spent  on  these  matters  is 
increasing as time goes by. You know, people really care about their face. If they want 
to have face and be respected by their fellow villagers, they have to spend a huge 
amount of money on these things (Interview 27). 
 
In  addition,  peasants  are  also  extremely  vulnerable  when  dealing  with  local  state 
officials or going through complicated bureaucratic formalities. Due to the absence of 
rule of law, the discretionary and unchecked use of public power, as well as officials’ 
rent-seeking and self-enrichment attempts, corruption is endemic. Since local officials 
wield  crucial  and  broad  power  over  peasants,  peasants  have  to  frequently  approach 
those  officials  for  particularistic  favours  by  offering  gifts,  showing  of  deference,  or 
using personal relationships (Unger 2002:143-146).               
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It is crucial to have a wide view of the socioeconomic structure of Chinese rural society 
before  rushing  to  explain  peasants  as  well  as  other  actors’  political  behaviours  or 
strategies  employed  in  village  politics.  Although  peasants,  especially  those  in 
prosperous  coastal  districts  where  B  village  locates,  have  been  economically  much 
better off in comparison with the past, they actually still face a largely unstable and even 
hostile world full of uncertainties and threats. Most Chinese peasants today are able to 
feed  and  clothe  themselves  so  that  subsistence  may  no  longer  be  their  top  priority 
(something  Scott  thought  was  important  to  clientelism  but  which  Oi  challenged), 
however, peasant insecurity and dependence is continued. 
 
Guanxi and clientelism 
 
In such an insecure context, the most important “anxiety-reduction behaviour” (Powell 
1970: 411) that Chinese peasants have employed to make life more secure and bearable 
is to maintain, create and manage guanxi, and especially to seek particularistic benefits 
or protection from various patrons.   
 
Guanxi in Chinese rural society 
To translate literally, the Chinese term “guanxi” means “relationship” or “connection”. 
In  a  research  on  guanxi  in  Taiwanese  rural  society,  Jacobs  refers  to  guanxi  as 
“particularistic ties” (Jacobs 1979). The sum total of one’s guanxi is called a guanxi 
network  (Gold,  Guthrie,  and  Wank  2002a:  6),  perhaps  indicating  the  dense  and 
overlapping nature of these social relations.   
 
Guanxi as a social phenomenon exists and operates in a wide social scope and a variety 
of contexts in Chinese society, and in both urban and rural areas (For a collection of 
articles on this see Gold, Guthrie, and Wank 2002b). But some argue that it is more 
pervasive in rural areas since it is rooted in a rural context where kinship ties, mutual 
aid and obligation have always been indispensable and predominant (Yang 1994). And,   65 
the  function  of  guanxi  in  Chinese  rural  society  has  been  intensively  studied  and 
recognized by social scientists (Kipnis 1994; 2002; 1996; 1997; Yan 1996a; 1996b). Yan, 
for  example,  points  out  that  guanxi  networks,  which  are  functionally  useful  and 
important for villagers, actually involve all aspects of people’s life in the community 
from agricultural production and recreation to political alliances (Yan 1996a: 8-9). And 
those who fail to cultivate and maintain their guanxi networks risk being isolated by the 
majority in the village, which under circumstances of personal crisis could result in 
severe  social  sanction.  He  argues  that  the  necessity  and  importance  of  guanxi  is 
demonstrated  and  strengthened  by  its  “economic,  social  and  political  functions  in 
everyday life” (ibid.: 15).     
 
Thus Chinese peasants intentionally build up, maintain, rely on and are also deeply 
embedded in their guanxi networks because, most importantly, their guanxi networks 
serve  to  offer  mutual  assistance,  protection  as  well  as  opportunities.  The  insecurity 
arising from decollectivization, market reform and increasing chances of dealing with 
difficult world beyond village boundary have make peasants continue to rely  –perhaps 
even more than they did in the past–on their  guanxi networks (Oi 1989: 183-226; 
Unger 2002: 143-146; Wilson 2002).   
 
Likewise, all my interviewees in B village have indicated to me, in one way or another, 
that guanxi is crucial for their life. One villager interviewee, for instance, talked about 
the importance of guanxi:   
 
In the countryside, guanxi is very important for people, particularly for us ordinary 
villagers. Why? Because, in everyday life, no one can be certain that he/she or his/her 
family will never need assistance of various forms from other people. For example, 
during busy season of farming, you may find to be shorthanded; when sending your 
children to school, or starting your private business, or when your family member 
needs expensive hospital treatment, you may have a sudden need of a large sum of 
money; when holding weddings for your children or funerals for your parents, you   66 
may be short of both money and hands. In addition to these, you may also encounter 
various difficulties when dealing with the authorities, say, applying for licenses, going 
through legal formalities and so on. In short, for us ordinary villagers, it is fairly easy 
to fall in trouble under such circumstances. Therefore, without relying on relatives and 
friends, it would be almost impossible to go through these life crises. These relatives 
and friends are your guanxi, … which is extremely important for your life (Interview 
30). 
 
Another villager’s comment helps to demonstrate why villagers today have to turn to 
their guanxi for assistance rather than the village collective:   
 
During  the  common  era,  although  all  villagers  were  poor,  at  least  there  was  a 
‘collective’ that we could rely on. At that time, the collective was supposed to take 
care  of  villagers’  life.  The  issues  such  as  childbirth,  illness,  schooling  and  burial 
arrangements were all guaranteed. But nowadays the village collective cares nothing 
about villagers. You cannot rely on the village collective at all once you are in need. 
Last year, for example, one villager in our village was seriously wounded in a car 
accident and urgently needed a large sum of money for operation. His wife could not 
gather  the  needed  money  in  a  sudden  and  therefore  came  to  the  village  cadres 
requesting to borrow some money from the village collective. You know what? Her 
request was turned down by the cadres, saying that the collective money could not be 
lent to individual villagers. Look, even in such circumstances, the collective could not 
be counted on, what’s the use of the collective though? Once in trouble, people can 
only rely on their own family members, relatives and close friends (Interview 31).   
 
The  above  citation  has  serve  to  demonstrate  that  informal  guanxi  ties  have  been 
continually cultivated, maintained and relied on by villagers to reduce their sense of 
insecurity  and  pursue  their  individual  goals  and  opportunities  under  the  existing 
structure.  Particularly,  in  the  reform  era,  with  the  relative  absence  of  impersonal 
guarantees of security, guanxi networks seem to play a more important role in villagers’   67 
life.   
   
Guanxi and patron-client relationship 
Guanxi, in its primary form, is a dyadic  alliance between two individuals based on 
reciprocal exchange, and it largely fits in Foster’s concept of “dyadic contract”. Dyadic 
contracts, according to Foster, are created and maintained by people so as to defend 
themselves as well as maximize the opportunities in an insecure world (Foster 1963; 
Foster 1961). Dyadic contracts, or guanxi ties can mainly fall into two types: one is 
symmetrical/horizontal ties made between people of equal socio-economic status; the 
other is asymmetrical/vertical ties, that is patron-client bonds between people of unequal 
socio-economic status (ibid.). Guanxi, as a term, is used indiscriminately by Chinese 
people to refer to both types of ties.   
 
Although  symmetrical/horizontal  dyadic  alliances  and  asymmetrical/vertical  dyadic 
alliances are both functionally helpful to ordinary villagers, the vertical patron-client 
alliances are much more attractive and useful. This is because through the patron-client 
bond, a peasant can associate himself to someone, namely a patron, who owns greater 
status,  power,  influence,  wealth  and  authority.  Exchange  based  on  patron-client 
relationship  can  bring  scarce  resources,  opportunities,  protection,  security,  or  any 
critical things that a client badly needs. This is why Oi, when analyzing Chinese village 
politics, chooses to apply the concept of patron-client relationship rather than that of 
guanxi (Oi 1989: 131-132).   
 
Since contemporary rural Chinese society is conducive to the flourishing of both guanxi 
and vertical patron-client relations, the question is how and to what extent patron-client 
alliances affect and constrain villagers’ behaviour in village elections.   
 
Why do villagers participate in village elections? 
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With  the  coming  of  direct  village  elections,  villagers  are  required  to  take  time  and 
energy to participate and vote. The Organic Law stipulates that “a VC election is valid 
only when over half the eligible voters cast their votes” (Organic Law Article 14). This 
means without 50 per cent of voters participating, village elections are not lawful. In 
fact the voting rate of B village has been extremely high in each round of three direct 
elections held since 1999 at 98.7%, 97.8% and 99.7% respectively (see table 2.1 below). 
Why is the voting rate always so high in B village? What factors motivate villagers to 
go to the ballot booth?   
 
Table 3.1 Information on voters’ participation in B village’s three rounds of direct 
VC elections   
 
           
 
Year   
 
Total 
eligible 
voters 
 
Voters 
participating 
in  electoral 
meeting 
 
Proxy 
votes 
 
Absent 
voters   
 
Voting 
rate 
 
Voting 
subsidy 
(yuan) 
1999  700  315  386  9  98.7%  10   
2002  693  251  427  15  97.8%  10 
2004  706  254  450  2  99.7%  N/A 
 
Voting subsidy 
The voting subsidy has been taken as a popular measure to lure villagers to go to vote in 
village elections especially in economically wealthy area (Guo 2003; Guo and Tong 
2006; Hu 2001: 61). Because Article 14 of the Organic Law stipulates that the VC 
election is valid only when more than half eligible voters attend the electoral meeting, 
distributing a voting subsidy to voters is often used to encourage voting and a quorum 
for VC elections.   
 
The voting subsidy as a measure to attract villagers’ electoral participation has also been 
applied in Xinjia Township. According to a Xinjia Township leader (interview 1), a   69 
voting subsidy has been used in all the 28 villages of Xinjia Township since the first 
direct VC elections in 1999. But rather than the township government, it is each village 
collective that pays for this sum of money. In most villages, each voter is given 10 yuan 
for  attending  electoral  meetings.  However,  in  a  few  villages  with  relatively  weak 
collective economic capacity, 5 yuan per voter has been given (Ibid.).   
 
One point should be noted here. In theory a voting subsidy is supposed to subsidize 
voters who take time to attend the electoral meeting for earnings lost and those who do 
not personally participate the electoral meeting are not eligible to have such subsidy. 
But in reality, a voter who does not show up personally but authorizes someone else to 
go to vote for her also receives such a subsidy. In B village this was certainly the case in 
the 1999 and 2002 elections: so long as a voter’s vote was cast, not matter whether she 
attended the meeting herself or asked someone else to vote on her behalf, she received 
the 10 yuan subsidy.   
 
Obviously, this seems to be unfair for those voters who really spend hours participating 
in an election. However, this small institutional adjustment has three advantages. First, 
there are always some eligible voters who are not able to go to vote personally on the 
election date (for instance, the many young people working outside the village), and if 
these voters are deprived of their voting subsidy, they may lack the inducement to go 
through the formalities of even proxy voting. If these voters neither go to vote nor adopt 
proxy  voting  the  participation  rate  may  substantially  decrease  and  even  risk  falling 
below the lawful minimum, leading to an invalid election. Second, since often proxy 
voting  is  carried  out  by  a  voter’s  immediate  family  member  or  close  relative,  for 
example a wife voting for a husband, a son for his parents (Interview 47 and 55), the 
actual voter is unlikely to consider it unfair that the trustee (the person making the vote 
by proxy) gets the voting subsidy. Third, the total number of on-the-spot voters on the 
election day will be dramatically reduced, which can make the organization of electoral 
meeting much easier.       
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The voting subsidy is adopted to lure villagers’ to participate in the election. This seems 
to  indicate  that  without  it  the  voting  rate  should  be  significantly  lower.  But  is  the 
subsidy the main motivating factor for villagers? One indicator is whether the voting 
rate falls when there is no subsidy. As Form 2.1 shows that although voting subsidy was 
not adopted in B village’s 2004 election, the voting rate that year was higher than in 
1999 and 2002. This indicates that it is at least not a decisive factor affecting villagers’ 
decisions to participate in elections.   
 
Local issues   
An  important  local  issue  which  is  of  wide  concern  to  people  may  largely  motivate 
voters to cast their votes. However, in B village, only the 1999 election, that is, the first 
direct village election, were more or less affected by issues of wide concern. When the 
first direct village election was approaching in 1999, the challengers (Qu Jiamao, Qu 
Jiaxian and Qu Jiaji) reportedly raised two issues in their political campaign to attack 
the incumbent old cadres and canvass votes: anti-corruption (auditing village financial 
account) and refunding villagers’ share in a bankrupt village collective factory.   
 
Corruption  was  considered  to  have  been  very  serious  in  B  village  before  1999. 
Collective  funds  had  been  abused  and  embezzled  by  the  village  cadres;  collective 
properties and enterprises were badly managed; village cadres took advantage of their 
public position to get illegal benefits for themselves, their relatives and friends. In short, 
cadre corruption was serious and many villagers were disgruntled (Interview 31, 41, 50, 
51 and 53). Thus in 1999 election, the challengers promised villagers that once they got 
elected  they  would  audit  the  previous  village  financial  accounts  to  figure  out  how 
village collective fund had been spent in the past and who should be responsible for 
what (Interview 31, 41 and 50).   
 
The second issue was about refunding villagers’ shares in a bankrupt collective factory. 
In 1996, the then cadres of B village had decided to run a pencil factory, which was 
supposed to be very profitable. However, since the collective funds were short at that   71 
time, the then village cadres raised money from many individual households (about 50 
households) and promised return with good interest. Unfortunately, this investment, like 
other collective-managed enterprises, failed: it was not long before the factory went 
bankrupt. Thus villagers who had contributed money wanted to get their money back. 
However, the then cadres said the village  collective had no money to  pay back the 
villagers.  In  the  1999  election,  the  challengers  promised  to  those  villagers  who 
contributed  money  for  the  pencil  factory  that  once  they  came  to  power  they  would 
refund their money (Interviews 31, 41, 50 and 53).   
 
Many villagers were concerned about these two issues and the challengers’ promise did 
seem appealing to voters in 1999 election. However, although the challengers won the 
1999  election,  neither  issue  was  solved  by  the  time  they  left  office  in  2002.  The 
“democratically”  elected  first  VC’s  failure  to  deliver  their  promises  on  widely 
concerned issues made villagers very disappointed in and cynical about the big promises 
made  by  candidates.  As  a  result,  in  the  following  2002  and  2004  elections,  no 
candidates, neither the incumbents nor the challengers, attempted to make promises on 
issues of wide public concern (Interviews 31, 41 and 47). 
 
Although both the 2002 and 2004 elections did not revolve around particular public 
issues, the voting rate in the three rounds was not significantly different. Thus issues of 
public concern do not seem to explain the sustained high voting rate. 
 
Political efficacy   
Political  efficacy,  as  defined  by  Campbell,  Curin  and  Miller,  is  “…the  feeling  that 
political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in 
bringing about this change” (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954: 187). Political scientists 
have considered political efficacy as predictor of political participation (Abramson and 
Aldrich 1982) as well as an important result of participation (Finkel 1985). 
 
As far as Chinese village elections are concerned, Li (2003), who examined the first   72 
direct VC elections in twenty villages in Jiangxi Province in 1999, argues that Chinese 
villagers feel a higher level of political efficacy after their first “free and fair” village 
election because they realize that they are able to eliminate unpopular cadres. He further 
predicts that enhanced efficacy will cause more active participation as well as political 
restructuring in Chinese villages. Li’s conclusion is based only on the first direct village 
election and his logic is that since villagers have realized that they now can make a 
difference by removing unresponsive village cadres, thus their political efficacy may 
improve and they will participate more actively in following elections. The question 
here, however, is: whether the change of cadres really can make a difference in terms of 
village governance? In other words, even if villagers’ votes can lead to a change in 
village leaders, would their efficacy be affected if they find that the change of village 
leaders  actually  made  no  difference  to  village  governance?  Li  finds  that  villagers’ 
efficacy in this sense has been enhanced based on his survey of 20 villages soon after 
the  first  direct  village  elections.  However,  without  longitudinal  observation,  it  is 
impossible to know whether the level of villagers’ efficacy will continue to increase, 
will decrease, or will remain stable afterwards and through further rounds of elections.       
 
My study of B village through its three rounds of elections shows that because the new 
cadres  elected  in  1999  election  failed  to  make  any  substantial  difference  to  village 
governance, villagers became frustrated and sceptical. As one villager commented: 
 
In 1999 election, Jiamao and his men promised to audit the village financial accounts, to 
refund the money raised from villagers for the pencil factory, and some other things as 
well. But did they make it in the end? Nothing. They achieved nothing. What is the use 
of elections? Whoever comes to power has to listen to the Party and government, don’t 
they (Interview 35)? 
 
If political efficacy mainly refers to the villagers’ feeling that they can make a difference 
to village governance by voting in VC elections, in B village, I think villagers’ political 
efficacy has not been the major factor in promoting electoral participation at least in the   73 
2002 and 2004 elections.   
 
Thus,  voting  subsidy,  local  issues  and  political  efficacy  all  fail  to  explain  the 
consistently very high voting rates in the three rounds of direct elections in B village. 
What then is the reason for it?     
 
Social connections   
My  research  indicates  electoral  mobilization  based  on  informal  social  connections 
(guanxi) is largely the cause of the high voting rate in each of B village’s three direct 
elections. As I have discussed earlier, in a small rural community like B village people 
are bound together by a large number of personal relations, such as kinship, marriage, 
friendship, and patronage. Without reference to the norms, values, and rules held by the 
actors  and  the  sorts  of  interpersonal  relationships  which  commonly  occur  in  this 
community,  namely,  without  an  understanding  of  the  informal  institutions  and 
relationships, it is very difficult to fully understand political activities like elections.   
 
As a single lineage village, over 95 per cent of households in B village that bear the 
surname  Qu  actually  can  be  traced  back  to  a  common  founding  ancestral  family 
(Interviews  47  and  50). Although  the  single  lineage  has  been  divided  into  different 
lineage  branches  and  there  is  no  close  horizontal  association  based  on  lineage  (no 
village-wide lineage activities have been reported during my fieldwork), villagers are 
related to each other through a variety of informal social bonds. The aggregation of 
these bonds is effectively the village guanxi network, which is central in the everyday 
life  of  every  villager.  Mutual  aid,  kinship  obligations  and  reciprocal  exchange  have 
always been the most important function of these ties, effectively providing material and 
non-material security. And with the introduction of direct village elections, electoral 
mobilization  in  B  village  has  soon  become  tied  into  this  network  of  village  social 
connections. Voters are mobilized on the basis of various ties, especially patron-client 
ones. Villagers are largely embedded in and dependent on this network and once these 
ties are utilized in an electoral campaign, voters can be pressured to cast their votes. For   74 
example, being asked what had motivated him to come to vote in the 2004 VC electoral 
meeting, one villager interviewee of B village talked about the importance of guanxi 
and “face” (mianzi):   
 
Actually  I have  my own  business to mind and don't want to come to vote at all. 
There’s absolutely no use in electing so many cadres in a village and no matter who 
gets elected, he cannot really make a difference to the village. But because of the issue 
of face (mianzi wenti), I came to vote anyway. How could you refuse them if you are 
approached by relatives or friends to urge you to vote for a candidate? In countryside, 
guanxi and renqing (human feelings) are too important (Interview 41). 
 
“Face” is an important concept in Chinese culture in relation to a person’s social status 
and  prestige  in  his  social  network  and  social  exchanges.  Ho  defines  “face”  as  “the 
respectability and/or deference which a person can claim for himself from others, by 
virtue of the relative position he occupies in his social network and the degree to which 
he is judged to have functioned adequately in that position as well as acceptably in his 
general conduct …” (Ho 1976: 883). Hwang (1987: 953-957) points out that abiding by 
norms in social exchanges adds to one’s face, a form of social capital. And Wilson 
(2002: 166), based on his recent research in Chinese villages, argues that “maintaining 
one’s  face  is  a  prerequisite  for  acquiring  capital  and  material  goods  through  social 
relations”. Applied to the villager’s comment analysed here, “the issue of face” actually 
implies a norm of informal social exchange. The villager was mobilized to vote because 
he was “approached by a relative or friend”, who asked him to do a favour by going to 
vote  for  certain  candidates.  He  did  so  because  otherwise  he  would  be  regarded  as 
refusing to give “face” (respect, deference or assistance) to the person approaching him. 
Refusing to give other people “face” may very likely lead to his difficulty to acquiring 
favour or assistance from those people in the future.                   
 
Among all my 26 villager interviewees in B village, 23 (88%) revealed that “face”, 
“guanxi” or “renqing” had been very important factors motivating them to vote in VC   75 
elections. As Hu has noted in research on VC elections in Fujian Province, villagers’ 
active participation is related to “the characteristics of residency of rural community” 
(Hu  2001:  57-60).  He  argues  that  villagers  and  their  families  live  within  the  same 
village  for  generations  and  develop  longstanding  and  deeply  involved  relationships. 
They then actively participate in elections out of the personal connections with those 
candidates, who may be their relatives, neighbours or friends. He further illuminates 
that some kinds of ethics or norms followed by villagers, such as reciprocity, exchange 
of favours, mutual aid in time of need and so on, may push villagers to go to vote 
because a villager may risk being subject to the censure of morality if he stays away 
from  elections  for  which  his  relatives,  friends,  and  neighbours  are  running  (ibid.). 
Similarly,  the  research  of  Tong  (2003)  and  Xiao  (2003)  also  indicates  that  the 
mobilization of village  elites by making use of social connection (guanxi) networks 
largely contributes to villagers’ high participating rate in VC elections.
19   
 
How  do  villagers  vote:  the  development  of  clientelism  under  direct 
elections 
 
Among  all  these  various  informal  social  bonds  that  connect  villagers  to  each  other, 
patron-client relationships are perhaps most crucial and effective in mobilizing villagers 
to voting in village elections. As I have demonstrated at the beginning of this chapter, 
Chinese rural society is strongly favourable to and characterized by clientelism. In the 
reform  era,  ordinary  villagers  not  only  confront  larger  insecurity  in  life  due  to  the 
demise of village collective, but may also need financial, technological, and marketing 
assistance and services to improve their standard of living. However, these limited but 
critical  resources  are  often  controlled  by  a  few  village  patrons  within  the  village 
community.  Thus  there  is  a  continuing  need  for  villagers  to  seek  patrons  so  as  to 
respond  to  increasingly  complex  demands  on  particularistic  basis.  And  as  a  result, 
                                                        
19  In Taiwan’s local elections, guanxi or informal social connections also played a crucial role in 
mobilizing voters to take part in elections. See Bosco (1992) and Gallin (1969).   76 
patron-client  structure  is  still  predominant  in  the  village  community  with  ordinary 
villagers/clients depending on their patrons.         
 
With  the  coming  of  direct  village  elections,  the  client  has  acquired  a  new  political 
resource, since simply his or his family’s votes may be required by his patron. Even 
someone with no other valuable services to offer may now find that the votes of his 
immediate family can be needed by a potential patron, which enables the continued 
existence or new creation of a patron-client bond. In Chapter 4, I will give a detailed 
analysis of the patron-client exchanges in VC elections focusing on the strategies that 
candidates use, as patrons, to secure the votes of villagers. From the point of view of 
ordinary villagers, they find themselves being approached by their patrons to ask for 
their votes in VC elections. As clients, they are bound to their patrons by a debt of 
obligation and therefore cannot refuse their patrons’ request for their electoral support. 
Some villagers also find themselves being offered immediate benefits by candidates to 
exchange  their  votes  and  perhaps  to  create  a  patron-client  relationship,  which  is 
appealing to them. On the whole villagers are pulled together in VC elections largely on 
the basis of a variety of guanxi relationships, particularly patron-client ones. Their votes 
are actually delivered in cluster to their (potential) patrons as a matter of course. Just as 
Scott has described the local electoral politics in Southeast Asia, “working on voters 
individually or by class affiliation made little sense [for a candidate] when most of the 
electorate was divided into patron-client clusters” (Scott 1972b: 110).       
 
In classifying English voters from mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries, Scott 
puts them into three categories:   
 
A central distinction [of voters] is the extent to which they were free agents and, if they 
were, whether they were motivated by short-run inducements or by larger policy issues. 
Those who were, by and large not free agents were termed “locked-in electorates”; those 
who  were  more  nearly  free  agents  but  oriented  to  short-run  gains  we  have  termed 
“potential machine electorates”; and those who were oriented to broad policy issues we   77 
have termed “issue electorates” (Scott 1972a: 97-98).     
 
Perhaps  the  bulk  of  villagers  in  B  village  fit  well  in Scott’s  category  of  “locked-in 
electorates”  who  are  embedded  and  locked  in  to  the  patron-client  networks.  Some 
villagers may fit in the category of “machine electorates”, who have “relative freedom 
from  the  economic  and  social  pressures  that  operated  on  most  ‘locked-in’  rural 
electorates” (Ibid.: 99). These villagers are likely to have relatively better economic 
well-being, stronger supportive ties or better sense of security, which enable them to 
gain relative independence and to bargain with candidates. These “machine electorates”, 
however, as Scott points outs, are largely oriented to trade their votes for short-range 
and particularistic favours (or promises) from candidates. “Issue electorates”, who are 
“oriented to broad policy issues”, hardly exist due to the nature of village elections 
although, as discussed previously, local issues perhaps more or less played a role in the 
first direct VC election in B village.   
 
To the locked-in voters/clients, the electoral contest between candidates/patrons can put 
them in difficult position when they find that competing candidates/patrons approach 
them to solicit their votes. For example, one B village villager told me that in the 2004 
village election the two competing candidates canvassed an old couple who were poor, 
physically weak and had no kin background within the village. Their  only son was 
seriously disabled due to their consanguineous marriage. At that time, both candidates 
had a distant relative relationship with the couple. When soliciting their votes, the both 
candidates implied that if the couple did not give their votes to them, they would not 
help  when  the  couple  encountered  difficulties  in  the  future.  The  couple  felt  so 
embarrassed and helpless that cried ceaselessly in private (Interview 42). This villager 
added:   
 
Many villagers have become annoyed about the elections because they are very likely 
to be put in a dilemma. You know, villagers are often approached by two competing 
candidates or factions, with both sides soliciting your vote. And it is very likely that   78 
you have some kind of connection with both sides. How do you choose? Not matter 
which side you give your vote, you will offend the other side. It really is an annoying 
thing for people. It is not unusual that, due to village elections, friends have turned to 
enemies  and  neighbours  don’t  talk  to  each  other.  The  Centre  calls  for  building  a 
harmonious society. How can this contribute to the harmonious society (Interview 26)? 
 
Analyzing  clientelist  politics  in  peasant  society,  Powell  points  out  that  the  electoral 
competition among patrons “may lead to less bargaining power for the client, rather 
than more, as for example the case of a peasant who finds himself within the power 
domain of a landlord, a moneylender, and a storekeeper, all of whom pressure him to 
vote in accord with their particular preferences” (Powell 1970: 416). Powell’s analysis 
largely  fits  the  situation  in  B  village.  Where  clientelism  is  pervasive,  villagers  are 
pressured at the same time by different candidates/patrons in village elections, and this 
actually makes many of them more vulnerable because no matter which side a villager 
chooses,  they  will  inevitably  offend  the  other  candidates/factions  and may  therefore 
damage part of their supportive network in the village community.   
 
It is suggested, particularly by those taking the liberal-democratic approach, that since 
direct village elections have empowered villagers to elect the VC cadres they think will 
serve them best and remove those whose performance has been poor, villagers, as a 
whole, have shown great enthusiasm and have actively participated in VC elections (Li 
2003; O'Brien 2001; O'Brien and Li 2000; Wang 1997). However, in contrast, many 
villagers of B village have become increasingly apathetic and even sceptical to direct 
VC elections. As one villager put it: “In my opinion, whether village elections are held 
or  not  makes  very  little  difference  for  our  lives.  Although  it  is  supposed  to  be 
self-governance, in fact no matter who gets elected, they still need to carry out the work 
assigned by the Party and the government, don’t they? Village elections only matter to 
those who want to struggle for power” (Interview 30). To a large degree, the reason that 
villagers  of  B  village  are  not  enthusiastic  about  VC  elections  is  that,  as  clients  or 
“locked-in” voters, they are not free agents and their votes can be easily claimed by   79 
their village patrons.     
   
Conclusion 
 
Although B village is located in an economically developed area and in the reform era 
the villagers’ average living standard has dramatically improved and is much better off 
than their counterparts in poor in-land areas, due to absence of a social security system 
and safety nets, serious wealth gap formed in market reform, absence of free peasant 
associations  as  well  as  strong  bureaucracy  and  villagers’  heavy  financial  burden, 
average villagers nowadays still experience serious insecurities and are perhaps more 
vulnerable than in the pre-reform period due to the collapse of collective welfare and 
protection.  In  this  context,  villagers  use  informal  social  connections,  especially 
patron-client ties, to seek security as well as opportunities and particularistic favours. 
Direct village elections were introduced in B village in this context. 
 
With arrival of direct village elections, what is the main factor that motivates villagers 
to cast their votes? Although voting subsidies, political efficacy, and local issues may 
play a role they cannot fully explain the very high voting rate in each of the three rounds 
of direct village elections held since 1999. This chapter argues that it is the electoral 
mobilization based on informal social connections (particularly patron-client relations) 
that accounts for the high voting rate in B village. Villagers are highly dependent on and 
deeply  embedded  in  the  social  network  of  their  village.  And  electoral  mobilization 
based on such personal relationships and networks can involve almost every member of 
the village community.   
 
Villagers are mobilized into elections largely by personal relationships, and especially 
their  patron-client  ties.  A  villager  usually  chooses  to  give  his  vote  to  a  patron  in 
exchange for something that she badly needs or to repay a previous debt owed to the 
patron. Votes like that are to a great extent under clientelist control and therefore not   80 
free, even when election procedures adhere to the regulations and are formally “free and 
fair”.  Villagers  are  largely  “locked  in”  to  the  patron-client  networks  of  the  village 
community. In addition, in B village, the vote-soliciting competition between different 
candidates/factions has put many villagers in a dilemma, and may have caused partial 
damage to their crucial community network and therefore decreased their “bargaining 
power”  with  village  patrons.  How  villagers’  votes  are  solicited  by  the 
candidates/factions will be the subject of the next chapter.   
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4 Candidates, patrons and factions       
 
 
 
The role of villager’s committee (VC) candidates and how they campaign to win village 
elections have largely been unexplored. Some researchers hold that self-promotion and 
campaigning  for  winning  votes  are  culturally  not  acceptable  in  small  Chinese  rural 
communities and therefore candidates have tried to avoid campaigning. For instance, 
Pastor and Tan say they have observed “little or no campaigning” in Chinese village 
elections. They argue, “In a small village, where everyone knows each other and where 
it is viewed as culturally inappropriate to promote oneself, most candidates have been 
reluctant  to  campaign”  (Pastor  and  Tan  2000:  496).  The  question  is,  however,  if 
candidates are reluctant to campaign, how they gain votes from their fellow villagers? 
Moreover,  who  actually  runs  for  VC  election?  What  are  their  incentives?  Little 
academic attention has been paid to such questions so far. This chapter will examine 
these questions by focusing on the role of candidates in VC elections.   
 
This chapter will start by discussing the changing composition of village patrons in the 
reform era. I will demonstrate that village patrons are no longer mainly limited to the 
village cadres as during the commune era. Village patrons today may include any people 
with wealth, power, skills, knowledge, status, and most importantly, useful connections 
outside  the  village.  VC  candidates  are  usually  among  the  village  patrons,  whose 
influence over their villager clients can be easily translated into votes in VC elections. 
Then in the second section, I look at why some patrons stand as candidates in elections 
and then explore in detail how candidates solicit votes from villagers through informal 
clientelist  relations.  Finally,  I  will  discuss  how  and  why  factions  emerge  in  village 
elections and demonstrate their role in village elections. The chapter concludes that VC 
electoral candidates are invariably patrons and they solicit votes largely by making use 
of their patronage resources and clientelist networks. As patrons, on the one hand, they   82 
are able to attract a sizeable following by distributing benefits or patronage; on the other 
hand, they are comparatively free to behave in an arbitrary and highly personalistic way 
in dealing with their followers. During an election, candidates reach their villager clients 
to claim their votes on the basis of past, current or future benefits, and usually, those 
clients have relatively little recourse to bargaining in such a situation (and many of them 
actually do not want to bargain with their patrons as they can find it useful to support a 
patron in the election – a rare chance to reciprocate). In order to facilitate vote soliciting, 
factions form around alliances between candidates and their clients. As a consequence, 
village elections are largely a factional contest structured around clientelist networks.   
                         
The  changing  composition  of  village  patrons  and  patrons  as  VC 
candidates 
 
The composition of village patrons: before and after the reform   
A patron, as defined by Foster (1963: 1282), “is someone who combines status, power, 
influence, authority—attributes useful to anyone—in ‘defending’ himself or in helping 
someone  else  to  defend  himself.”  And,  he  further  defines  that  “a  person,  however 
powerful  and  influential,  is  a  patron  only  in  relationship  to  someone  of  lesser 
position—a  client  who,  under  specific  circumstances,  he  is  willing  to  help”.  Scott 
(1972b: 93) points out that a patron “often is in a position to supply unilaterally goods 
and services which the potential client and his family need for their survival and well 
being”, and, “being a monopolist, or at least an oligopolist, for critical needs, the patron 
is in an ideal position to demand compliance from those who wish to share in these 
scarce commodities”. However, an individual may be both a patron and a client in a 
“clientele pyramid”, i.e., a patron may be the client of a higher patron who in turn is the 
client of a patron even higher than himself (Lande 1977: xxi).     
 
The composition of patrons in B village, as in many other Chinese villages in transition, 
has changed over time. During the Mao era, patrons were almost exclusively cadres in a   83 
village community. Villagers under the commune system could be clearly divided into 
to two types of political actors: “the masses” and the cadres. Due to the strict household 
registration system which forbade the commune members’ other occupational choices 
outside their village, it was very difficult to change their social status as agricultural 
laborers and rural residents. Therefore, in this context, to become a cadre was almost the 
only  way  for  villagers  to  improve  their  socioeconomic  status.  Some  villagers  who 
combined “good class” background, outstanding skills in agricultural production, ability 
to deal with various problems among villagers and most importantly, the support of 
commune leaders, were able to become village (brigade or small team) cadres. Village 
cadres during commune era possessed authority, political power, prestige, and scarce 
resources as well. They could get villagers to comply by offering to grant them access to 
goods  and  opportunities  (such  as  income,  imputs,  leisure  or  social  services),  or  by 
threatening to deprive them of these resources (Oi 1989). By doing so, village cadres in 
the commune era could not only have a better life themselves, but also favour their 
relatives,  friends  and  clients  (Oi  1989;  Unger  2002).  Thus  village  patrons  during 
commune era, were almost exclusively brigade or team cadres, or what He Xuefeng 
(2002b) called “elites within the political system”. For example, Qu Jiazhi, who had 
been a team leader of B village during the commune era, recalled that period proudly 
and with pleasure: 
 
To be a cadre at that time [the commune era] was really a pleasant and authoritative job. 
As a team leader, I was in charge of allocating work tasks to my team members. Every 
team member was obedient and submissive. You know, I could punish a defiant member 
by allocating him heavy task and favour an obedient one by letting him do light work. 
Since every one wanted to do light work, no body dared to confront me. It was really 
much easier and commanded more respect to be a cadre then than it does nowadays 
(Interview 47). 
 
Since the dismantling of the commune system, rural society has been under transition. 
On the one hand, with the disbanding of collective agriculture, individual households   84 
have been able to do their own business and enrich themselves under the household 
contract  system,  thus  the  opportunities  for  villagers  to  change  their  socioeconomic 
status have greatly increased; on the other hand, due to the development of the market 
economy, the closed boundary of the village community has been broken, which enables 
villagers to find and make use of alternative chances and resources out of their village to 
change their socioeconomic status. As a result, in the reform era, village patrons have no 
longer been limited to village cadres as they were under the commune system. As Unger 
suggests, today “a more pluralistic structure of patronage has developed” (Unger 2000: 
78). Village patrons nowadays can refer to anyone who owns, controls, and thus can 
offer scarce resources, opportunities or other valuable and useful goods. Although in the 
reform era village cadres still control a range of scarce resources and remain patrons, 
they no longer monopolize scarce resources within the village community as they did 
during the commune era. Especially with outside-community contacts becoming more 
and more frequent and the development of a market economy, those persons who are 
able to offer jobs, loans, market opportunities, or assistance in dealing with “outsiders” 
can  draw  a  following  among  those  villagers  who  have  had  much  more  limited 
experience with the market and outside opportunities (Oi 1989: 224). In research on 
Italian rural society under transition, Silverman also finds that as outside relationships 
and contacts became more important over time, “the most valuable patron was neither 
the wealthiest nor the most generous, but the one with the best connections” (Silverman 
1967: 289). As far as rural China is concerned, although the demise of the commune 
system and the development of the market economy has undermined village cadres’ 
monopoly over opportunities and resources and other patrons have emerged on the basis 
of other resources, the clientelist nature of village politics has not diminished; it has 
merely evolved.   
 
However, in terms of the role of patrons after the commune era, there are two prominent 
characteristics: first, the resource base of patronage has enlarged in reform era. The 
patronage base, according to Scott, can be classified into three categories: a) one’s own 
knowledge and skills, b) direct control of the personal real property, and c) indirect   85 
control of the property or authority of others (often the public) (Scott 1972b: 97-98). By 
this  classification,  village  cadres/patrons  under  the  commune  system  almost  totally 
relied on their position and power derived from the higher-level authority, or, in Scott’s 
term,  the  “indirect  office-based  property”  (Ibid.:  98).  However,  with  the  end  of  the 
commune system, apart from the village cadres, some villagers who possess knowledge 
and  skills  (especially  market-related  ones)  or  own  personal  real  property  have  also 
become  potential  patrons.  For  instance,  Qu  Jiamao,  as  a  person  with  knowledge,  is 
constantly approached by his fellow villagers who want to ask him his views on the 
wisdom of things they are contemplating doing; Qu Sixu, who is a truck driver and has 
a transportation business, is often requested by villagers to transport their property; Qu 
Sifa runs a motorcycle repairing shop and is able to offer fellow villagers better services 
with lower prices (Interviews 50, 51 and 53). People like them, although not acting as 
village cadres before the advent of direct VC elections, actually have become patrons in 
the reform era based on either their knowledge, skills or personal real property, instead 
of the cadre status (indirect office-based properties).   
 
Second, village patrons have increasingly functioned as middlemen or brokers in the 
reform era. The patron’s role in connecting his clients to the world outside the local 
community is one of the most crucial features in descriptions of patronage systems in 
different cultural settings (Kenny 1960: 17&18; Pitt-Rivers 1954: 141; Silverman 1965: 
178).  Patrons  of  local  communities  have  been  validly  described  as  “gatekeepers” 
(Kenny 1960: 17), “mediators” (Silverman 1965) or “brokers” (Wolf 1956: 1075). More 
and  more  frequently  in  the  reform  era,  villagers  have  had  to  deal  with  “outsiders” 
(especially when facing complicated bureaucracies, such as when they apply for loans, 
credit, licenses of different kinds, or when dealing with the police and tax officials) and 
find opportunities outside their village community (looking  for employment, market 
opportunities  and  so  on).  Ordinary  villagers  do  not  feel  safe  when  facing  a  hostile 
outside  world  and  would  not  trust  those  strange  outsiders.  So  they  tend  to  seek 
assistance from people they feel they can trust and those who are better equipped and 
more experienced to deal with the outside world, namely, their patrons. These patrons,   86 
relying on their knowledge, skills and experience, as well as strong outside connections, 
thus can act as middlemen offering brokerage services to their clients. Oi, focusing on 
the  changing  role  of  village  cadres  of  the  early  post  commune  era,  has  argued  that 
“village cadres can no longer act as absolute gatekeepers” but “will remain middlemen 
between the peasants and the state as well as the market” (Oi 1989: 226).   
 
Apart from village cadres, other villagers with outside connections have also assumed 
the role of middlemen  or brokers. Some of them have connections with the market 
system, and some with the political system. But all these persons are capable of offering 
their fellow villagers crucial assistance in one way or another. For instance, Qu Jiaji has 
been able to act as a patron largely due to his valuable connection with his uncle, who is 
a People’s Liberation Army general. For many young people in the countryside, to join 
the army is an opportunity to escape farming and pursue a promising future. However, 
the quotas for recruitment are very limited each year (about one or two per village) and 
the selection process is usually rather stringent. Qu Jiaji, thanks to his uncle, is able to 
get valuable extra quotas for his fellow villagers who are eager to send their children to 
the army, or to help some applicants in the selection process. This has made Jiaji a 
respectable and valuable person (patron) in the eyes of many villagers (Interviews 29 
and 51). Qu Jiamao also gains his prestige partly from his outside connections. He was a 
deputy head teacher of the township primary school for many years before and at the 
end  of  1980s  he  resigned  to  set  up  his  own  private  business  selling  paper  boxes. 
According to Jiamao, his many students now have been in various positions and some 
are “very successful persons”. With these connections and contacts with his previous 
students, Jiamao is often approached by fellow villagers to seek help in time of need. 
For example, one of Jiamao’s neighbours was caught by police and faced a fine for 
driving a car without a valid driving license. After the neighbour turned to Qu Jiamao 
for help, Qu Jiamao contacted one of his pervious students who was an official in the 
County  government  for  help.  With  the  help  of  Jiamao’s  student,  the  fine  that  his 
neighbour  faced  was  withdrawn  (Interview  50).  These  outside  connections,  together 
with  Jiamao’s  knowledge  and  personal  economic  endeavors,  enable  him  to  have  an   87 
influence among villagers, namely, to be a patron. 
 
Candidates arising from the village patrons 
With the coming of direct village elections, village patrons who want to seek village 
public office and have a clientele at their command thus get the chance to stand as a VC 
candidate  running for elections. As the patron-client structure is predominant in the 
village community, to be a patron is actually a crucial precondition for a candidate who 
wants  to  run  for  VC  election.  As  noted  above,  a  patron  is  someone  who  combines 
authority, power, prestige, wealth or any scarce resources and maintains a number of 
clients  through  clientelist  exchange.  Therefore,  if  a  patron  stands  for  election  his 
chances  will  be  good:  on  the  one  hand,  as  a  person  with  prestige  or  “face”,  he  is 
well-known in the community in terms of his reputation, ability or personality; on the 
other  hand,  and  more  importantly,  as  a  patron,  he  may  easily  claim  votes  from  his 
clients who are bound to him by a debt of personal obligation, which largely facilitates 
his winning office. In other words, a patron’s influence over his clients can be easily 
translated  into  political  resources,  which  are  essential  for  winning  VC  elections.  In 
contrast, a non-patron candidate (if there is one), who has no patronage resources and a 
big size of personal following, does not have the advantage in elections as a patron 
candidate does and therefore have little chance to win elections in the village arena that 
is ridden by clientelism. As a result, in B village, all candidates who had actively run for 
village elections and got elected in elections are considered by villagers “able persons”, 
namely, patrons who own their local leadership to their personal skills, wealth,  and 
outside connections—all of which enable them to build a personal following.   
 
Candidates’ motivations for running for VC positions 
Salary 
Being able to get salary from holding VC positions should be one of the factors that lure 
some village patrons to run for VC offices. But village cadres’ salary standards vary 
greatly in different regions of rural China. In economically developed regions, village 
cadres are paid much more generously than those in poorer areas. For example, in a   88 
wealthy village in southern Jiangsu Province, one of the most developed rural areas in 
China, the major village cadres were paid over 43,000 yuan in 1999 (Zhong 2003: 176). 
Another rich village in Guangdong Province, three top village cadres’ salary averaged 
190,000 yuan (Unger 2002: 155). In some poor inland rural areas, village cadres only 
receive about 1,000 to 2,000 yuan a year and even this small amount of income means a 
lot for most villagers in that regions (Cao 2005: 186; Zhong 2003: 176). According to 
the township officials, the highest pay level for village cadres in Xinjia Township is 
around 9,000-10,000 yuan per year and this is only applied in three or four villages with 
very good collective economic condition. The average level is about 5,000-6,000 yuan 
per  year  and  in  a  few  villages  with  poor  collective  economic  condition,  the  village 
cadres can only have 3,000-4,000 yuan (Interviews 1,5 and 8). The salary of village 
cadres  in  each  village  usually  depends  on  the  economic  condition  of  the  village 
collective,  village  cadres’  workload,  as  well  as  the  village  tradition.  The  economic 
condition of the village collective, however, is the basic and principal factor deciding 
the salary level of village cadres since it is the village collective funds that pay for their 
salaries. 
 
The  collective  funds  of  B  village  are  wealthier  than  that  of  other  villages  for  two 
reasons. First, at the end of the 1990s, with the privatization of the collective-owned 
enterprises, the money obtained from selling enterprises went into the village collective 
funds. Second, in recent years, the government has bought pieces of farmland from B 
village for public construction or industrial development and the money has also gone 
into the collective funds. As a result, the annual salary for VC chair of B village is 
around  RMB  7,000,  which  is  relatively  high  compared  with  most  other  villages  of 
Xinjia Township. Deputy VC chair and VC member usually get 80% of VC chair’s 
salary (interview 3). However, the annual average income per person of B village is 
reported to be RMB 3500 in 2003 (interviews 2, 50 and 53). What is more, since the VC 
members of B village usually work part time (often in the morning of weekdays) and 
still  have  quite  some  time  to  run  their  own  businesses,  this  salary  should  be  quite 
attractive, at least in the eyes of some ordinary villagers. For example, one villager of B   89 
village commented: 
 
What a good job it is (to be a village cadre)! They just sit in the office comfortably, 
having tea, smoking and reading newspapers. What’s more, they basically only work 
three, four hours in the morning a day and are paid six, seven thousand kuai (Chinese 
yuan) each year. Isn’t it good enough? You know, many villagers work laboriously in 
their farmland early and late and can just make no more than a half of their salary 
(Interview 36).   
 
Although no village cadres of B village have ever indicated to me their satisfaction to 
their salary, rather, they often complained that their hard work could not match the low 
pay (Interviews 50 and 53), comparatively speaking, such a salary is quite desirable.   
 
Hidden benefits 
In addition to the official monetary pay, village cadres can also enjoy quite some hidden 
benefits from their posts, which include dining and drinking on collective funds and 
seeking personal interests with power.     
 
Eating  and  drinking  on  public  funds,  which  is  called  gongkuan  chihe  in  Chinese, 
actually is a prevalent phenomenon among Chinese officialdom. Although it is normal 
for the governmental departments (at the township level and above) to have a budget for 
entertainment in relation to official businesses such as official reception for higher up 
officials or other guests, due to the lack of strict public supervision, such entertainment 
expenditure is often exploited or abused by government officials (Wang 2007; Zhang 
2006). Some officials even entertain their family members or personal friends by taking 
advantage of public funds (Wang 2007).   
 
At village level, a reasonable sum of money spent on entertainment should have been a 
normal expenditure for village administration. In Longkou and many places elsewhere, 
the  expenditure  item  for  village  entertainment  is  officially  recognized  and  formally   90 
shown on village account statement (interview 3 and Cheng 2001). In theory, the village 
entertainment expenditure should only occur in the process of doing necessary public 
affairs, such as serving meals to some guests or providing entertainment in relation to 
certain public activities. In reality, however, due to lack of transparency and oversight 
(this will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6), village cadres, actually have considerable 
discretion on how to spend on entertainment. As a result, despite the central government 
policy to constrain village level entertainment expenditure (Guowuyuan bangongting 
2006), in many villages, a significant part of village public funds is often overspent and 
even abused on dining and drinking, particularly for entertaining township officials who 
make inspection visits to villages (Cheng 2000: 52-53; Liu 2006; Zhang 2001; Zhang 
2003).           
 
As far as B village is concerned, its entertainment fees added up to about 20,000 yuan in 
2004 (interview 2). On average that is about 1,700 yuan per month. However, the annual 
salary for VC chair is 7,000 yuan (about 600 yuan per month). And the average annual 
income per person of B village in 2004 is claimed to be 3500 yuan (interview 55). This 
means that the public money that B village cadres spent on dining and drinking each 
month almost equals a villager’s half-year income. An overwhelming majority of the 
entertainment fees in B village was spent on entertaining township officials who made 
frequent inspection visits to B village. It was even alleged that village cadres abused 
public money on entertaining their relatives and friends by the excuse of doing official 
businesses (interviews 50 and 53). In addition to meals and drinks, village cadres can 
also get some other benefits. For example, their tea and cigarettes are paid by the village 
collective funds as part of village administrative or entertainment expense (interview 
55).   
 
Another form of hidden benefits of being a village cadre comes from seeking personal 
interests with power. Traditionally, official status in China usually means privileges and 
respect (Zhong 2003). Though officially village cadres do not have cadre status, they do 
have semi-official status since they are assigned many administrative tasks to fulfill, and   91 
the most important thing is that, in terms of village affairs, village cadres do have a say 
in getting things done. In other words, village cadres do have considerable power on 
their  village  arena.  Those  powers  may  include  discretion  in  how  to  carry  out  the 
township government’s regulations and orders, like for example in implementing family 
planning policy or in allocating plots of land for housing, the uses of village collective 
funds,  arranging  village  production  activities  or  what  to  do  for  village  daily 
administrative affairs. All these things can be done with considerable discretion and 
particularistic  considerations  based  on  guanxi.  And  often  gifts,  bribe  or  favours  are 
expected of villagers in return for services provided by village cadres, which involves 
corruption or patronage (Cao 2005: 186-187; Zhong 2003: 176; interviews 10, 28 and 
51).   
 
Prestige and private resentment 
In addition to the material benefits, prestige is another important incentive for village 
patrons to run for VC elections. Some village patrons run for VC elections mainly to 
gain prestige for themselves or damage their enemies’ prestige. Holding village public 
offices can bring prestige to the village patrons and make them more respectable in the 
eyes  of  ordinary  villagers  (Interview  6).  Especially  with  the  arrival  of  direct  VC 
elections, winning VC office through villagers’ direct voting can, to a large degree, be 
regarded  as  meaning  that  a  village  patron  has  a  significant  influence  and  a  large 
following in the village community. And holding village public offices and controlling 
power and authority enable a patron to nurture and extend his personal clientele (Scott 
1972b: 98), which in turn adds up his prestige or “face”. 
 
Private resentment seems to be another important factor encouraging candidates to run 
for VC elections. Within a village, personal conflicts may easily lead to resentment. 
These conflicts among people can be out of various reasons, for instance, daily quarrels 
between neighbours, friction between cadres and the masses, fights on personal benefits 
or even out of jealousy to others (Interviews 1, 7, 49 and 50). Personal conflicts have 
played so big a role in the competition for VC offices that many Xinjia Township cadres   92 
criticize this phenomenon. A Xinjia cadre said: “After we carried out the direct VC 
elections,  some  candidates  actively  ran  for  elections  just  out  of  private  resentment 
toward the incumbent village cadres. Their aim was merely to remove the incumbent 
cadres and retaliate against them once they get elected.” (Interview 7) When I asked this 
cadre if the same thing happened in B village, he replied, “I think Jiamao and his mates 
did have this incentive because they started to scrutinize the previous village accounts 
as soon as they got elected in 1999. Their true intention was to retaliate against Qu 
Sixiang [the VPB secretary] and other old cadres” (Ibid.). 
 
Interviews  with  both  Jiamao  and  Sixiang  confirmed  that  personal  conflicts  between 
them played a role (Interviews 49 and 50). For instance, Sixiang told me: 
 
Personal conflicts together with the faults in my job made me become the object of 
resentment for some people in the village. Jiamao and I have mutual resentment. I once 
offended Jiamao’s bother for the sake of the village collective. Since then, his brother 
has harbored a grudge against me and has often come to my home or office after he’s 
been drinking, vituperating against and trying to provoke me. In the end, I could not 
stand it and called the police. The police punished his brother. In the countryside, people 
have a strong sense of kinship, which means if you offend one person, you will become 
the enemy of his whole kindred. Since I had such severe conflict with Jiamao’s brother, 
Jiamao would hate me and be eager to find chances to stricke back as well. So, direct VC 
elections offered him the chance (Interview 49). 
 
Similarly, one Xinjia Township official revealed that one of the reasons that motivated 
Jiazhi’s running for VC elections in 2002 was also for personal resentment: 
 
Jiazhi had been the deputy VC chairman for many years before direct elections were 
introduced. In 1999, when the first direct VC election was held, Jiazhi also actively took 
part in the election campaign, attempting to be elected VC chair. However, Jiamao beat 
him in the end, which made Jiazhi choked with resentment. Three years later, in the 2002   93 
election, Jiazhi made a determined stand again. This time, he won VC Chair and finally 
vented his anger (Interview 9). 
 
It is very unlikely that the candidates themselves confess publicly that their incentive of 
running for VC offices is out of private resentment. It is also impossible to gauge to 
what  degree  this  factor  pushes  a  candidate  to  run  for  VC  offices  and  whether  his 
intention is to retaliate against the incumbent cadres or just to prove himself.         
   
Strategies for winning votes 
 
La piao: guanxi mobilization for village electoral campaign   
During  my  fieldwork  in  B  village  and  Xinjia  Township,  the  most  often  heard  term 
concerning  village  elections  was  “la  piao”  (perhaps  best  translated  into  English  as 
“soliciting votes”). As one villager told me: “nowadays, (village) elections are actually 
about competition in la piao. It is almost unimaginable for any candidate to get elected 
without la piao.” La piao, however, was viewed negatively by villagers and usually 
conducted furtively and in private. When I asked Qu Jiamao if he had won the 1999 
election by la piao, he replied me cautiously: “I did visit my fellow villagers’ houses, 
telling them my opinions and my plans for village governance in the future so as to gain 
their support. But I don’t think la piao is the correct term for my action. Look, if you 
don't let your fellow villagers know your intention to run for the election, how can they 
vote for you?” (Interview 50) Here, Jiamao does not think visiting fellow villagers and 
telling them his will to run for election equates to la piao. According to my fieldwork 
investigation  in  Xinjia  Township,  although  few  elected  village  cadres  would  like  to 
attribute their winning offices to la piao (although they often do so when talking about 
their electoral contenders). Instead, they all tended to claim they had got elected due to 
“the support and trust of the masses” (Interviews 50, 51, 53 and 57). However, “the 
masses” seem not to agree fully with this statement. At least, the overwhelming majority 
of my villager interviewees do not think so. How, then, do candidates la piao in village   94 
electoral campaigns? Why is la piao, in terms of village elections, a kind of activity 
with negative connotations? Based on interviews and observation in B village, I have 
identified four forms of la piao that are employed by candidates: claiming votes from 
their  clients,  making  particularistic  promises,  offering  specific  material  benefits  and 
voting buying.   
 
First  of  all,  claiming  votes  from  his/her  clients  perhaps  is  the  most  common  and 
effective  way  for  a  candidate  (patron)  to  gain  votes.  As  discussed  previously,  in  a 
patron-client relationship, the patron is in fact in a position to supply critical goods and 
services which the clients need for their survival and well being. In this sense, a client is 
someone  who  has  entered  an  unequal  exchange  relation  in  which  he  is  unable  to 
reciprocate fully. A debt of obligation binds him to the patron. The patron therefore is in 
an ideal position to demand compliance of his/her clients. As Scott puts it: “the patron’s 
domination  of  needed  services,  enable  him  to  build  up  savings  of  deference  and 
compliance which enhance his status, and represents a capacity for mobilizing a group 
of supporters when he cares to. The larger a patron’s clientele, and the more dependent 
on him they are, the greater his latent capacity to organize group action” (Scott 1972b: 
94). With the arrival of direct VC elections, the patron who seeks VC office is in an 
ideal position to claim votes from his/her clients by take advantage of their deference, 
compliance  and  obligation  to  reciprocate.  In  B  village,  for  example,  almost  all 
candidates have tended to mobilize the votes of their fellow villagers who owe them a 
debt of human feelings (reqing) (Interviews 47, 49, 50 and 52). 
 
Second,  in  exchange  for  their  votes,  a  candidate  would  make  various  particularistic 
promises to villagers for whom he is not a patron—in doing so he is seeking to become 
a patron and establish clientelist relations. Promises are made according to the very need 
of different persons, from promising village subcommittee posts or job opportunities, to 
decreasing people’s contract fees for renting village collective properties, or offering 
future help in applying for house construction licence and so on (Interviews 38, 47, 48, 
50  and  55).  In  short,  each  villager,  or  family  may  have  or  will  have  different  and   95 
specific problems to solve and they are therefore willing to exchange their votes for 
some particularistic concern of a potential village patron.   
 
Third, to villagers who are not his clients, a candidate would exchange their votes on an 
instrumental basis by directly giving specific material benefits. Although wining, dining, 
and the exchange of gifts among villagers, are part of villagers’ everyday lives (Kipnis 
1996),
 such  activities,  particularly  when  undertaken  by  a  candidate  shortly  before  a 
village  election,  can  be  considered  very  instrumental.  For  example,  one  villager 
interviewee  told  me  that,  shortly  before  the  2004  election  in  B  village,  one  of  the 
candidates had entertained many fellow villagers at dinner. He said, “Just about two 
weeks before the election, Qu Jiaji invited the men to the restaurant, while his wife 
entertained the women at home. Every guest was clear about why he/she was invited by 
the couple” (Interview 39). In addition to B village, in Xinjia Township’s 2004 VC 
elections, candidates of other villages were also reported to give cooking oil, restaurant 
free meal voucher, cigarettes or things like that to their fellow villagers to exchange 
their votes days before election (Interview 40, 45, 50, 51 and 54).   
 
Finally, vote buying is a direct trade between money and votes. Vote buying may happen 
when  a  candidate  solicits  vote  from  a  fellow  villager  with  whom  he/she  has  no 
patronage relationship and perhaps only distant or no guanxi relations at all, while the 
villager is ready to sell his/her vote for immediate economic return. Especially in a close 
and highly competitive election, vote buying is very likely to be used by candidates to 
win  votes.  During  the  2004  village  elections  in  Xinjia  Township,  vote  buying  had 
happened in some villages according to my interviewees (Interviews 13, 16, 26, 55 and 
57).  Since  vote  buying  is  usually  carried  out  privately  and  secretly,  and  neither  the 
buyers nor the sellers would like to admit such clearly illegal action, it is very difficult 
to get reliable and accurate data on this. Nonetheless, in B village’s 2004 VC election, 
candidates of both factions (factions in B village will be introduced and discussed below) 
accused  their  rivals  of  “buying  votes”  (Interviews  47,  52  and  53).  Also,  in  Xinjia 
Township’s 2004 VC elections, one elected VC chair of Z village admitted to me that he   96 
had had to give money to some villagers to win their votes (Interview 58); one villager 
of T village told me that one of the candidates in his village had wanted to buy his vote, 
but he had refused (Interview 59). In addition, there were also quite a few interviewees, 
including both villagers and township government officials, who had simply assured me 
of the “facts” of vote buying but refused to give more specific details on it (Interviews 
13,  16,  26,  55  and  57).  Nationwide,  vote-buying  in  village  elections  has  also  been 
reported in many places. A prominent example is a case which happened in Shanxi 
Province and was reported by the Chinese official newspaper, People’s Daily (Liu 2003). 
Due to the spread of vote buying in village elections nationwide, the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs  (MoCA)  issued  a  circular  in  2004  which  demanding  every  place  to  “firmly 
forbid the candidates or their relatives and friends to directly or instigate others to buy 
off their fellow villagers, electoral workers as well as other candidates by using money, 
properties or other benefits in village elections” (Ministry of Civil Affairs of the PRC 
2004). 
 
All the four forms of la piao employed by the candidates are based on face-to-face 
informal  social  bonds  that  can  pull  villagers  together.  These  social  connections  are 
generally called guanxi or renqing by villagers. A candidate may pull together voters on 
the basis of kinship relations, workmate relations, neighbour relations, in-law relations, 
or any kind of personal relations. However, as I have analyzed previously, these socials 
connections can be divided into two categories: the horizontal ones and the vertical ones. 
The horizontal ones are between villagers of equal status, while the vertical ones are 
formed between villagers of unequal status and are patron-client relationships. As far as 
la piao is concerned, a candidate will put all his guanxi ties into full use, namely, he 
may employ both the horizontal and the vertical ties to gain votes. However, what I 
would  like  to  emphasize  here  is  that  since  the  candidates  almost  always  emerge  as 
patrons, they are actually likely to be able to command quite significant support from 
their clients in elections. In the process of la piao, a candidate actually always attempts 
to reach his clients on the basis of a past, present, or future particularistic benefits (or 
implicit threat to withdraw such benefits). A candidate’s behaviour in la piao largely fits   97 
a pattern of patron mobilization, through which he is able to claim votes from those who 
owe favours or are indebted to him or those who want to gain favours from him in the 
future.         
 
This analysis may be viewed as a simple method by which a single candidate tries to 
solicit votes through his ego-centred personal network. In practice, due to the strong 
competition  between  opposing  candidates  and  the  necessity  of  gathering  as  many 
voters/votes  as  possible,  candidates  are  induced  to  make  alliances  to  integrate  their 
different  guanxi  networks  so  as  to  mobilize  a  larger  group  of  followers.  Mutually 
opposed factions therefore come into being, sometimes realigning over time. 
 
Patrons and the formation of factions 
Factions,  as  defined  by  Nicholas,  are  non-corporate  political  conflict  groups  with 
members recruited by a leader on diverse principles (Nicholas 1977: 57&58). When 
addressing  this  definition,  he  especially  points  out  that  a  faction  leader  usually  has 
“several different kinds of connections with his followers; he makes use of all possible 
ties to draw supporters into his faction” (ibid.: 58). Most other scholars, when analyzing 
factions, also have stressed the particularistic ties formed between individuals (Bailey 
1969: 52; Boissevain 1977: 279-287). In the Chinese rural context, “factions are held 
together not by common ideology or class but by social ties (kin, patron-client, friend, 
etc.)”  and  they  thus  can  be  considered  as  “mostly  exclusive  guanxi  networks”  (see 
Bosco 1992: 158&168).
20   
 
Since the followers attached to a single candidate’s personal network can be limited, 
they  may  be  insufficient  to  win  elections.  However,  if  a  group  of  candidates  ally 
together and form a faction, with each faction member trying to secure votes/followers 
for his faction candidate through his own connections, the possibility of winning will of 
course  significantly  enhanced.  In  fact,  in  B  village,  la  piao  is  carried  out  in  a 
                                                        
20  Evidence for factions’ recruiting supporters on the basis of guanxi in a non-election context in Chinese rural 
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“team-work” style based on faction. Since there are three village committee posts (one 
chair, one deputy chair and one member) subject to election in B village, each faction 
would  usually  choose  the  same  number  of  candidates  to  run  for  these  posts.
21  For 
instance, in a village where three posts were subject to election, each of the two opposed 
factions had three candidates. When soliciting votes, faction members just directly told 
their followers which three they should write on their ballots (Interview 47 and 50). 
Although one villager may like one while hate another concerning the candidates of a 
faction, faction mobilization attempts to confine villagers choices within the “package” 
of each faction. It is also worth noting that in most cases, the candidates who ally and 
run for elections together are themselves faction leaders. However, this is not always the 
case. In some villages, the real faction leaders may not run elections themselves but pull 
wires behind the curtain instead (Interview 15).   
 
Two factions crystallized in B village with the coming of the first direct VC elections in 
1999:  the  Old  Leading  Team  (OLT)  Faction  and  the  New  Faction.  Since  then,  the 
electoral contest in B village has been between the two groups. Briefly, the OLT Faction 
mainly  consists  of  those  former  village  cadres  who  had  led  B  village  before  direct 
election in 1999 and a number of villagers who once benefited from their power. The 
core person in the OLT Faction is Qu Sixiang, who was the Party secretary or boss of B 
village (initially when it was a “brigade”) for almost thirty years. Sixiang was appointed 
as the brigade secretary in 1970s during the commune era and had continued to be the 
village Party secretary until 2000. Having been the boss of B village for three decades, 
he was regarded as an “able” and “authoritative” leader by both many villagers and the 
Xinjia Township cadres. One villager comments:   
 
Sixiang is really a scarce and prominent leader in the countryside. He started to establish 
and run village-owned factory even as early as the end of 1970s and B village was 
almost the first one in Xinjia Township to develop rural industry. You know, Sixiang did 
                                                        
21  In most cases, the candidates who ally and run for elections together are themselves faction leaders. However, this 
is not always the case. In some villages, the real faction leaders may not run elections themselves but pull wires 
behind the curtain instead.         99 
make a great contribution to the economic development of B village (Interview 23).   
 
Another villager, however, was very critical of him: 
 
Sixiang is a corrupt cadre who had abused power for many years. When he was in 
power, he only favoured his own relatives and friends, who had enriched themselves at 
the  cost  of  the  village  collective.  He  appointed  his  men  as  the  managers  of  the 
village-owned factory, but made no profit for the collective. All those village-owned 
factory ended up bankrupt, but he and his men had got enough benefits. He sold a large 
amount of village farmland without the consent of the villagers, and till today people 
have no idea where the money has gone (Interview 28).       
 
Although villagers have different views, Sixiang has always enjoyed the support of the 
township government. A Xinjia Township leader appraised him: 
 
Sixiang is the kind of village leader who are very scarce in countryside. You know, 
acting as village cadres is the kind of job that able guys avoid to do and unable guys 
wish to do but cannot manage. So it is not easy for villagers to get an able person to be 
their village leader. Sixiang is really a good leader. He is brainy, flexible, familiar with 
government policies and full of leading experiences of rural work (Interview 10). 
 
Sixiang also left me with similar impression when I interviewed him. His talk was clear, 
logical and persuasive. Actually there were no any other village cadres who had left me 
such an impression during my fieldwork in Xinjia Township. In the interview, Sixiang 
said: 
 
I was the village Party Branch secretary of B village for 30 years since 1970s. I 
started to set up village-owned enterprises in the early 1980s shortly after the national 
policy of reform and opening up. The first village-owned enterprise that I set up was 
an electric welding machine factory. We had great success in running this factory,   100 
which  returned  considerable  profits  for  our  village.  With  the  accumulation  of 
collective funds, one by one, I set up a series of village-owned enterprises: a raincoat 
factory,  a  hencoop  factory,  a  paint  factory,  a  hennery,  a  gas  station  and  a  pencil 
factory. B village became one of the best collective-economy-developed villages in 
Xinjia Township. I am hated by some villagers due to personal resentments and some 
mistakes I had made in my job. Direct village election simply gave a chance for those 
guys to revenge us old cadres (Interview 49). 
 
Mainly based on the power derived from his position, Sixiang has been able to build up 
a following in the village. Qu Jiabo, Qu Jiazhi and Qu Shaodong and Qu Sifa are among 
his  most  loyal  followers  and  core  members  of  the  OLT  Faction.  Jiabo,  Jiazhi  and 
Shaodong had been VC chair, deputy chair and VC member respectively since early 
1990s under Sixiang’s leadership. Sifa was appointed by Sixiang as manager of the 
village-owned paint factory in late 1980s. In 1998, Sifa bought the paint factory from 
the village collective and was still managing it in 2006. In short, all the core members of 
the OLT Faction have vested interests in village power.   
 
The opposing faction, which I call the New Faction, first emerged in 1999 with the 
coming of the first direct village election. Core members of this faction, largely consists 
new  village  patrons  who  did  not  act  as  village  cadres  before  but  gained  significant 
prestige  and  patronage  resources  in  the  reform  era  because  of  their  ability, 
entrepreneurial  skills  or  useful  outside  connections.  With  the  advent  of  direct  VC 
elections, these new patrons became serious contenders for village power largely due to 
their obtained patronage resources. The initial core members of this faction were Jiamao, 
Jiaji and Jiaxian, who united together running for the VC offices and won in 1999. Since 
core members of this faction did not personally benefit from the village power held by 
those  old  village  cadres,  they  were  thereofore  very  critical  to  the  “corrupt”  deeds 
committed by the members of the OLT Faction. Jiamao said:   
 
For a long time, villagers have been very discontented with the old village cadres’   101 
corrupt and evil doings. When they were in office, they only sought benefits for 
themselves, their relatives and friends by abusing the power. The first direct village 
election in 1999 offered us a chance to challenge them. Shortly before the election, 
Jiaji and Jiaxian came to me, inviting me to run for the election together with them. I 
agreed  and  that  is  why  we  three  cooperated  together  and  won  the  1999  election 
(Interview 50).   
 
Like the OLT Faction, the New Faction also unites and acts on the basis of personal 
relationships. However, the New Faction does not have a strong and prominent leader as 
the role Sixiang plays in the OLT Faction. Originally, the reason that Jiamao, Jiaji and 
Jiaxian  united  together  to  run  for  VC  elections  was  that  they  were  neighbours  and 
friends  and  were  all  discontented  with  the  old  village  cadres  for  different  reasons 
(Interview 50, 51 and 53).     
             
Taking advantage of proxy voting 
In theory, proxy voting is supposed to guarantee every voter’s right to vote, even when 
one can not personally go to vote on the election day. The revised Organic Law does not 
include any content on proxy voting. It is stipulated in provincial or local regulations for 
implementing the revised Organic Law. For instance, “Measures for VC Elections in 
Shandong Province” (the 1998 Measures) stipulates that: 
 
If a voter is illiterate or not able to fill ballot due to disability or will be away in the 
election day, he may entrust other voters (except the candidates) to vote for him. Proxy 
voting should be applied for by the voter himself and approved by the village electoral 
committee. Proxy voting must not be against the will of the client. Each voter must not 
accept more than three proxy votes (Article 16). 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, proxy voting in B village is very common. Over 
the last three rounds of elections, there have been many more proxy votes cast than 
votes in person. Proxy voting was accounted for more than 50 per cent of the total votes   102 
cast in each round VC election (see Table 3.1). Despite this, proxy voting has been 
endorsed by local authorities because, without it, it would be very difficult to reach the 
quorum for VC elections.
22  In practice, however, proxy voting has been misused to gain 
“safe” votes by candidates. A villager in B village explained how it was misused in 
reality: 
 
In reality, proxy voting actually has become a method employed by the candidates to 
gain safe votes. For example, suppose a candidate (or his supporter) M comes to a voter 
to request his vote. For the sake of face-saving, this voter usually would agree to vote for 
M even if he does not really want to. Because this voter knows that, as secret voting is 
applied in election, he may still vote someone else on the election day while avoid 
offending M at the moment. However, M also knows that despite his promise, the voter 
may still probably vote for someone else in the election. To secure the vote, M would 
then ask for this voter’s voting certificate, by which M can arrange a person whom he 
trusts  to  vote  for  this  voter  on  the  election  day  [in  accordance  with  proxy  voting 
stipulation]. And this voter in the end would be very likely to agree to do so even though 
it is against his will. Because, he doesn’t want to or may not afford to offend M. So, by 
taking advantage of proxy voting, a candidate can easily turn those uncertain votes into 
his safe votes (Interview 34). 
 
Proxy voting can also facilitate candidates’ vote soliciting in another way. Since quite 
often, one voter will vote for his whole family, the candidate therefore does not have to 
solicit votes from each individual family member, instead, he only needs to work on one 
member and can get his whole family’s votes. For example, a villager said:   
 
It is very rare that family members go to cast their ballots individually. Usually one 
person, say the husband or wife, will cast all the votes on behalf of his family. Family 
votes usually go as a block. If you have some influence over one member, the whole 
                                                        
22  Article 14 of the revised Organic Law stipulates that a VC election is only valid when more than half eligible 
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family’s votes will very likely go to you as a whole. It is usually needless to work on 
each family member separately. Of course, it is important to work on the one whose 
opinion carries the weight in the family. For instance, Siyou is a henpecked guy and 
always obedient to his wife. If you want to get his family’s votes, you have to deal with 
his wife (Interview 25).       
 
Proxy voting actually serves to further lower the freedom of the voters and subject them 
to  various  personal  relations  (especially  the  clientelist  ones)  that  the  candidates  can 
deploy. Although anonymous voting is formally practiced in VC elections, the existence 
of proxy voting largely discounts the anonymity of voting and facilitates candidates’ 
vote soliciting.             
 
Patronage and factional politics in three rounds of electoral contest 
 
The 1999 election 
The 1999 election was the first direct village election in B village and the first time that 
the two opposing factions crystallized. The New Faction candidates, Jiamao, Jiaxian and 
Jiaji, campaigned to challenge the then incumbent village cadres, who belong to the 
OLT Faction. Sixiang was village party secretary at that time and his intention was to 
keep the incumbent VC cadres, his allies, in power. The incumbent VC cadres before 
1999  election  were  Jiabo  (VC  chair),  Jiazhi  (deputy  VC  chair)  and  Shaodong  (VC 
member). But the result was the New Faction won all the three VC positions and came 
to power (See Appendix 4, table 1).   
 
Three  reasons  contributed  to  the  New  Faction’s  victory  in  1999.  First,  its  members 
carried out la piao successfully. All three candidates united together and solicited votes 
cooperatively.  By  taking  advantage  of  their  factional  network,  a  large  number  of 
villagers were mobilized and enlisted into their network. As Jiamao said, “Each one of 
our three made use of our own connections and go about the work separately. We visited   104 
almost each household at that time and tried to persuade fellow villagers to support us” 
(Interview 50). Compared to the New Faction, candidates of the OLT Faction, i.e. the 
incumbent  cadres,  did  not  try  their  best  to  mobilize  villagers  by  the  same  way.  A 
government official of Xinjia Township commented in regard to the failure of the OLT 
Faction: “Failing to la piao seriously is one of the most important factors leading the 
lose of the old cadres of B village in 1999. When the first direct VC election came about, 
those old incumbent village cadres did not carry out la piao seriously. Since they had 
been  village  cadres  for  years  and  had  always  been  appointed  by  the  township 
government, they felt shameful to solicit votes from ordinary villagers household by 
household. On the contrary, Jiamao and his men had no such thinking because they had 
been ordinary villagers all along” (Interview 17). Second, the three candidates of the 
New Faction were politically “clean” to villagers. Since all three candidates of the New 
Faction  had  never  been  cadres  before  and  therefore  had  nothing  to  do  with  the 
“corruption”, “unfairness” or “abuse of power”, which some claimed had characterized 
the leadership of those members of the OLT Faction. In the words of Jiamao, “I was a 
piece of white paper in the eyes of the ordinary villagers at that time” (Interview 50). By 
contrast, those old incumbent cadres had been “dirty” in the eyes of many villagers after 
years in office. And the New Faction also attempted to destroy the integrity of the OLT 
Faction by circulating numerous charges of corruption against its core members and 
candidates (Interview 40 and 42). Apart from the allegations of corruption and misdeeds, 
during years in power, they had offended many villagers in the process of implementing 
various  unpopular  state  policies,  such  as  family  planning,  tax  collecting  and  so  on 
(Interview 17, 31 and 50). As a result, the New Faction skillfully took advantage of 
villagers’ discontent to those old village cadres. Finally, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the New Faction candidates made promises on two local issues in this election: 
to  audit  previous  village  account  and  punish  those  old  cadres  who  had  committed 
corruptions and to refund some villagers’ share in a bankrupt village collective-owned 
factory. The promises seemed to be appealing to many villagers. 
 
These three factors led to the overwhelming victory of the New Faction in 1999. All   105 
three VC positions were filled the candidates of the New Faction. Jiaomao, Jiaxian and 
Jiaji won VC chair, deputy chair and VC member respectively in this election (See 
Appendix 4, Table A). 
 
The 2002 election 
 
In the 2002 election, the OLT Faction fought back. Jiazhi and Sifa, who belonged to the 
OLT Faction, won the VC chair and deputy chair respectively. Jiamao and Jiaxian, who 
were core of the New Faction, stepped down, although Jiaji kept his position as a VC 
member (see Appendix 4, Table B).   
 
Why the OLT Faction won back in the 2002 election? First of all, the OLT Faction had 
drawn a lesson from their failure in the 1999 election. They had realized the importance 
of la piao. Thus in the 2002 election, members of the OLT Faction had actively carried 
out la piao, mobilizing villagers through their factional networks. As a Xinjia Township 
official told me: “In the 2002 election, Jiazhi, Sifa as well as other members of their 
faction understood that without seriously la piao, it’s almost impossible to get elected. 
Therefore, they  also tried their utmost to la piao” (Interview 14). Second, the New 
Faction had failed to deliver their promises on the two local issues they raised during 
their tenure, which more or less damaged their prestige among many villagers. Jiamao 
told me the reason for which he had failed to deliver the promises:   
 
Initially, when I just started to do my job after being elected, I was really ambitious, 
attempting to investigate and solve those problems left by the old cadres as soon as 
possible so as to give the villagers a clear and satisfactory answer. However, once I 
really did, I realized how difficult it was. I actually stirred up a hornet nest. Those old 
cadres kept making trouble. They even incited some of their supporters to break into my 
house, cursing me. I asked the township government to support me to do my job and 
help to investigate those corrupt things done by the old cadres. The township leaders, 
however, had been always indifferent or simply ignored my requirements. In the end, I   106 
thoroughly became disappointed and lost confidence. Look, to work seriously, I could 
not get the support of the higher-level government and the understanding of the people; 
to work halfheartedly and seek personal benefits, I am not that kind of person. Therefore, 
three years later I did not want to do the job any longer and refused to run for reelection 
(Interview 50).   
 
Thirdly, Jiamao’s decision not to stand for re-election in 2002 led to the decrease of the 
followers/voters who could have been recruited to the New Faction. Since Jiamao had 
been so frustrated that he did not stand as a candidate, the New Faction lost a core 
member who could have enlisted a significant number of voters/followers. Jiamao said, 
“When the 2002 election came, Jiaxian and Jiaji urged me to seek reelection with them, 
but I firmly refused. Because I had stayed away from the election, many villagers who 
should have voted for me were likely to give their votes to the other faction” (Interview 
50). 
 
The 2004 election 
The  2004  election
23  was  the  third  electoral  contest  between  the  two  factions. 
Interestingly, in this election, each faction had a core member defect to the opposing 
camp. Jiaji, who had been the core member of the New Faction, defected to the OLT 
Faction. Jiaji defected to the OLT Faction mainly for two reasons. First, it was said that 
during his last VC tenure working with Jiazhi and Sifa (both are core members of the 
OLT  Faction),  Jiaji  “colluded”  with  the  two  exploiting  village  public  power  for 
improper personal gain. This motivated him to continue to work with Jiazhi and Sifa as 
VC cadres so as to get more improper personal benefits (Interviews 50 and 53). Second, 
he reckoned that to join the OLT Faction and seek re-election together with Jiazhi and 
Sifa as the incumbent would be his best chance to get re-elected (Interviews 50).   
 
While Sichun, who had actively solicited votes for the OLT Faction in the 2002 election, 
                                                        
23  The seventh session VC, i.e., the VC elected in May 2002 should have been due in April 2005 if serving a full term 
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stood as the candidate of the New Faction this time. It was said that Sichun, who was a 
wealthy  milk  dealer,  secured  many  votes  for  the  OLT  Faction  and  “significantly” 
contributed to the OLT Faction’s winning in the 2002 election. But Sichun actually had 
been  keen  to  be  a  VC  cadre  himself  rather  than  merely  playing  a  supportive  role. 
However,  despite  his  contribution,  the  OLT  Faction  would  not  make  him  a  VC 
candidate for unknown reasons. With the advent of the 2004 election, the New Faction, 
in order to defeat the OLT Faction, asked Sichun to defect to them. In exchange, the 
New Faction would make Sichun a VC candidate in the election. Eager to be a VC cadre 
himself, Sichun defected to the New Faction and ran against the OLT Faction in the 
2004 election. His defection led to a significant number of votes/voters affiliated to him 
going to the New Faction.   
 
Thus, in the 2004 election, the candidates of the New Faction were Jiaxian, Sixu and 
Sichun. The candidates of the OLT Faction were the incumbent VC cadres, Jiazhi, Sifa 
and Jiaji. The result was that Sixu and Sichun got elected and became the VC chair and 
deputy chair respectively. Jiazhi and Jiaji were ousted. At the same time, although Sifa 
was re-elected, he lost the position of deputy chair and became the VC member (see 
Appendix 4,Table C). 
 
Analysis of the three elections   
Each VC election has led to the change of VC cadres in B village since 1999. The 
change  of  personnel,  however,  is  largely  due  to  factional  competition  based  on  the 
personal/factional networks. The faction that could enlist more followers would win the 
election in the end. The degree of factional mobilization has also increased.       
 
In the first direct VC election, the factions were delineated on “old cadres versus new 
challengers”  lines.  But  the  degree  of  factional  mobilization  was  much  less  than  the 
following two. And issues—or at least two issues, i.e., anti-corruption and refunding 
villagers’  money  in  a  bankrupt  village  factory—were  more  or  less  significant  in 
mobilizing voters (alongside considerations of personal relations and benefit). Although   108 
the two issues may have played a role in mobilizing voters, Jiamao and his men’s failure 
to make any difference during their tenure greatly discouraged the villagers and made 
them  quite  cynical  to  the  so-called  public  promises.  This  has  further  strengthened 
villagers’  inclination  to  exchange  their  votes  for  particularistic  benefits  which  are 
largely distributed by village patrons.   
 
In the  following 2002 and 2004 elections, the degree of clientelist mobilization has 
clearly  increased  as  no  candidates  or  factions  attempted  to  attract  voters  by  raising 
issues or making promises concerning the whole village community. Instead, candidates 
of both factions tried their best to la piao through their guanxi ties. The faction that 
could lock in most voters would win the election. It is also worth noting that, although 
factional mobilization is decisive in winning elections, factional solidarity is fragile. As 
B village’s 2004 VC election has demonstrated, defection in factional membership can 
be an important factor that strongly influences the electoral result. The defection of Jiaji 
(from the New Faction to the OLT Faction) and Sichun (from the OLT Faction to the 
New Faction) demonstrates that the factions in the 2004 election were formed on a 
different basis from those in the 1999. As for voters, the point of view of candidates 
were no longer an issue; for candidates, seeking power, prestige and personal gain also 
take precedence over loyalty to ones group or consideration of village issues. As Spiro 
has observed in a Burmese village: “if factionalism is a characteristic feature of village 
life, the fragility of factional solidarity is, in turn, one of the characteristic features of 
factionalism” (Spiro 1969: 412). 
 
Conclusion   
 
The scope of village elites has been enlarged in the reform era. Unlike the commune era, 
when the village elites had been largely limited to the village cadres, nowadays, any 
villagers who own entrepreneurial skills, knowledge, wealth, job opportunities, or, more 
importantly, outside connections have been able to become patrons and middlemen in   109 
an  evolving  clientelist  village  politics.  These  patrons/middlemen  are  important  to 
villagers, who are eager to get security, assistance, opportunity, or various favours from 
them. Meanwhile, a village patron also feels free to require services from his clients in 
time  of  need.  Village  election  can  be  such  a  moment,  when  the  patron  can  require 
service from his clients. 
 
The coming of direct village election has made it possible for some village patrons to 
stand as candidates in elections due to various reasons: attractive pay, invisible benefits 
or personal honor/resentment. In B village, la piao has become the principal method for 
winning votes. La piao, to a large degree, is to secure votes through making use of 
informal personal connections. These personal connections can be either horizontal ones 
or vertical, patron-client ones, patron-client ones. But it is argued that the patron-client 
relations can be more helpful for a candidate to secure votes. Since, as a patron, his 
clients have relatively less freedom and may even bound to be his followers. 
 
To facilitate electoral competition and la piao, opposing factions have crystallized. The 
capacity of enlisting supporters is crucial for the winning of village elections. All three 
rounds  of  elections  in  B  village  have  been  based  on  factional  competition.  Village 
elections  in  B  village  have  largely  become  a  factional  contest  based  on 
factional/clientelist networks.   
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5 The role of local state officials in village elections 
 
 
 
In the previous two chapters, I have analyzed the behaviour and strategies of ordinary 
villagers and VC candidates in village elections. I have argued that within the village 
community ordinary villagers today still tend to behave like clients, depending, to a 
greater or lesser extent, on a small number of village patrons who own wealth, power, 
various resources and outside connections. In village elections, VC candidates, who rise 
from the ranks of village patrons, solicit votes through a range of means, but especially 
through their patron-client relations. In this chapter, I will discuss other important actors 
in village elections—local state officials—often themselves patrons of village leaders or 
candidates. 
 
“Local state officials” here refers to township government officials—those officials who 
deal  with  villagers  and  village  committees  directly  in  the  everyday  politics  in  rural 
China. Township government officials actually play a crucial role in terms of village 
elections:  they  are  responsible  for  implementing  electoral  laws  and  regulations, 
organizing  village  elections,  and  dealing  with  various  electoral  issues  for  example. 
Existing research has made clear that Chinese local state officials, as a whole, do not 
support village elections (Kelliher 1997; O'Brien and Li 2000). They sometimes violate 
the  electoral  laws  and  regulations,  adopting  tactics  like  monopolizing  nominations, 
handpicking nominees, conducting snap elections, banning candidates of whom they 
disapprove  from  running  for  elections,  annulling  electoral  results  if  the  “wrong” 
candidates win, or conducting elections by a show of hands (Fan 1998a; Ma 1994). 
However, with both pressure from above (the higher level authorities) and “popular 
resistance” (Li and O'Brien 1996) from below (villagers), local state officials in more 
and more places have been forced to take the electoral laws and regulations seriously, 
holding “free and fair” village elections in their locales (Li 2002; Xiang 2002; Xiao   111 
2002b). But has this meant that they have changed their attitudes toward it? If not, how 
do they play their role and pursue their goal in village elections?   
 
This  chapter  will  begin  by  describing  local  state  officials’  roles  as  state  agents  and 
policy  implementers,  and  the  strategies  they  employ  in  the  process  of  policy 
implementation. I will then discuss local officials’ attitudes to village elections and their 
strategies to influence them. I argue that local state officials, as policy implementers in a 
“pressurized” political system (Rong 1998), have to rely on village cadres to carry out 
various state policies at the village level. Yet the implementation of direct VC elections 
seem to deprive these officials’ power to handpick their favoured VC cadres. However, 
by  making  use  of  administrative  regulations  and,  particularly,  informal  clientelist 
relationships, local state officials are still able to exert a strong influence upon so-called 
“free and fair” VC elections.               
 
Local state officials as state policy implementers     
 
Chinese local governments and officials today still largely remain policy-implementing 
arms of the central government. Even though the political system has become somewhat 
more decentralized and relaxed in the reform era, the central government in Beijing still 
exercises significant power and influence over the local governments. However, policy 
implementation at local levels in China over the last two decades has primarily evolved 
from voluntary compliance due to Party discipline and heavy ideological indoctrination 
(Lampton  1987:  17)  to  a  “pressurized  system”  (Rong  1998)  involving  monetary 
incentives  and  career-jeopardizing  punishments.  The  new  pressurized  system  is 
embodied  in  the  cadre  responsibility  system  or  political  contract  system  (ganbu 
zhengzhi zeren zhi or gangwei zeren zhi) at the county and township/town levels. This 
system was first implemented in the early 1980s in some regions in China and later 
adopted nationwide (Edin 2000: 50). Under the cadre responsibility system, county and 
township/town  leaders  sign  political  performance  contracts  with  their  immediately   112 
superior authorities. Even though the specific content of the contract may vary from 
place  to  place,  some  key  elements  in  the  performance  contract  always  include 
promoting local economic development, maintaining local social and political stability, 
controlling local birthrates and collecting state and local taxes (Rong 1998: 29). Also 
included in the contract are specific rewards and punishments that depend on whether or 
not the goals are met. The performance contract is the main basis for cadre evaluations 
at the end of each year. If the specific performance goals in the contract are successfully 
met, contracted officials are rewarded with better career opportunities and monetary 
awards or bonuses. But if they fail to achieve the goals laid out in their contracts, local 
government leaders may be reprimanded and lose further promotion opportunities (ibid.: 
31).   
 
Even though the cadre contract system as practiced at the local levels has helped the 
central government and provincial authorities in China achieve some specific goals and 
policy compliance from local governments and officials, this system has also caused 
“selective policy implementation” (O'Brien and Li 1999) or policy distortion at local 
levels.  However,  as  Zhong  (2003)  has  argued,  it  is  simplistic  to  say  that  central 
government policies are ignored or distorted. Policy implementation in China is much 
more complicated. Much depends upon policy issue areas, which are intertwined with 
the rational career behaviour of local state officials. On the one hand, local officials are 
legally and politically obligated to implement policies passed on to them from the above. 
Administrative punishments or even removals from office remain the most effective 
mechanisms by which higher authorities force local government officials to carry out 
and comply with central or provincial government policies. This is why open defiance 
of higher authorities is rare in China. On the other hand, there are numerous, often 
conflicting factors, that local officials have to take into consideration in implementing 
polices  from  above  (Ibid.).  How  to  balance  the  two  skillfully  is  an  art  that  local 
government officials must master in order to advance their careers.   
 
O’Brien and Li (1999) find that the strategy of “selective policy implementation” has   113 
often  been  used  by  local  state  officials.  According  to  them,  on  readily  measurable 
policies the Centre has established effective controls that lead implementers to define 
their  tasks  as  policymakers  wish.  Enough  feedback  reaches  higher  levels,  and 
well-designed  inducements  and  sanctions  encourage  most  ground-level  officials  to 
execute even remarkably unpopular measures. On other policies, for which success or 
failure cannot be assessed without increased popular input, top-down controls have been 
largely ineffective, and local officials have considerable discretion, which often lead to 
ignorance  or  cheating  of  state  policies.  Similarly,  Zhong  (2003)  suggests  that  five 
important  variables  are  likely  to  specifically  affect  policy  implementation  in  China, 
which are the amount of attention paid by higher authorities, monitoring mechanisms 
involved in supervising policy implementation, clarity in policy goals (including setting 
quantifiable targets in policy evaluation), issue intractability, and conflict or potential 
conflict with local interests. And based upon theses variables, he has divided policy 
issue  areas  at  local  levels  in  the  PRC  into  the  following  four  categories:  crucial, 
spotlight, guideline, and routine legal/regulative issues. He argues that local government 
officials in China tend to pay more attention to policies in the first two categories than 
the last. 
 
As existing research has suggested, reacting to different degrees of scrutiny and severity 
in  punishment  for  implementation  failures,  which  is  embodied  in  the  political 
responsibility contract system, Chinese local officials tend to prioritize policy issues. 
What then is the attitude of local officials to village elections? 
 
Local state officials’ attitudes toward direct village elections   
 
Township cadres deal with peasants directly, and according to the official propaganda to 
“serve” the peasants is their daily work. And so they think they know rural reality and 
peasants well. During my investigation in Xinjia Township, every time I interviewed 
township cadres about village elections or villagers’ self-governance, they would begin   114 
by reminding me about rural reality and the character of peasants. In particular they 
tended to expound on peasants’ poor “quality” (su zhi).   
 
Peasant quality 
Though most of them are themselves of peasant origin, Xinjia Township officials tend to 
view peasants negatively, often with scorn. They like to iterate the “fact” that peasants’ 
quality is so low that they should not be permitted to enjoy political rights such as the 
right to directly choose their village leaders. Nationwide surveys have also found that a 
majority of township cadres agree with the hypothetical statement, “peasants’ political 
and educational quality is too low for them to practice democracy” (Xin 1993: 37). In 
these  cadres’  opinion,  villagers  are  vengeful,  self-serving,  feudal,  superstitious  and 
faction-ridden. Peasants see democracy as a weapon, ideal for revenge and they are 
materialistic and short-sighted, so they vote against the common good (Li and Zhao 
2004;  Wang  2005a).  For  example,  one  Xinjia  Township  officials  told  me  why  he 
believed villagers were not competent to choose leaders by themselves: 
 
Peasants are selfish, narrow-minded and short-sighted. They only consider themselves 
and think about their short-term interests. They don’t consider collective interests at all. 
Most of them do not care who the village cadres are as long as those cadres don’t come 
to them collecting money …. Many villagers don’t take their suffrage seriously at all. 
When we held the first direct elections in 1999, one village even elected an old man who 
was over eighty and had been paralyzed in bed for years (Interview 4). 
 
Similarly, another Xinjia official commented: 
 
Peasants always haggle over every ounce. They always concentrate on their every little 
loss  and  gain.  As  a  township  cadre,  a  lot  of  things  I  deal  with  every  day  involve 
mediating in villagers’ quarrels: most of them are like ‘your dog bit my chicken’; ‘the 
Zhangs’ sheep ate the Wangs’ crop’. Don’t think those things are too small. If you do not 
handle it properly, the two sides will become enemies easily. When a villager comes to   115 
vote, he will above all consider which candidate has good personal relationship with him 
instead of putting a candidate’s morality and ability in the first place. If you once offend 
him, even for carrying out proper government polices, he will hate you and will never 
vote for you (Interview 13). 
 
Although local state officials tend to emphasize villagers’ low quality, another important 
reason that they do not support direct VC elections is that they have no confidence that 
villagers  themselves  can  elect  “ideal”  village  cadres  who  must  enforce  the  state’s 
unpopular  polices.  Those  who  are  “ideal”  village  cadres  in  the  eyes  of  local  state 
officials may well antagonize people if they do their jobs effectively. Effectiveness in 
the job may lead to unpopularity at the poll. Thus it stands to reason that the competent 
will be voted out, while those elected may be unwilling to implement the unpopular 
state policies or tasks. So local state officials also firmly hold that VC elections should 
be subject to the party-state’s leadership.     
 
Elections and the Party’s leadership 
Township officials seem to be firm apologists for the principle of Party leadership. They 
always  stress  that  the  Party’s  leadership  is  a  precondition  of  village  elections  or 
self-governance and that village elections should be under the Party’s leadership. In 
terms  of  village  elections,  the  Party’s  leadership  means  to  township  officials  the 
leadership  of  township  Party  committee  (township  government)  and  its  subordinate 
organizations in villages, i.e. VPBs. They will try their best to bring the elections under 
their control and would deem it a mistake on their part if a village election were to 
produce a VC that defied the government’s authority or “made trouble” (Interview 1 and 
3).   
 
A township official spoke of the importance of strengthening the Party’s leadership:   
 
No matter whether in village elections or something else, we must adhere to the Party’s 
leadership. Without the Party’s leadership, the countryside will definitely fall into chaos.   116 
At the same time, without a stable situation, the economy will not be able to develop. 
When we held the first direct elections in 1999, the Party’s leadership was not stressed 
enough  so that  many  villages  encountered turmoil  afterwards. The  most  outstanding 
problem was that the elected VCs attempted to fight for power with the VPBs. Seeing 
the  situation  getting  worse,  a  deputy  Party  secretary  of  Longkou  had  to  make  an 
emergency  speech  on  TV  reiterating  the  need  to  adhere  to  the  Party’s  leadership 
(Interview 4). 
 
According to the deputy Party secretary of Xinjia, after its first direct election in 1999 B 
village fell into “chaos” largely because Jiamao and his men who were elected VC 
cadres, had “no sense of adhering the Party’s leadership” but fighting for power against 
the VPB secretary Sixiang. He commented: 
 
B village fell into chaos soon after the first direct election in 1999 when Qu Jiamao and 
his two fellows were elected to the VC. All three were not former village cadres and they 
got elected by soliciting votes and making empty commitments to their fellow villagers. 
After  getting  elected,  these  guys  have  no  sense  of  adhering  the  Party’s  leadership, 
wrongly holding that they can do whatever they want. They not only refused to accept 
the leadership of the village Party branch but also intentionally opposed it. This led to 
instability and even paralysis of the village governance. You know, with endless conflict, 
how could the village work and the government tasks be done (Interview 1)? 
   
In a Xinjia Township government report reviewing the 1999 village elections work, it 
set out the problems with elections: “Some VC cadres cannot understand the correct 
relationship  between  VCs  and  VPBs  and  have  an  one-sided  view  of  villagers’ 
self-governance”; “some VC cadres don’t have the right motivation for holding office” 
but “put most of their energy into retaliating against the VPB secretaries or former VC 
chairmen”; and some VPB secretaries “do not have confidence and ideas to strengthen 
and improve the VPBs’ leadership over VCs” (Zhonggong Xinjia zhen weiyuanhui 1999: 
1).  So,  to  solve  these  problems,  Xinjia  Township  planned  to  further  stress  the   117 
“importance” and “necessity” of adhering to and strengthening the Party’s leadership, 
strengthening and guaranteeing the leadership of VPBs, and “educating” the VC and 
VPB  cadres  so  that  they  could  fully  understand  their  duties  and  “exert  their  power 
according to law” (Zhonggong Xinjia zhen weiyuanhui 1999) . 
 
With  the  implementation  of  direct  VC  elections,  the  local  state  still  emphasizes  its 
“leadership” over them and over village administration largely because it has a vital 
interest in the outcome of village elections. Township government is the lowest level of 
government, while the village committee is legally a mass organization responsible for 
implementation of numerous tasks and policies handed down from above. As indicated 
previously,  township  officials’  performance  in  meeting  targets  is  evaluated  and 
motivated  in  a  “pressurized  system”,  which  decides  township  officials’  rewards  and 
punishments. However, most of the assignments can only be accomplished with the 
cooperation  of  village  cadres.  Before  direct  VC  elections  were  introduced,  village 
cadres had long served primarily as implementers, facilitators, and enforcers of policies 
made by various levels of government. They had been treated as the “legs” of township 
government  officials,  who  depended  heavily  upon  them  to  implement  various  state 
policies,  particularly  important  and  difficult  ones,  like  collecting  taxes,  developing 
economy, carrying out family planning, and keeping social stability. The arrival of direct 
village elections, however, may risk township officials losing their “legs”. The township 
officials’ reach into the villages to carry out state policies has depended largely on its 
power to appoint and control village cadres. But village elections are designed to take 
this power away.   
 
Holding direct village elections belongs to the policy issue areas that Zhong calls “laws 
and regulations”, which, according to him, are “routinely violated” by local government 
officials and are the “most problematic area” in the policy-implementation process at 
local levels in China (Zhong 2003: 138-139). Likewise, O’Brien and Li classify the 
Organic Law and village elections as “popular policies ”, which tend to be ignored and 
cast aside by local officials because compliance cannot be accurately assessed (O'Brien   118 
and Li 1999).     
 
Although local officials are unwilling to let peasants directly elect village cadres, they 
cannot simply cast aside the electoral regulations because ignoring or violating them 
may lead peasants to lodge complaints and appeal to higher levels of government (see 
O'Brien  and  Li  1995).  A  high  frequency  of  complaints  and  appeal  visits  by  local 
residents indicates a lack of political and social stability in a particular locale, and may 
seriously affect the career of the leaders of that locale (Zhong 2003). So how can local 
state officials ensure that they have reliable “legs” to stand on on the one hand but avoid 
violating  the  electoral  regulations  on  the  other?  Based  on  my  fieldwork  in  Xinjia 
Township, I have identified a range of subtle strategies adopted by local officials to 
strongly influence village elections without breaking the formal rules and risking the ire 
of local villagers.                     
 
Free and fair？ ？ ？ ？Local state officials’ strategies for controlling village 
elections 
 
Organizing village elections strictly according to the procedures   
To avoid villagers lodging complaints and appeals and reduce the risk of being punished 
by the higher-level authorities, local officials in Xinjia Township have chosen to abide 
by the letter of electoral laws and regulations since the first round of direct elections in 
1999. “The principle of carrying out VC elections strictly according to the laws and 
regulations”  has  been  repeatedly  stressed  in  the  Xinjia  Township  government 
documents. For example, the 1999 village election work plan reads: “[Officials] must 
implement the laws and regulations strictly—no legal procedure must be ignored and no 
villagers’ democratic rights should be reserved” (Zhonggong Xinjia zhen weiyuanhui 
1999:  3).  The  2002  VC  election  work  plan  reads:  “Throughout  the  whole  election 
process, [officials] must abide strictly by the laws and regulations, seriously implement 
the procedures as set down by the government and make sure that villagers enjoy their   119 
right to democratic elections. No stipulated procedure must be omitted, no step must be 
ignored  and  no  discretionary  simplification  of  the  procedures  must  be  allowed” 
(Zhonggong Xinjiazhen weiyuanhui 2001: 9). 
 
In  practice,  Xinjia  Township  officials  have—in  so  far  as  I  have  been  able  to 
determine—strictly followed the standard election procedures set out by the Longkou 
government (see Longkoushi diqijie cunweihui huanjie xuanju gongzuo lingdao xiaozhu 
bangongshi  2002;  Longkoushi  nongcun  "liangwei"  huanjie  xuanju  gongzuo  lingdao 
xiaozu bangongshi 2004), especially  when organizing the formal  electoral meetings. 
Voter registration has been carried out shortly before the formal electoral meeting and 
posted publicly; candidates have been directly nominated by the villagers; there have 
been more candidates than seats; secret voting has been guaranteed; and the vote count 
has been carried out in full public view. Based on my observations of elections in 2004 
in B village and 14 other villages in Xinjia Township, a videotape of B village’s 2002 
electoral meeting, and my interviews and conversations with township officials, village 
leaders and ordinary villagers, it does seem that all these rules and procedures have been 
implemented strictly in VC elections in the township since 1999. 
 
A Xinjia Township official talked about their great care in implementing electoral rules 
and the pressure on them to ensure that everything was handled correctly: 
 
We township cadres were all very tense on the day of electoral meeting. Each stage had 
to be carried out with great care. Even negligence over a small matter could lead to 
invalidation and make our efforts go to waste. And in some villages, due to complicated 
factional and clan tensions, some troublemakers attempted to make trouble. If they found 
any fault on our part, they would either appeal to higher authorities or make trouble on 
the ground (Interview 6). 
 
Because the township government organized the electoral meeting strictly according the 
letter of the relevant laws and regulations, few villagers questioned the authenticity of   120 
the procedure. Even Jiaxian, the losing candidate in B village’s 2004 election admitted, 
“It is unlikely that anyone will cheat in the formal electoral meetings” (Interview 53). 
 
If  the  focus  were  merely  on  the  formal  implementation  village  elections  of  Xinjia 
Township since 1999 would be considered “free and fair”, or procedurally “democratic” 
by most scholars. For example, Li takes village elections he has surveyed in Jiangxi 
Province in 1999 as “free and fair” because four practices were adhered to : (1) direct 
nomination of candidates by villagers; (2) contested election of villagers’ committee 
members;  (3)  anonymous  voting;  and  (4)  open  counting  of  votes  (Li  2003:  653). 
Similarly, Pastor and Tan believe that two most important indicators of “free” village 
elections should be the “secret ballot” and “competitiveness” (Pastor and Tan 2000: 
509).  All  these  factors  have  been  evident  in  Xinjia  Township  since  1999.  So,  have 
township officials really organized village elections freely and fairly? If we switch our 
focus to other aspects of the election process and focus on how officials use informal 
techniques,  including  clientelist  relations,  to  influence  the  outcome  of  elections,  the 
answer may be very different. 
 
The comment of one Xinjia Township official vividly conveyed preparation that he and 
his colleagues put into influencing the elections before election day:   
 
As the organizers of village elections, we township officials can actually be compared 
to a chef who makes a banquet. You know, the guests can only see the meals after the 
banquet starts and the dishes are served. However, you know, the menu, the recipe 
and the cooking materials are all prepared and made in the kitchen by the chef long 
before the banquet starts. When the dishes finally show up on the table one by one, 
the chef’s job has already finished. Similarly, the process of formal election is just 
like the process of serving dishes. To us, the electoral meeting is just like serving the 
dishes rather than making them. The electoral meeting may look gorgeous, but even 
before it starts, our job has already finished (Interview 16). 
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How are the “dishes” made in the kitchen? Township officials use a range of techniques, 
notably, trying to influence which candidates stand for election. 
 
Defining the qualifications of the candidates 
The revised Organic Law stipulates that “all villagers over 18 years old have the right to 
vote  and  stand  for  elections  regardless  of  nationality,  race,  sex,  occupation,  family 
origin and residential period. But the persons whose political rights [mainly people who 
are in prison or on probation for committing offences] have been deprived are excepted” 
(Article 12). However, local officials have often tried to specify certain qualifications of 
the candidates. For example, in the work plan for the 2002 village elections, Xinjia 
Township  government  tried  to  clearly  “raise  the  standards  and  conditions”  (tichu 
tiaojian  he  biaozhun)  of  VC  candidates  and  to  form  a  “correct  guiding  direction” 
(zhengqu  daoxiang)  for  selecting  VC  cadres  from  among  villagers  (Zhonggong 
Xinjiazhen weiyuanhui 2001: 10). “In the light of the Xinjia Township’s reality”, the 
township set out the conditions VC candidates should have. These conditions reflect the 
township’s desire for village cadres who are compliant with Party policy, law-abiding, 
and have leadership qualities. They also reveal a preference for younger, better educated 
candidates, and perhaps implicitly also males with some ability to promote economic 
growth (Ibid.): 
 
￿    be  of  high  political  quality,  be  supportive  of  the  CCP’s  leadership,  implement 
seriously the Party’s lines and policies as well as the resolutions and decisions of 
higher-level government;   
￿    conscientiously abide by the Constitution, laws, statutes and national policies, have 
comparatively strong sense of law and policy, be able to fulfill citizens’ duties, take 
the lead in handing in all kinds of taxes and fees and have no criminal record or 
record or violating discipline; 
￿    be  impartial,  decent  and  stick  up  for  solidarity,  have  the  ability  to  correctly 
understand and deal with the conflicts among the villagers in the new era and to 
have high prestige among them;     122 
￿    be  in  the  prime  of  one’s  life,  have  relative  high  educational  level  and  ability  of 
leading and organization, be able to serve the villagers heartily and lead the mass to 
develop economy and get rich together. 
 
In  addition  to  the  specifications  set  out  in  2001,  by  the  2002  VC  elections,  Xinjia 
Township in a further document made two other “suggestions” (jianyi) about the type of 
candidates it preferred. These related to the gender balance of the village leadership and 
the relationship between the VC and the village party organization. First, the township 
proposed  that  “VCs  should  have  an  appropriate  quota  for  women”  (yingdang  you 
shidang funu de ming’e), though it did not set a specific quota for the number of women 
on the VC. This does not seem to be due to concerns to control village politics more 
than application of a common gender balance policy in government to the village level. 
Second, the township encouraged concurrent office-holding for VC and VPB members 
(Xinjiazhen huanjie xuanju gongzuo lingdao xiaozu 2002). This is likely to have been 
motivated partly by the desire for compliant VC leaders—VC members who are also 
Party members would automatically be VPB members and subject to Party discipline 
and therefore more responsive to the township’s wishes (the VC and VPB relation after 
direct VC elections will be attended in detail in Chapter 6). The township might also 
have been motivated, however, by financial considerations: the village would spend less 
on salaries under concurrent office-holding. And as we shall see in the next chapter, the 
township controls village finances. 
 
The  Xinjia  Township’s  work  plan  for  the  2002  VC  elections  also  listed  the 
characteristics of those “unsuitable” for nomination as VC candidates. These often are 
the direct opposite of the characteristics that the township has said it prefers, so that they 
include  non-compliance  with  the  Party  discipline,  a  criminal  record  or  record  of 
violating Party or government key policies. However, this list gives more detail of the 
kinds of behaviour the township finds problematic. These range from things which it 
seems would be subjectively defined and identified by township officials (for example, 
“being a bad influence”, “not behaving well”, having a “bad moral character”), things   123 
which  relate  to  higher  level  party-state  political  fears  (for  example  in  relation  to 
Falungong  activities),  and  others  which  make  villages  difficult  to  manage  from  a 
township perspective (cliques, factions, bust-ups). These are articulated as follows:   
 
￿  those who have poor political quality and consciousness, and do not support, carry       
out, and even resist the Party’s lines and policies; 
￿  those who have had criminal punishment within three years and have not behaved 
well afterwards; 
￿  the criminal suspects who are undergoing legal investigation; the persons who have 
been  convicted  of  illegal  acts,  such  as  gambling,  watching  pornography  and 
drug-related behaviour; those who are under punishment by Party disciplines within 
the  fixed  years  that  is  prescribed  by  CCP  Statutes  of  discipline  punishment 
(zhongguo gongchandang jilu chufa tiaoling);”   
￿  those who violate policies of family planning, house building regulations and to 
break  the  village  rules  and  regulations  (cun  gui  min  yue)  and  causing  a  “bad 
influence”; 
￿  those who take part in organizing feudal and superstitious activities; those believing 
in evil religions like Falungong;   
￿  persons who refuse to pay taxes and fees according to the law or perform other     
personal duties;   
￿  those who bad moral character and do not abide by social morality, and those who 
have strong selfish motives and even form cliques and factions to engage in violence 
and cause a bad influence;   
￿  those who have been deprived of political rights or who are on probation, parole or 
released from custody for medical treatment;   
￿  those who are old and weak, or who have an illness which will affect their ability to 
carry out normal duties (Zhonggong Xinjiazhen weiyuanhui 2001: 10-11).   
 
From the above document we can see the township’s effort to influence villagers by 
setting out the qualifications that VC candidates should have. From the qualifications   124 
listed, we can see that the township prefers obedient VC candidates and that prime 
among  its  qualifications  are  those  that  relate  to  implementing  the  “lines”,  policies, 
resolutions and decisions of higher levels of government and to “consciously” fulfilling 
duties, particularly those relating to collecting taxes and fees.   
 
The revised Organic Law does not contain these specifications for VC candidates. This 
means that the VC candidates’ “qualifications” as set out in the township document are 
not mandatory, otherwise the township’s regulation would go against the national law. 
So instead of using “must” (bixu), the Xinjia Township used “should” (yingdang) or 
“not suitable” (buyi) in its election-related documents.   
 
The township officials usually try to influence the villagers to vote for candidates with 
these qualifications by propagating them, but finally it is the villagers’ votes that decide 
who is elected. So township officials complain repeatedly that the qualifications and 
standards for VC candidates have not been clearly stipulated by the Organic Law, and 
that this has made it difficult for them to organize the elections, or rather, to preclude 
those unfavourable candidates from their perspective. As one Xinjia Township official 
put it: 
 
Because  the  law  doesn’t  stipulate  clearly  the  detailed  characteristics  for  VC 
candidates, we feel that it is very hard to implement it in practice. We need clear, 
rigid (gangxing) standards to establish candidates’ qualifications so that unqualified 
people, such as those who want to make trouble or seek personal interests, will not be 
able to win elections. Actually we have reported this to the higher-level government 
but have not yet had a response (Interview 16). 
 
Actually the higher-level government has not ignored the demands of its subordinates. 
In  a  summary  work  report  on  VC  elections  to  its  higher  level  in  2002,  Longkou 
government has pointed out that one of the problems in implementing the Organic Law 
is “the lack of specific standards for VC candidates’ qualifications” and suggested that   125 
this be remedied (Longkou shiwei zuzhi bu 2002: 11). 
 
Pre-election mobilization and opinion investigation 
Xinjia officials have viewed pre-election mobilization as a very important step in their 
efforts to organize VC elections. In the first direct VC election in 1999, however, Xinjia 
Township seemed to mainly focus on the general publicizing of related laws and rules 
on VC elections to township cadres and villagers. According to the Xinjia Township’s 
work  plan  for  the  1999  VC  elections,  the  township  government  emphasized  the 
importance of training officials and educating and mobilizing villagers so as to let them 
understand and take part in VC elections. For example, Xinjia Township intended to 
hold training courses for township officials and village cadres to study “related laws and 
regulations”; it required each village to hold various meetings to “carry out electoral 
mobilization and educate villagers” so as to “strengthen their sense of rule of law, to 
understand  various  regulations  on  VC  elections,  to  be  clear  about  the  significance, 
requirements  and  approaches  for  elections,  to  improve  understanding,  to  correct 
attitudes, to enhance democratic consciousness and sense of responsibility and to take 
part  in  the  elections  enthusiastically  and  voluntarily”  (Zhonggong  Xinjiazhen 
weiyuanhui 1999: 6). 
 
In  1999,  at  least  according  to  the  official  document,  pre-election  mobilization  was 
mainly aimed at educating the masses and generally publicizing relevant laws and rules. 
This is backed up by the recollections of a township official: “Because it was the first 
time for us to organize direct VC elections in 1999, we had had no experience before 
and therefore failed to make full preparations” (Interview 7). However, based on the 
experience of the first VC elections in 1999, Xinjia government updated their strategy in 
organizing  the  following  2002  and  2004  elections.  In  addition  to  requirements  on 
generally publicizing the relevant laws and regulations to the people, unlike in the 1999 
elections, in the following two sessions of VC elections, the Xinjia government paid 
great attention on pre-election mobilization and opinion investigation.   
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Pre-election mobilization was mainly attempted to shape people’s voting orientation by, 
in  the  words  of  the  Xinjia  government,  “creating  a  correct  atmosphere  and  guiding 
people  to  choose  up-to-standard  candidates”  (Zhonggong  Xinjiazhen  dangwei; 
Xinjiazhen zhengfu 2002) . To realize this, township officials made and distributed to 
each  household  leaflets  containing  candidate  standards  and  qualifications  that  the 
government required; they also made tapes with the same kind of content, broadcasting 
to  villagers  twice  a  day  in  every  village;  and  they  also  posted  up  government 
announcements  and  propaganda  slogans  relating  to  VC  elections  in  each  village 
(Zhonggong Xinjiazhen dangwei and Xinjiazhen zhengfu 2002; interviews 18 and 19 ). 
 
Opinion investigation was another important step taken by the township before holding 
formal elections particularly in 2002 and 2004 elections. According to the township 
government, the purpose of carrying out opinion investigation was to “find out the real 
situation” in each village so as to “hold the initiative” (zhangwo zhudongquan) and 
“working  out  specific  work  measures”  for  organizing  VC  elections  (Zhonggong 
Xinjiazhen weiyuanhui  2001: 3). To achieve this purpose, the township government 
document required the responsible township officials to carry out “intensive and careful 
investigation”  in  each  village  before  election,  which  was  quantified  as  100% 
household-visiting  rate  in  small  and  medium  sized  villages  and  80%  in  large-sized 
village (Ibid.). Although such household-visiting rate as a government target perhaps 
has  largely  failed  to  be  achieved  in  reality  (For  example,  in  B  village,  no  ordinary 
villager interviewees reported that he or she was ever visited by township cadres to 
solicit  his  opinion  on  VC  elections.),  it  does  reflect,  however,  the  intention  of  the 
township government to have an careful opinion investigation to take the initiative in 
influencing the election.   
 
In practice, the Xinjia cadres know that it is not necessary to visit each household or 
ordinary  villager  to  achieve  the  aim  of  opinion  investigation.  It  is  much  easier  and 
efficient  for  them  to  just  approach  the  village’s  elite,  namely,  a  small  number  of 
influential village patrons. The deputy Party secretary of Xinjia who are responsible for   127 
organizing  VC  elections  put  it:  “Actually  it  is  not  necessary  for  us  to  visit  each 
household or each villager at all to find out the real situation. The elite within a village 
are just a few. If you can grasp the elite’s views [on VC elections], you will basically 
know the real situation” (Interview 1). 
 
Influencing the village elite 
How  do  township  officials  solicit  the  opinions  of  village  elites  on  VC  elections? 
According  to  the  Xinjia  Township  government’s  summary  work  report  on  the  2002 
elections, perhaps the most important form is to send work teams to individual villages 
holding symposiums in which the village elite attended: 
 
We transferred 16 township cadres, who are experienced with rural work, and formed 
four  work  teams,  going  deep  into  each  village  to  make  intensive  and  painstaking 
investigations. Our work teams in total convened more than 30 symposiums, in which 
VC and VPB cadres, Party members, villager’s representatives and ordinary villagers 
participated  …We  mainly  discussed  and  exchanged  views  on  aspects  of  politics, 
economy, social conditions and public opinion in each village. Through the surveys, we 
particularly  found  out  which  villages  have  competent  leading  teams,  a  healthy 
atmosphere and harmonious cadre-mass relations and which ones have severe clan and 
factional conflicts (maodun) and tense cadre-mass relationships (Zhonggong xinjiazhen 
weiyuanhui; Xinjiazhen zhengfu 2002). 
 
I failed to find the record of detailed content on the symposiums in Xinjia government 
files. There were no files recording for example who spoke what at that time, how the 
views were exchanged or how the township finally drew its conclusions. This is most 
likely because although formally the symposiums are to “solicit opinions”, in reality 
their aim is to help influence who will stand as candidates in the elections. However 
since this is not strictly legal, it cannot be recorded in the official records.   
 
A lower-ranking Xinjia official talked about pre-election opinion solicitation in 2002,   128 
describing how it was conducted, with individual officials like himself being allocated 
villages and sent there to convene meetings with villagers identified as influential by the 
township. This was done in preparation for further, “closed”, high-level meetings among 
senior township officials and key villagers: 
 
… my colleagues and I went to each village and convened meetings of influential village 
figures, usually including current and former village cadres, villager’s representatives, 
Party members or those villagers who have high prestige and have strong influence and 
interest  in  village  politics.  Our  bosses  had  instructed  us  in  advance  that  instead  of 
making  any  comments  in  the  meeting,  we  should  only  listen  and  write  down  the 
participants’ words and viewpoints, such as their evaluation of the incumbent village 
leaders and their expectations of the persons most likely to win the next elections … 
Afterwards, we would report what we had heard and noted to our bosses. Then they 
would make visits and talk to the people concerned in private according to their need. 
Actually  we  had  no  idea  about  what  our  bosses  would  do.  There  are  quite  some 
techniques in this affair. We, rank and file, just don’t know (Interview 17). 
 
The  private  talks  between  township  leaders  and  village  elites  seem  to  be  a  quite 
important, if not decisive, element in influencing the final election results. However, the 
content of the talks are never revealed. The township leaders who carried out the talks 
were  unwilling  to  reveal  any  detailed  information  when  I  interviewed  them.  For 
instance, when being asked about how the relevant work had been done in B village, the 
deputy  Party  secretary  of  Xinjia,  who  was  in  charge  of  the  election-related  affairs, 
appeared to be very reserved. But she did give me some general information: 
 
Generally speaking, different villages have different situations. Each village has its own 
characteristics.  We,  above  all,  need  to  get  a  clear  understanding  of  each  village’s 
situation,  such  as  who  wants  to  run  for  VC  cadres,  who  is  likely  to  win,  how  the 
incumbent village cadres have performed and what kind of relationships there are among 
the key figures within a village. And then we will carry out our work (zuo gongzuo)   129 
based on the various characteristics and problems of the village. Actually to do this job 
requires many. When arranging the leading team of a village (cun lingdao banzi), we 
township cadres should first of all have an impartial mind. With investigation, we must 
determine who are the people most suitable to be village cadres and who are not. Then 
we need try to set out the reasons objectively to villagers, especially to those influential 
and prestigious village figures, when talking to them. What we need to do is to present 
the facts and reason things out (bai shishi, jiang daoli) to them. What we absolutely 
avoid is directly telling the villagers whom to vote for and whom not to vote for. If we 
do like this, we would definitely encounter problems (Interview 1). 
 
This deputy secretary also told me of a case in which she successfully dissuaded an 
influential village figure from supporting an “unsuitable” candidate. This happened in 
the  2002  VC  elections.  There  is  a  village,  the  incumbent  VC  chairman  of  which, 
according to the deputy secretary, was a “competent” and “upright” cadre. However, out 
of  personal  resentments,  one  of  his  enemies,  who  had  a  strong  clan  background, 
attempted  to  oust  him  by  supporting  and  soliciting  votes  for  another  “unsuitable” 
candidate. Knowing this situation, the deputy secretary privately talked to the opponent, 
asking  him  to  “consider  things  from  an  impartial  mind”.  Though  have  personal 
resentments, the opponent admitted the competence of the incumbent and gave up his 
support to the other candidate. The incumbent was re-elected as VC chairman finally 
(Interview 1). This case demonstrates that, to the township officials, investigating and 
finding out the real village situation before holding VC elections is not the end but the 
means. The end, however, is to exert their influence over village elites or key figures 
accordingly so as to secure a township government favourable electoral result.   
 
Meanwhile,  as  revealed  from  above  interview,  the  township  officials  are  also  very 
careful and cautious when intervening and exerting their influence to realize their own 
electoral  intention.  They  must  avoid  excessively  intervening  so  as  to  be  accused  of 
manipulating or controlling elections, which is clearly against the law and may bring 
them  trouble.  That  is  why  they  only  choose  to  exert  their  influence  informally  by   130 
“presenting the facts and reasoning things out” to people concerned but avoid directly 
and explicitly supporting their favoured candidates. As Xinjia Township government 
puts in its work plan for the 2002 elections: “when carrying out investigations, cadres 
should mind their ways and means. Especially to some sensitive issues, cadres should 
hold  proper  limits  for  their  wording  and  action  to  avoid  triggering  new  unstable 
elements” (Zhonggong Xinjiazhen weiyuanhui 2001). In fact, in order to hide their true 
intention  of  influencing  election  results,  Xinjia  officials  often  claim  that  their 
pre-election  involvement  is  “impartial”  (interview  1)  or  “without  any  predetermined 
viewpoints” (interview 9). But when I asked the interviewed Xinjia Township official, 
“If the township cadres come to the masses without their own bias, what is the aim of 
the  pre-election  mobilization  and  opinion  investigation?  Is  the  purpose  merely  for 
forecasting the final electoral result?” This official did not give me an answer, which I 
interpret  as  he  was  unwilling  to  tell  the  truth  that  township  officials’  pre-election 
involvement  is  not  impartial  but  the  opposite.  Nonetheless,  the  mayor  of  Xinjia 
Township, who is an outspoken person, disclosed the truth in an informal occasion, 
when he said: 
 
Come to the masses without any bias? This is just what is said. We must try our best to 
ensure that satisfactory candidates are elected. If necessary, we even need to help them 
with their election work (zuo gongzuo). Although we cannot directly tell villagers to vote 
for X, Y, Z, we do talk to those influential figures in the village to make clear some facts 
so  as to  gain their understanding  and  support  [for government  preferred candidates] 
(Interview 2). 
 
It  is  clear  that  before  holding  elections,  Xinjia  Township  cadres  usually  have  had 
preferred candidates. What they attempt to do in the pre-election mobilization stage is to 
influence villagers, especially village elites, to realize the government’s preferences. As 
it was put in the government work plan for the 2002 VC elections: “we should enhance 
education and guidance for the key figures in a village including Party members and 
villagers’ representatives … so that these key figures will influence and help the mass of   131 
the villagers correct their consciousness (duanzheng tamen de yishi), make clear their 
aim  and  finally  turn  the  Party  committee  and  government’s  intention  into  villagers’ 
voluntary  actions”  (Zhonggong  Xinjiazhen  weiyuanhui  2001:  3).  The  question  here, 
however, is why those “key figures”, namely, village elites or patrons, would respect 
rather than defy the township officials’ opinions and preferences and  help “turn the 
government’s  intention  into  villagers’  voluntary  action”?  How  do  township  officials 
achieve their intended goals in the “free and fair” village elections? Explanation can be 
found, again, by looking at  clientelist relations both within the village and between 
village elites and township officials.   
 
Patron-client relationships between village elites and local state officials 
As  I have discussed in the previous chapter, village elites/patrons who have critical 
goods  and  services  to  offer  can  have  a  number  of  villager  clients  affiliated  or 
subordinated to them and during VC elections, village patrons can effectively mobilize 
their clients over who they have some critical leverage based on the patronage. These 
village patrons, however, themselves tend to be clients of more powerful, higher-status 
patrons beyond their village community. As Lande has pointed out, “[i]t is common for 
clienteles to be pyramided upon each other so that several patrons … are in turn the 
clients of a higher patron who in turn is the client of a patron even higher than himself” 
(Lande 1977: xxi). To be applied in the analysis here, these higher patrons are often 
played by local state officials.           
 
Chinese  local  officials  have  always  been  able  to  wield  power  in  a  significantly 
discretionary way, and in a way which may directly affect the lives of the people under 
their jurisdiction. In the last twenty years, official status and power have become even 
more  important  due  to  decentralization,  weakening  ideology,  and  deterioration  of 
morality  (Gong  1994;  Lu  2000).  Even  though  China  has  been  developing  a 
market-oriented  economy,  that  economy  is  still  closely  tied  to  political  power  and 
governmental intervention. Guanxi is till the most important asset in getting things done 
in China and is intricately linked with governmental offices and officials (Gold, Guthrie,   132 
and Wank 2002b). Local state officials’ discretionary use of broad power continues to 
make the rural population dependent upon the goodwill of them to get access to loans, 
new housing sites, business licenses, market information, jobs and contracts. Village 
patrons,  as  I  have  demonstrated  in  the  previous  chapter,  have  much  more  frequent 
interactions  with  local  officials.  The  relationship  between  local  officials  and  village 
patrons is both give and take, just as it is between them and their own clients. On the 
one  hand,  village  patrons,  although  much  more  prosperous  than  ordinary  villagers, 
know very well that alienating their local officials may cost them more than it is worth. 
They have fully realized that local officials have the ability to sanction the insubordinate 
and make life difficult for them or their family in subtle but nonetheless effective ways. 
On  the  other  hand,  those  elites  in  a  clientelist  relationship  with  local  officials  can 
receive valuable goods, services and opportunities in exchange. Local officials can not 
only  offer  land,  contracts,  job  opportunities,  but  also  facilitate  various  bureaucratic 
processes, such as gaining approval for loans and getting various licenses (Murphy 2002: 
67-68;  Oi  1989;  Unger  2000;  Unger  2002:  140-146).  Local  officials,  who  in  fact 
monopolize a broad range of critical resources and opportunities, are in an ideal position 
to trade these scarce resources for obedience from those who are eager to share. What is 
more, local officials can also aid their clients by their nonenforcement of state policies 
in  time  of  need  (see  Zhong  2003:  138-139).  Consequently,  with  the  introduction  of 
direct village elections, township officials have realized that although they can no longer 
simply  handpick  village  cadres  as  before,  they  still  can  strongly  influence  electoral 
results through clientelist exchanges with village patrons.   
 
An interesting example happened in C village of Xinjia Township. In the 2002 election 
of that village, a villager who was a construction businessman had actively run for VC 
chair. As a construction businessman (and a patron), he employed a number of fellow 
villagers  to  work  in  his  construction  team  and  therefore  owned  a  large  personal 
following in his village. By claiming votes from his followers, he seemed to have a 
good chance of winning the election. However, this person was not satisfactory to the 
township government, which preferred the incumbent village cadres remain in office. In   133 
order  to  dissuade  him  from  running  for  VC  office,  the  mayor  of  Xinjia  Township 
promised  him  that,  if  he  would  withdraw  from  the  electoral  contest,  a  profitable 
government construction contract could be offered to him and he would also be given 
prior  consideration  when  similar  government  construction  contracts  appeared  in  the 
future. As a result, this person quit the electoral competition and in exchange he got the 
government  contract;  the  government  kept  their  preferred  incumbent  VC  cadres  in 
power  (Interview  8).  As  far  as  this  example  is  concerned,  it  demonstrates  that  a 
patron-client  relation  was  created  between  the  township  mayor  and  the  construction 
businessman.  And  through  the  clientelist  exchange  embodied  in  the  relation,  the 
township mayor exerted decisive influence and successfully precluded the unwanted 
candidate (the construction businessman) without violating the formal electoral rules 
(although the clientelist exchange itself clearly constituted corruption).     
 
There  was  another  example  in  B  village.  In  2004,  Jiamao’s  brother,  who  was  a 
construction worker, fell from a roof when doing construction work and was seriously 
injured.  Investigation  revealed  that  Jiamao’s  brother  had  drunk  a  lot  alcohol  before 
doing his job. Since in doing this he had violated occupational regulations, his employer 
refused to offer any  compensation for his injury. Thus, Jiamao turned  to the Xinjia 
Township  party  secretary  for  help.  Although  the  party  secretary  did  not  think  the 
employer bore any fault in relation to the injury of Jiamao’s brother, he finally pressured 
the  employer  to  pay  a  sum  of  money  to  Jiamao’s  brother  out  of  “humanitarian 
considerations”. The party secretary told me: 
 
The accident was because Jiamao’s brother asked for it. He was an alcoholic and had 
been  drinking  before  going  to  work.  Nobody  should  be  responsible  for  his  injury. 
According  to  law,  his  employer  has  no  duty  to  compensate  for  it  under  such 
circumstances. But as Jiamao came to us asking for help, we did try our best to do him a 
favour by pressuring his brother’s employer to compensate 80,000 yuan. You know, the 
employer  did  not  deserve  this.  But  we  considered  that  Jiamao  had  not  made  many 
troubles for the government when he acted as village chairman of B village and remained   134 
to be an influential figure in his village, we therefore did him a favour as we may still 
need Jiamao’s cooperation with the government in the future (Interview 3).   
 
Although this example seems not directly relate to village elections as the previous one 
does, it serves to highlight the role of patron-client relationships between the village 
elites such as Jiamao and the local state officials, which are very likely to be invoked by 
the  local  state  officials  (patrons)  to  influence  the  village  elites  (clients)  in  village 
elections. As Scott has suggested, once a patron-client relation is created, it can persist 
for long periods as long as the patron and the client have something to offer one another 
(Scott 1972b: 95 & 100).  In this case, Jiamao invoked the patron-client relation by 
seeking assistance from the township party secretary at one time when he needed help; 
At another time, say during the election, the township secretary may approach Jiamao 
for help in supporting the government favoured candidates.   
 
Due  to  the  “face-to-face”  nature  of  patron-client  association  (the  creation  and 
maintenance of a patron-client relationship rests heavily on face-to-face contact between 
only the two parties) (See Powell 1970: 412; Scott 1972b: 94), and because the local 
state officials who exploit their office to reward clients, usually violate the formal norms 
of  public  conduct  and  get  involved  in  corruption  (as  the  two  examples  have 
demonstrated), concrete data on the process of patron-client exchange between local 
state officials and village elites is very difficult to collect (I will present further data on 
the patron-client exchange between local state officials and village cadres in the analysis 
of Chapter 7). Nonetheless, the two examples here may suffice to make the point that 
because local state officials are in positions of broad power from which they are able to 
dispense  political  favours  to  their  clients  and  also  take  sanctions  against  the 
insubordinate, the village elites/patrons who are eager to obtain the political favours 
therefore are willing to act as clients of local state officials and in exchange respect and 
follow  the  “will  of  the  higher  ranks”.  This  is  largely  why  and  how  the  local  state 
officials choose to influence the village elites/patrons and attempt to “turn the Party 
committee and government’s intention into villagers’ voluntary actions” (Zhonggong   135 
Xinjiazhen weiyuanhui 2001: 3) in village elections. 
 
Conclusion   
 
Local state officials are largely policy implementers of the central  government. The 
pressurized political system and the political responsibility contract system make local 
officials,  reacting  to  different  degrees  of  scrutiny  and  severity  in  punishment  for 
implementation failures, tend to prioritize policy issues. Some issues are given more 
serious attention than others. However, no matter how local state officials prioritize their 
tasks, they need village cadres as their “legs”. Before the introduction of direct village 
elections, local state officials had the power to appoint their favoured village cadres, but 
the elections have taken this power away. As a result, local state officials as a whole are 
rather critical of direct village elections and have developed strategies to influence the 
electoral results without violating the “letter” of the laws and regulations.   
 
First  of  all,  township  officials  have  carried  out  elections  strictly  according  to  the 
electoral laws and regulations. The electoral procedures set on paper, such as direct 
nomination  of  candidates  by  villagers,  contested  elections,  anonymous  voting,  open 
counting of votes and so on, have been implemented carefully so as to both please the 
higher-level authorities and avoid villagers’ complaints and appeals. This may also leave 
electoral observers with the impression that local officials have faithfully implemented 
the electoral policy in a free and fair way. In-depth analysis, however, reveals that local 
state officials have set out qualifications for candidates so as to exclude “troublemakers” 
or unqualified candidates perceived by the government and most importantly, they have 
actually intervened and influenced elections in an informal but powerful way through 
manipulating intra-village clientelist relationships and using their own direct clientelist 
relations  with  potential  candidates.  Local  state  officials  are  actually  in  position  of 
powerful patrons, being able to both offer a variety of favours to their clients and take 
sanctions  against  those  who  are  insubordinate.  Village  elites,  although  as   136 
patrons/middlemen  of  their  fellow  villagers,  are  also  rational  enough  to  deploy 
clientelist exchange for their own benefits. Consequently, the local state officials are 
still able to strongly influence the electoral results, even though the letter of the law and 
regulations have been strictly followed and the “free and fair” elections are held.   
 
A clientelist perspective is the key to understanding the local state’s role in direct village 
elections. On the one hand, in contrast to the liberal-democratic view, it reveals that the 
local state actually still exerts substantial influence over so-called “free and fair” village 
elections  by  employing  informal  clientelist  influence;  on  the  other  hand,  it  also 
challenges the view taken by the authoritarian approach advocates, who tend to put the 
emphasis  upon  the  local  state’s  authoritarian  intervention  or  manipulation  of  village 
elections, showing that the local state officials have to use clientelist inducement more 
than administrative coercion to guarantee their preferred electoral results.                     
 
Although the “invisible hand” of local state officials has played an influential, often 
even decisive, part in village elections, direct village elections have removed local state 
officials’  100  per  cent  certainty  of  having  their  preferred  candidates  elected.  For 
instance, in B village’s 1999 election, all the government’s preferred candidates lost and 
in the 2004 one, only one government-preferred candidate (Sifa) won. However, even if 
the  government-preferred  candidates  lose,  the  system  of  post-election  village 
governance still to a large degree guarantees the dominance of state power. In the next 
chapter, I will examine post-election governance, showing how “democratic” or directly 
elected village administration has failed to function after the elections. 
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6 Village self-governance: a “democratic” style? 
 
 
 
In the previous chapters, I have examined B village’s VC elections, mainly focusing on 
the  behaviour  and  strategies  employed  by  villagers,  VC  candidates  and  township 
officials. I have argued that clientelism undermines the implementation of direct or so 
called “democratic” or “free and fair” village elections. Clientelism, both an informal 
social institution and a political strategy, has been used by different actors for different 
ends  as  part  of  (but  not  only  in  relation  to)  the  process  of  VC  elections.  Through 
clientelism, VC elections, despite formally being organized in a “free and fair” way, that 
is in line with the law, are dominated by patrons within the villages and by township 
state officials.             
 
In this and the next chapters, I will examine village governance in the era of direct VC 
elections in B village. In theory, VC elections should only be the means, while villagers’ 
“self-governance” or “grassroots democracy” or ”village democracy” should be the end. 
The revised Organic Law specifies in its first article that the purpose of making the Law 
is  “to  guarantee  villagers’  self-governance,  make  sure  villagers  managing  their  own 
affairs, develop rural  grassroots democracy…”  (Article 1). Therefore it is crucial to 
examine post-election village governance to see whether direct VC elections have had 
any  effects  upon  “self-governance”  and  whether/how  the  rules  and  institutions  on 
“self-governance” have been implemented in practice.         
 
This  chapter  will  focus  on  B  village’s  post-election  governance  by  examining  three 
questions. First, it will explore the relationship between the VC and the VPB in village 
governance. I argue that intra-village institutional and factional conflicts, have made it 
difficult for the two bodies to cooperate in village governance as they did before the 
advent of direct VC elections. The VC-VPB conflict is largely the manifestation of the   138 
factional struggle triggered by direct VC elections. Second, the chapter will analyze the 
operation  of  the  institutions  that  aim  to  make  village  affairs  open  and  to  supervise 
villager cadres’ power. I argue that democratic institutions stipulated in the Organic Law 
have failed to function properly in reality. Third, another crucial institution for village 
governance,  the  villagers’  representative  assembly  (VRA),  will  be  examined.  The 
examination will show that the VRA, which is the body supposed to be responsible for 
crucial issues within the village, remains a rubber stamp in practice due to both the 
institutional  deficiency  and  clientelist  relations  between  the  village  cadres  and  the 
villagers’ representatives.                         
 
The  role  of  the  VPB  and  VPB-VC  conflict  in  post-election  village 
governance   
 
It is impossible to discuss village governance, even after direct VC elections, without 
fully exploring the role of the VPB. As Oi and Rozelle have suggested: “Even free and 
fair elections cannot be assumed to bring meaningful change to the contours of rural 
power  where  there  is  a  dual  authority  structure  –  Party  and  government  –  in  every 
village” (Oi and Rozelle 2000: 513). This section discusses the role of the VPB and 
VPB-VC conflict in post-election village governance. 
 
VPB before the introduction of direct elections 
According to the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a Communist 
Party branch (dangzhibu) should be established in any work unit or place where there 
are three or more full  Party members.  A Party branch—a smaller unit than a Party 
committee—is the grassroots or primary Party  organization in China. Therefore, the 
VPB,  as  the  grassroots  organization  of  CCP  in  countryside,  exists  in  almost  every 
Chinese village. The CCP Constitution defines grassroots organizations as the “militant 
bastions of the Party in the basic units of society” and attaches eight functions to these 
organizations, including the most important function of “propagating and carrying out   139 
the Party’s line, principles, and policies, the decision of the Central Committee of the 
Party and other higher Party organizations, and their own decisions” (Article 31). 
 
Before the implementation of direct VC elections, that is before 1998, the VPB’s status 
as the leading core of a village had been underlined repeatedly by Party policy
24  and 
had  always  been  taken  for  granted.  For  instance,  the  Central  government  issued  a 
circular in 1994 specifically emphasizing that “VPB must strengthen the leadership over 
VC” and “VC must be subject to the leadership of VPB” (Zhonggong zhongyang 1994). 
As I have indicated in the Chapter 2, the VPB was the central decision-making body in 
village governance. All major decisions concerning village affairs had to be approved by 
the Party branch before formal adoption by the VC. This was how higher Party and 
governmental authorities made sure that decisions made by the village administration 
conformed to the Party line and policies. A VPB usually has one secretary, one deputy 
secretary  and  several  members.  Traditionally,  VPB  cadres  and  particularly  the  VPB 
secretary,  who  dominated  the  power  of  village-level,  was  appointed  directly  by  and 
responsible to its higher level Party organization, that is the township Party committee. 
It was also common that the VPB cadres concurrently held key positions in the VC 
(Zhong 2003: 159-162). 
 
In B village, Qu Sixiang, as VPB secretary, had dominated village politics for more than 
twenty  years.  He  was  first  appointed  as  VPB  secretary  in  1976,  and  presided  over 
village affairs until 2000, when he resigned the VPB secretary post one year after the 
first directly-elected VC came into power. Before direct VC elections were carried out, 
the VPB cadres in B village were simply appointed by the township Party Committee 
though in the form of election by all village Party members (B village has a total of 38 
Party members in 2000). And also the VPB cadres usually concurrently held VC office. 
For instance, from 1995 to 2000, the personnel composition of the VPB was Qu Sixiang 
(VPB secretary), Qu Jiabo (deputy secretary and concurrently serving as VC chair), Qu 
                                                        
24  A Central document issued in 1994 stressed that “VPB must strengthen the leadership over VC” and “VCs must be 
subject to the leadership of VPB”. See Zhonggong zhongyang (CCP Central Committee): 1994.     140 
Jiazhi (VPB member and concurrently serving as deputy VC chair), Qu Jialing (VPB 
member and concurrently serving as VC member), Qu Shaodong (VPB member). The 
VPB was the decision-making body in the village at that time and the VC primarily 
implemented the decisions made by the VPB. All major decisions concerning village 
affairs had to be made or approved by the VPB before formal adoption by VC. By this, 
the  township  Party  committee  and  government  made  sure  that  Party  policy  was 
implemented smoothly in the village (Interviews 11, 47 and 49). 
 
The VPB secretary was no doubt the most important and powerful village official (“first 
hand”, or boss) in the village. He served as the personification and chief representative 
of the Party at the village level. One of the crucial powers held by the Party secretary 
was recommending personnel composition of village administration and recruiting new 
Party  members  in  the  village.  The  VPB  secretary  also  had  the  final  authority  over 
village public financial and budgetary matters. Usually all major village expenditures 
had  to  be  approved  by  the  VPB  secretary.  The  power  of  the  VPB  secretary  over 
financial matters was especially significant in well-to-do villages like B village, which 
once owned a number of enterprises (Guo and Bernstein 2004; Interview 10). 
   
VC-VPB conflict following the introduction of direct elections 
With the implementation of direct VC elections in 1999, the VPB’s traditional power in 
village governance was potentially challenged by the VC. The Organic Law and direct 
VC  elections  have  empowered  the  VC  and  potentially  changed  the  village  power 
structure.  The  previous  unified  leadership,  centred  around  the  VPB,  has  become 
dualistic:  VPB  cadres  are  elected  by  village  Party  members  or  appointed  by  the 
township Party Committee, while VC cadres are elected by ordinary villagers through 
VC elections. Now village power is supposed to be shared between the two bodies. The 
revised Organic Law states that the VPB should “exert the effect of the leading core” 
even  though  the  Law  also  stipulates  that  the  VPB  should  “support  and  guarantee” 
villager’s self-governance (Article 3). Article 3 of Measures for Implementing the PRC 
VC  Organic  Law  in  Shandong  (the  2000  Measures)  specifies  that  “the  VC  must   141 
consciously accept the leadership” of the VPB and “perform its responsible duties well”. 
This stipulation means that the VPB exercises leadership “over important matters” while 
the VC should take charge of specific issues (Guo and Bernstein 2004: 258). But even 
so, such an ambiguous formula says little about who is actually in charge of specific 
issues and the division of work between the two bodies. How could the VPB exert its 
leadership over the VC without intervening the VC’s work? In village governance, what 
should be considered as “important matters” to be decided by the VPB and what should 
be classified as “specific issues” belonging to the duty of the VC? Unfortunately, no 
regulations has set out these clearly. The confusion and contradictions in the revised 
Organic Law are largely the root of the so-called “two-committee” (the VPB is also 
called  VPB  committee)  conflict  (liangwei  maodun).  Bewildered  VPB  secretaries  in 
Xinjia township asked their superiors what use it was to have elected VC cadres when 
the leading core remained the VPB. By the same token, the village committee chairs 
were also perplexed: if the leadership of the VPB must be adhered to, why bother with 
elections in the first place (Interviews 1 and 14)?   
 
Since the implementation of the revised Organic Law, conflict between VCs and VPBs 
in village governance has become a nationwide problem (Bernstein 2006; Guo 2002; 
Guo and Bernstein 2004; Xu and Zhou 2001). In order to solve the VC-VPB conflict, in 
some  provinces,  particularly  in  Shandong,  Guangdong  and  Hainan  provinces,  local 
governments chose to merge the VCs and VPBs by oblige the Party secretary to run for 
the office of VC chair, thereby establishing his/her acceptability to the villagers (Guo 
and  Bernstein  2004;  Tan  and  Xin  2007:  594).  For  example,  in  November  1999, 
Shandong  province  issued  a  circular,  stating  that  “the  government  encourage  VPB 
secretaries and other VPB members to concurrently hold the position of VC chairs or 
other VC positions through electoral processes”; and “those VC chairs and VC members 
who are Party members and are considered to be qualified should be recruited to the 
VPB leading teams in accordance with related regulations and procedures of intra-Party 
elections” (Zhonggong Shandong shengwei; Shandongsheng remin zhengfu 1999).   
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Concurrent  office  holding  emerged  as  the  arrangement  favoured  by  the  Central 
government later. In July 2002, the Central government issued a “notice” on the new 
round of VC elections, “recommending” (ti chang) that candidates for VPB secretary 
should first run in the VC elections: if they received popular recognition by winning VC 
chair, they should then be nominated for the post of secretary; if they fail to be elected 
as VC chair, they should not be nominated for the VPB secretary post by the higher 
level party committee (Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting; Guowuyuan bangongting 
2002).  The  concurrent  holding  of  both  VPB  secretary  and  VC  chair  is  also  called 
“carrying two posts by one shoulder” (yijiantiao) (Guo 2002: 115).   
 
Concurrent office holding has failed to be widely adopted throughout China. In many 
provinces, such as Guangxi, Shanxi, Yunan, Neimenggu and Hunan, it is estimated that 
this method is adopted only in less than 20 per cent villages (Tan and Xin 2007: 594). 
And despite Shandong authorities’ preference, concurrent office holding rate in Xinjia 
Township, after its 2002 VC elections, for example, was only 32 per cent (9 out of 28 
villages) (Interview 3). B village, was among the rest 68 per cent villages, that did not 
adopt this method. According to the Xinjia Township officials, concurrent office holding 
is difficult to be implemented due to three reasons. First, many VPB secretaries who 
have faithfully implemented the state policies could not be elected if run in VC elections; 
second, those elected VC chair may be unwilling or not competent to implement the 
state policies and tasks; and finally, concurrent office holding, although may solve the 
problem of formal jurisdictional/institutional conflict between VC and VPB, can not 
necessarily solve the problem of informal power struggle between factions, which is 
usually the root of the VC-VPB conflict (Interviews 1 and 3).                           
 
The nature of the VC-VPB conflict, according to a Yantai government official, is that, 
after direct VC elections, the elected VC chair and the VPB secretary are likely to have 
a tense personal relationship and fight each other for power (Interview 56). Similarly, 
Guo  Zhenglin,  a  Chinese  scholar,  also  points  out  that  due  to  the  absence  of 
institutionalized work divisions and rules or norms about cooperation between the VC   143 
and the VPB, the relationship between the two bodies stands or falls largely on the 
personal relationship between the VC chair and the VPB secretary: if the VC chair and 
the VPB secretary have good personal relationship it is not likely that there will be 
serous conflict between the “two committees”; however, if the two persons have a tense 
personal relationship, “two-committee conflict” will be very likely to arise. He indicates 
that because it is based on a personal relationship, the two-committee relationship is 
“highly unstable” (Guo 2002: 111).   
 
As clientelist theories have also suggested, dyadic relationships can be ones of mutual 
hostility as well as of mutual aid and hostile exchanges between two factions may create 
continuing conflict and lead to community fragmentation (Lande 1977: xxxii-xxxiii). So, 
if the VC chair and the VPB secretary are in a dyadic relationship of mutual hostility, 
and with the absence of institutionalized work procedures, conflict between the two 
bodies is bound to arise. In B village the VC-VPB conflict manifested itself soon after 
Jiamao and his two fellows (the New Faction) won the VC election in 1999. Sixiang and 
his  followers  (the  OLT  Faction)  remained  in  the  VPB  posts,  and  it  became  almost 
impossible  for  the  two  factions  to  work  together  without  the  township  government 
officials’ frequent intervention. In particularly, the hostility between Jiamao and Sixiang 
reportedly  turned  the  village  office  site  into  a  virtual  battlefield.  Jiamao’s  working 
priorities as the elected VC chair were “auditing previous village financial accounts”, 
“clearing old debts” and “rectifying various previous mistakes” (Interviews 11 and 50). 
All these activities were aimed at striking blows at the OLT Faction. As Jiamao told me:   
 
According to law, as the elected VC chair, I took responsibility for the village affairs. To 
do my job, I of course had to find out what had happened in the past when the old 
leading  team  was  in  power.  Otherwise,  how  could  I  just  take  over  the  job  without 
knowing anything about it? Auditing the previous village financial records, clearing old 
debts, tackling the misdeeds committed by the old leading team was what I had to do and 
promised  to  do.  But  Sixiang  and  his  men  tried  their  best  to  make  trouble  and 
intentionally obstruct us from doing our jobs (Interview 50).   144 
 
Sixiang,  however,  expressed  his  anger  to  Jiamao  and  this  men’s  behaviours  of 
intentionally retaliating the old cadres after the first direct VC elections. Sixiang told 
me:   
 
Jiamao and his men had harbored a private resentment against me for a long time. Their 
very  purpose  of running  for  elections  was  not to  serve  the  villagers  but to  retaliate 
against us old village cadres. After Jiamao became the VC chair, he was not concerned 
with his job at all but always attempted to make waves. To them, “self-governance” 
meant they could do whatever they wanted (Interview 49). 
 
Sixiang and his OLT Faction of course did not want to surrender to their opponents. The 
OLT Faction took two strategies as counterattack. On the on hand, they took advantage 
of the formal institutional stipulation that the VPB should act as the “leading core” in 
village governance and opposed the New Faction occupied VC’s threatening motions, 
such as auditing previous village financial accounts. In Sixiang’s words, “fortunately, 
the law stipulates that the VPB is the leading core and all important issues must be 
decided by the VC and VPB together. That’s why Jiamao and his men failed to achieve 
their evil intentions” (Interview 49). On the other hand, members of the OLT Faction 
intentionally  picked  quarrels  and  created  troubles  so  as  to  make  the  New  Faction 
occupied VC difficult to carry out its normal work and thus damage its reputation. For 
example, when the VC under Jiamao’s leadership organized the collective mechanized 
cultivation (in B village, during seedtime the VC usually hires machines to cultivate all 
farmland  in  the  village  for  all  villagers.  This  is  much  more  efficient  for  individual 
household  cultivation),  some  core  members  of  the  OLT  Faction  claimed  that  their 
farmland had not been done satisfactorily and insisted that their farmland should be 
cultivated again. When Jiamao refused their request, they even forced the cultivator to 
stop and claim compensation on the spot. This made Jiamao’s work almost impossible 
to carry on until the township officials intervened in the end (Interview 50). Some OLT 
Faction members also kept going to the VC office, complaining about the VC work   145 
done by Jiamao and his men. Some even went to Jiamao’s house after getting drunk, 
abusing him (Interview 50 and 53).                                   
 
Such factional struggle and conflict made the village governance almost impossible to 
function  properly  and  village  work  came  to  deadlock  nearly  at  all  times.  A  Xinjia 
Township official talked about how B village’s governance became malfunctioned and 
paralyzed with the VC (occupied by the New Faction) and the VPB (occupied by the 
OLT Faction) fighting each soon other after the 1999 election: 
 
After Jiamao and his men became VC cadres of B village in 1999, the quarrels and fights 
between Jiamao’s men and Sixiang’s men were endless. Jiamao’s VC and Sixiang’s VPB 
could not work together at all. As long as Jiamao and Sixiang were both in the office, 
there  would  be  quarrels.  Jiamao’s  faction  was  eager  to  dig  up  so-called  “corrupt” 
practices committed by Sixiang and the village old cadres before, while Sixiang and his 
men of course tried his best to prevent such efforts against them. Sixiang’s suggestions 
and working plans were always opposed by Jiamao and vice versa. You can imagine how 
difficult  it  was  for  the  two  factions  to  collaborate  to  get  work  done.  Without  our 
government’s intervention, village affairs could not have been carried out with the two 
factions fighting each other all day (Interview 11). 
 
After direct VC elections, such factional struggles between VCs and VPBs have taken 
place in numerous Chinese villages. As one writer has commented: “No one can exactly 
say, since successfully carrying out democratic elections, how many previously peaceful 
villages have disappointingly fallen into unrest caused by factional struggles.” He asks 
perplexedly:  “Is  this  the  democracy  that  villagers  really  want”  (Zhu  2004:  111)?  In 
Xinjia  Township,  according  to  a  township  government  official,  about  one  third  of 
villages  have  experienced  this  kind  of  “unstable”  situation  due  to  severe  factional 
conflicts after direct elections (Interview 3). In one township of another county in Yantai 
City, the factional conflicts between VCs and VPBs were so severe that a total of 57 VC 
chairs and members in that township signed a letter to the central government in 2000   146 
saying that VPB secretaries had prevented them from carrying out their duties by failing 
to relinquish the village seal or by denying them access to village financing accounts. 
One was “brutally beaten up” by the Party secretary’s associates for complaining to 
country  authorities.  This  issue  aroused  the  Central  government’s  attention  and  was 
reported by the  central  media (Cui 2001; Jakobsen 2004:107).  In another village in 
Shanxi Province, the conflict between the elected VC chair and the VPB secretary had 
been so severe that the VPB secretary murdered the VC chair (Li 2001).     
 
VC-VPB conflict in the post-election village governance of B village, as in many other 
villages elsewhere, is actually the extension of the factional contest in the VC elections. 
The factional rivalry triggered by direct VC elections continues to manifest itself often 
in  the  form  of  VC-VPB  conflict  in  the  post-election  governance.  As  the  clientelist 
theorist  Lande  has  pointed  out:  “the  divisive  aspects  of  factionalism  must  not  be 
overlooked.  One  of  the  aims  of  each  faction  is  to  bring  benefits  to  its  leaders  and 
adherents. To do so, it must defeat efforts of rival factions to do the same. The losers in 
such zero-sum games are likely be resentful, to hope for a turn-about in which they can 
‘put down’ their opponents as they have been put down themselves. This leads to the 
related subject of feuding” (Lande 1977: xxxii).   
 
In B village’s first direct VC election, although the OLT Faction was defeated by the 
New Faction, its core members still stayed in the VPB that was not subject to popular 
election  and  was  supposed  to  “lead”  the  VC  filled  by  the  New  Faction.  If  the 
vote-soliciting based on factional competition created village division, the post-election 
governance  led  to  a  further  deterioration  in  the  division  and  factional  conflict. And 
because of the division and conflict, village administration has worsened rather than 
improved. For more than a year until Sixiang resigned the VPB secretary in July 2000, 
Jiamao and Sixiang refused to talk to each other, let alone cooperate with each other 
(Interview 55). The conflict between the VC headed by Jiamao and the VPB led by 
Sixiang  temporarily  ceased  in  July  2000,  when  Xinjia  Township  government  (Party 
committee) reshuffled B village’s VPB. In that reshuffle, Sixiang resigned his post as   147 
VPB  secretary  and  stepped  down.
25  Qu  Jiawan,  who  was  a  laid-off  staff  of  Xinjia 
Township  government,
26  was  appointed  as  new  VPB  secretary  of  B  village,  while 
Jiamao was appointed VPB deputy secretary. The new VPB personnel appointed by the 
Xinjia  Township  government  were  as  follows:  Qu  Jiawan  (secretary),  Qu  Jiamao 
(deputy secretary and also VC chair), Qu Jialing (member) and Qu Jiabo (member). 
 
After the VPB reshuffle, the VC-VPB conflict in the village government became much 
less severe due to three reasons. First of all, there was no personal resentment between 
Jiamao and the new secretary, Jiawan. Jiawan had worked outside the village for many 
years  before  returning  to  assume  the  post  of  the  VPB  sectary  and  had  no  close 
connection to either faction (Interview 55). And Jiawan used to be Jiamao’s student 
when he was a pupil in primary school. This personal connection facilitated the two’s 
cooperation to some extent as to show respect to one’s teacher is considered to be a 
virtue in China. Second, according to some villagers, Jiawan was not an aggressive 
character and was inclined to avoid conflicts (Interview 3 and 55). Thirdly, after the 
reshuffle, Jiamao concurrently held both the position of VPB deputy secretary and that 
of the VC chair, which seemed to have eased the VC-VPB conflict.
27 
 
Again, as stated previously, two years later Jiazhi (core member of the OLT Faction) 
ousted  Jiamao  in  the  2002  VC  election  and  started  his  collaboration  with  the  VPB 
(headed by Jiawan). (Jiamao remained on the VPB until the next reshuffle—in theory an 
election by Party members in the village—but was marginalized in village affairs, and 
indeed preferred to withdraw.) During Jiazhi’s tenure, the “VC-VPB relationship” is 
                                                        
25  As for the reason for Sixiang’s resignation, there were two versions: according to Sixiang himself, it was because 
he was “fed up” with working with Jiamao and also he had reached the retiring age to get pension by the year 2000 
(Interview 49). But according to Jiamao (Interview 50) and another villager interviewee (Interview 42), Sixiang 
resigned because on the one hand he felt he had no longer been able to “commit corruption” and on the other he 
resigned to act as a “string-puller” behind the curtain. No matter what is the reason, it seems one thing is clear that 
even after Sixiang’s resignation, he has remained to be the leader of the OLT Faction (Interview 50, 53 and 55).     
26  Jiawan had previously worked as a staff for Xinjia Township for ten years. He was appointed as the VPB secretary 
of B village in 2000 partly because he was just laid off with the government redundancy and needed a new job 
(Interview 3).   
27  Note that if following the concurrent office holding method, Jiamao, who was a Party member and elected VC 
chair, was supposed to concurrently hold the VPB secretary post rather than the VPB deputy secretary post. This 
demonstrates that the township government did not trust Jiamao to implement government policies and tasks. But to 
make Jiamao VPB deputy secretary also demonstrates the township government’s pragmatism in dealing with him 
after his election. It was an attempt to bring him under Party control and perhaps even co-opt him into the system.           148 
considered  by  the  township  government  leaders  to  have  been  quite  “stable”  and 
“satisfactory” (Interviews 2 and 3). This is because the VPB secretary, Jiawan, chose to 
side with Jiazhi and therefore the factional struggle failed to take place in the form of 
the VC-VPB conflict.     
 
However,  following  the  2004  VC  election,  the  situation  changed  again.  The  New 
Faction, as discussed in Chapter four, won the positions of VC chair (Sixu) and deputy 
VC chair (Sichun). The incumbent VC deputy chair, Sifa (also core member of the OLT 
Faction), secured his seat in the VC, but only won the position of VC member in this 
election (see Chapter 4). Interestingly, in the subsequent VPB reshuffle, Sifa replaced 
Jiawan and was appointed VPB secretary by the Xinjia Township government.
28  This 
created  a  very  complicated  web  of  relationships.  As  a  VC  member,  Sifa  should  be 
subordinate to the VC chair and deputy chair; however, as VPB secretary, he became the 
“first hand” of the village and was supposed to lead VC. Note that Sifa (the OLT Faction) 
had  hotly  competed  with  Sixu  and  Sichun  (the  New  Faction)  in  the  2004  electoral 
campaign, in which they had verbally attacked and even insulted each other. Though I 
do  not  have  much  information  on  the  running of  village  governance  after  the  2004 
election, I do suspect that the “two-committee relationship” very likely descended into 
conflict and factional struggle again. 
 
“Democratic” supervision?   
 
Villagers’ financing small team 
The villagers’ financing small team (VFST) is a specially designed institution supposed 
to empower villagers to supervise village cadres’ financing activities in order to practise 
“democratic  supervision”.  In  theory,  the  VFST  is  supposed  to  be  an  independent 
institution in village governance overseeing village financing to make sure public funds 
are  spent  sensibly  and  reasonably.  The  “Measures  for  Implementing  the  PRC  VC 
                                                        
28  Sifa,  as  Jiazhi’s  ally,  is  favoured  by  township  government  due  to  his  record  of  obeying  government’s 
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Organic Law in Shandong” (the 2000 Measures) stipulate that: “the villagers general 
meeting (VGM) recommends and selects 3-5 villagers to form a villagers’ financing 
small team (VFST). The VFST conducts audits and supervises village financial accounts 
and it is responsible to the VGM. … Every item of VC expenditure must be recorded in 
the village accounts only after audit by the VFST. The VFST should audit the village 
accounts at least once a month” (Article 26). In 2004, a central government document 
further specified that VFST members be selected by and responsible to either the VGM 
or the VRA. The VFST is entitled to veto unreasonable expenditures and where disputes 
arise, the issue concerned should be referred to the VGM or VRA for discussion and 
decision (Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting and Guowuyuan bangongting 2004).   
 
B village’s VFST members were elected from among villagers’ representatives by a 
ballot  of  those  representatives.  The  three  representatives  with  the  most  votes  were 
elected VFST members. But again, what the VFST should be in theory is one thing, but 
what  it  actually  is  in  reality  is  another.  In  B  village,  the  VFST  cannot  be  a  real 
independent overseeing institution; rather, the behaviour of the VFST members are also 
strongly influenced by clientelism and factional considerations. For example, one VFST 
member during Jiazhi’s tenure as VC chair, Siyi, described his job to me: 
 
We VFST members meet at village office once a month, usually on the evening of 25
th. 
The village accountant and treasurer will join us and show us the month’s expenditure 
receipts one by one. Our job is to check whether a specific sum of money has been spent 
properly. Actually I do find many problematic expenditures when carrying out my duties. 
But my opinion is no use at all. Even when I pointed out the problems and refused to 
endorse certain spending, it is still reimbursed. For example, I once noticed that there 
was an incredibly large sum of money spent on entertainment within a single month. I 
raised my doubts about it. Jiazhi [the VC chair] and Jiawan [the secretary] explained that 
more  money  had  been  spent  on  entertainment  that month  because there  had  been a 
number of inspections called by the township officials for various different purposes. I 
refused to accept that excuse and insisted that the village collective should not reimburse   150 
the unreasonable extra part of the spending. But this ended up with no clear resolution. 
No one has ever mentioned it again. Since it is the township government that keeps the 
village accounts, we VFST members have no idea how the account has been recorded. 
Things have been always like that. Another problem for the VFST is that some VFST 
members do their jobs out of their personal and factional considerations. They either 
keep silent for fear of offending the village cadres or side with them because they belong 
to their faction (Interview 54). 
 
As  far  as  B  village  is  concerned,  there  are  the  following  problems  affecting  the 
functioning of the VFST. First of all, VFST members have no opportunity to check the 
village account book. It is Xinjia Township government that keeps the account books of 
each village and nobody can check without the township government’s permission. All 
VFST members can do is to judge whether a sum of money is spent properly or not. But 
how the village account book has been recorded is not known to them. Second, the 
VFST  stamp  is  kept  by  the  village  treasurer  (a  position  concurrently  held  by  VC 
member)  rather  than  the  VFST  members.  According  to  the  regulations  (Zhonggong 
Longkou shiwei zuzhibu 2002: 58), if VFST members approve an expenditure receipt, 
they should stamp the receipt; if they think the expenditure is unacceptable, they can 
reject it by refusing to stamp the receipt. No expenditure receipt should be recorded in 
the village accounts without bearing the stamp. This stamp, which is called “special 
democratic financing stamp” (minzhu licai zhuanzhang), however, is kept by the VC 
member.  Hence,  VFST  members  suspect  that  the  stamp  bearer,  who  is  a  VC  cadre 
himself, may be likely to secretly abuse his access to the stamp (if he secretly stamps a 
receipt rejected by VFST, VFST members can hardly find out since they cannot check 
account book at all). Third, according to Siyi, an excessive amount of public funds has 
been spent on entertainment, which indicates that village cadres are likely to abuse their 
power. Fourth, the VFST’s opinions and objections have constantly been ignored by 
both village cadres and township government. For example, it was quite common that 
when receipts were rejected by the VFST the matter was not resolved. According to the 
Longkou regulations (Zhonggong Longkou shiwei zuzhibu 2002: 59), receipts rejected   151 
by the VFST should be explained and justified by VC and VPB cadres. If the VFST still 
finds them unsatisfactory, it should be discussed and decided on by the VGM or VRA. 
In  reality,  receipts  rejected  by  VFST  can  be  approved  easily  with  the  township 
government’s agreement. Last but not least, the VFST members’ behaviour is in fact 
strongly affected by clientelism and factionalism. Some VFST members are willing to 
endorse expenditures simply because they are the clients of the village cadres and are 
obliged  to  support  their  patrons.  Some  members,  such  as  Siyi,  are  intentionally 
faultfinding because they belong to the village cadres’ rival faction. Jiazhi’s comment 
may help to further support this. Strongly disagreeing Siyi’s view, Jiazhi expressed his 
anger over the behaviour of “certain” VFST members: 
 
I think certain persons in the VFST just intentionally make trouble, rather than do their 
jobs. Siyi is this kind of troublemaker. He is a remote relative of Jiaxian [a core member 
of the New Faction]. And because Jiaxian was ousted by us (in 2002 VC election), he 
bears a grudge against us and kept making trouble after being elected a VFST member. 
He  always  rebuked  us  for  absolutely  normal  village  expenditures.  For  instance,  the 
village water pump had a fault and we paid the technician 200 yuan to change a new part. 
But Siyi accused us of misusing the collective money, claiming that the part should cost 
no more than 50 yuan. He also accused us of abusing village entertainment budget. It is 
normal for every village to spend some money on entertaining higher level officials who 
make inspection visits to the village. It is out of the consideration of both courtesy and, 
more importantly, the village’s benefits. If we don’t show our hospitality to please them, 
how can we ask their support and favour in our village work? You know, Jiamao and 
Sifa also spent quite a lot of money on entertainment during their tenure. Siyi was a 
member of the VFST at that time as well and because of his close relationship with Sifa, 
he had never raised any doubts then (Interview 47). 
 
The VFST’s intended function of independent supervision cannot be achieved in reality 
largely because it is composed of persons who are constrained by their clientelist and 
factional relationships. On the one hand, if VFST members are clients of the village   152 
cadres, how can they supervise their patrons? On the other hand, if VFST members 
intentionally  refuse  to  cooperate  with  village  cadres  by  vetoing  even  reasonable 
expenditures simply because the cadres are their factional rivals, how can village cadres 
operate effectively? Clientelism has made the VFST either a rubber stamp or a tool in 
factional struggles. As one Chinese scholar has commented: “we have to doubt whether, 
in a face to face village community, the VFST, which is also subject to the influences of 
factional and clan relationships, can truly do its job openly, fairly and justly” (Lu 2005: 
17).  He  further  points  out  that,  as  the  formal  regulations  fail  to  offer  provisions  to 
discipline VFST members who fail to perform their duties properly, the function of the 
VFST is subject to the personal relationships among its members (Ibid.). And this is 
largely the root of its malfunction. Another Chinese scholar, Dang Guoying, expresses 
similar  doubts.  He  asks:  “what  if  the  members  of  the  overseeing  institution  act  in 
collusion with the village cadres? Under such circumstances, how can the overseeing 
institution be supervised” (Dang 2004)? 
 
Transparency in village affairs 
Transparency in village affairs (cunwu gongkai) is a measure to make village affairs 
open  to  villagers  so  as  to  empower  villagers  to  have  the  “right  to  know”  and  to 
supervise village cadres and the process of village governance (Yin 2004: 52-62). The 
revised Organic Law stipulates that transparency in village affairs must be carried out 
by the VC and that all village affairs that affect villagers’ interests, including village 
financial  statement,  management  of  the  collective  economy,  family  planning 
implementation and allocation of housing plots, must be open to the villagers. And also, 
the VC should “guarantee the genuineness of any materials made public and the content 
be subject to villagers’ enquiry” (see Articles 19 and 22). At the local level, the 2000 
Measures  contained  a  similar  stipulation  requiring  transparency  in  village  affairs 
(Article 24 and 25).   
 
According to the guidance handbook published by the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA), 
village affair transparency can be carried out in four forms: “village affairs publicity   153 
boards” (cunwu gongkai lan), village internal broadcasting, leaflets and village general 
meeting  (VGM)  or  villagers’  representative  assembly  (VRA)  (Minzhengbu  jiceng 
zhengquan he shequ jianshe si 2004). In B village, as in many villages elsewhere in 
rural China,
29  the most common and institutionalized form of publicizing village affairs 
to  villagers  is  using  “village  affairs  publicity  boards”,  although,  only  occasionally, 
village  internal  broadcasting,  leaflets  or  VRA  may  be  used  to  publicizing  some 
information  (Interviews  24,  35  and  44).  As  far  as  village  affair  transparency  is 
concerned, the Longkou authorities also only focus on the form of publicity boards, 
stating that “all village affairs concerned by villagers or affecting villagers’ interests, 
should  be  publicized  on  village  affairs  publicity  boards  and  subject  to  villagers’ 
supervision” (Zhonggong longkou shiwei zuzhi bu 2002: 61-64).   
 
In  practice,  even  use  of  the  publicity  boards  (gongkai  lan),  which  is  the  only 
institutionalized form for publishing information on village affairs, is under-used. The 
village affairs publicity boards of B village are located outside the VC/VPB office. It is 
actually the wall of a house, and information on village affairs that should be public 
knowledge  ought  to  be  posted  up  there.  But,  in  fact,  according  to  most  of  my 
interviewees, except for a poster of the village accounts statement that was posted up 
monthly, little else has ever appeared on the board.
30  This was confirmed by my three 
fieldwork trips to B village, during which I found only monthly statements of the village 
accounts posted on the board. And even this was very vague and even confusing. It was 
merely a form containing several items and showing both income and expenditures from 
each. For example, in terms of expenditures, under an item called “management fees” it 
showed that a significant sum of money had been spent in a certain month. However the 
form did not detail how the money had been spent. Similarly, the “other expenditures” 
item  also  contained  quite  significant  sums.  I  asked  a  Xinjia  Township  government 
leader what “other expenditures” meant on the statement. And he replied that it meant 
                                                        
29  For example, according to a survey carried out in Sichuan Province in 2005, in more than 50,000 villages of the 
province, there were 98.3% villages had village affair publicity board as their only form of village affairs publicity. 
See Wang (2005).       
30  Some interviewees said that they had never bothered to see the village publicity board (Interview 21, 24, 42, 45 
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“expenditures that did not fit in the categories specifically listed on the form” (Interview 
1). This leader gave me no examples of such “other expenditures”, only saying that 
“different villages have different situations”. It is clear that such form of village affair 
transparency  makes  it  difficult  for  ordinary  villagers  even  to  understand  what  is 
happening  let  alone  to  “supervise”  village  affairs.  I  asked  one  villager  interviewee 
whether he would read the posted village account statement every month. He replied: “I 
have never bothered to look at it. And even if I did, I would not be able to make sense of 
it. They are just tricks played by the cadres. We ordinary villagers are not interested in 
that stuff” (Interview 42). Another villager commented:   
 
Villagers cannot understand the village account poster at all. You know, it only shows 
such things as how much is spent on “administration fees”, how much is spent on 
“entertainment fees”. From the poster you have no way of knowing exactly how the 
money was spent. What’s more, it is very easy to cook the books, isn’t it? So the 
overwhelming majority of villagers are not concerned about the posted account at all. 
Even if someone has doubts, could they really go to check and audit the village 
accounts? No one would like to offend those cadres (Interview 30).                                                                 
 
Despite the situation in B village, the official statistics, however, have always shown the 
situation in a very optimistic light. For example, according to the figure of the MoCA, 
by  2003,  “transparency  in  village  affairs  has  been  implemented  in  95  per  cent  of 
villages” across the country with “more than 60 per cent up to standard” (Jiang 2003: 
10). Likewise, the official figure released by Shandong Province is also encouraging. 
According to the 2004 figures, there were a total of 86,699 VCs in Shandong, of which 
95.5 per cent (82,837) had carried out village affairs transparency. And among the VCs 
that  had  implemented  village  affair  transparency,  77.4  per  cent  (64,144)  were 
considered by the Shandong authorities as “satisfactory” and 20.4 per  cent (16,902) 
were classified as “acceptable” (yi ban) and only 2.2per cent (1,791) were considered 
“bad”  (cha)  (Wang  2004).  But  contrary  to  such  optimistic  official  statistics,  some 
in-depth investigations have revealed that what happens in B village is no exception but   155 
is found in other localities across the country (Bernstein 2006; Gou 2007; He 2007; 
Song 2002: 89-94; Yin 2004: 52-62). For instance, a qualitative investigation of the first 
village  self-governance  demonstration  county,  Laixi
31,  shows  that  village  affairs 
transparency in its villages had been largely “formalistic” (Yin 2004: 52-62). Yin argues 
that two reasons have led to this formalistic implementation. First, village cadres would 
not make village affairs open because they tend to seek improper benefits or commit 
corruption  by  taking  advantage  of  their  power.  Second,  township  officials  tend  to 
connive at village cadres’ misbehaviour in exchange for their cooperation in carrying 
out  some  rigid  government  tasks.  Third,  and  more  importantly,  although  ordinary 
villagers are supposed to participate and oversee the implementation of village affair 
transparency, they, as vulnerable people, in fact cannot “afford to offend their village 
cadres” if they challenge them on related issues because in a village community cadres 
are  still  able  to  make  an  individual  villager’s  life  “difficult”  if  they  want  to  (Ibid.: 
57-60). This analysis, I believe, is compatible with my clientelist explanation of the 
situation in B village.           
 
The recall and impeachment of VC cadres 
The  revised  Organic  Law  bestows  on  villagers  the  right  to  recall  and  impeach 
incumbent VC cadres in whom they have lost confidence. Article 16 of the Organic Law 
stipulates, 
 
If more than one fifth of eligible voters in a village jointly sign a proposal to recall VC 
members then this can be processed. Reasons for the recall should be put forward. The 
targeted VC member is entitled to make a defence. The VC should convene a villagers’ 
meeting without delay to vote on the recall proposal. The recall proposal can only be 
passed with the support of more than half the eligible voters in the village. 
 
This  is  another  institution  for  empowering  ordinary  villagers  to  “democratically” 
                                                        
31  Like Longkou County, Laixi County also locates in Shandong peninsula. Laixi is one of the counties of another 
eastern coastal city of Shandong Province: Qingdao. In 1990, the MoCA picked Laixi County as the first national 
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supervise elected VC cadres. Nationwide, although there have been a few reported cases 
of  villagers  successfully  using  this  power  and  recalling  their  incumbent  VC  cadres 
(Wang  2002:  103;  Xiao  2002b:  89-90),  this  does  not  seem  to  be  widely  used.  For 
example, Yantai city has a total of 6572 administrative villages. However, since the 
implementation of the revised Organic Law in 1998, there has not been a single reported 
case of the recall of VC cadres (Interview 56). 
 
Why is this clause not practical? First, villagers have little incentive to participate in 
actions  against  village  cadres.  With  the  absence  of  organizational  support  from  a 
voluntary sector or partisan organizations, it is very difficult to mobilize villagers to 
participate into such activities. Most importantly, collective action is undermined by 
particularistic clientelist ties. In this context, ordinary villagers today still try to avoid 
offending their village cadres for fear of retaliation.   
 
Second,  the  township  government  would  not  support  such  actions.  To  convene  a 
villagers’ meeting to recall a VC cadre is as inconvenient for these officials as to hold a 
village electoral meeting. If the incumbent VC cadres are satisfactory to the township 
government, it has no incentive at all to recall them even if villagers want to. However, 
if the incumbent VC members are in fact unsatisfactory to the township government, it 
still can use other methods to get things done—as I will discuss in the next chapter. And 
if villagers are mobilized to recall their VC cadres without the township government’s 
involvement, it would mean a failure of government control and so the township would 
not let it happen (Interview 3).   
 
Third, the stipulation on recalling and impeaching VC cadres is vague and flawed. For 
example, according to the revised Organic Law (Article 16), it is the VC that convenes 
the villagers’ meeting if a recall proposal made. But it is inconceivable that VC cadres 
would convene a meeting, the purpose of which is to oust themselves (Li 2005; Xiao 
2002b: 79-80). 
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The villagers’ representative assembly (VRA)   
 
The institutional status of VRA 
As  have  discussed  briefly  in  Chapter  2,  the  VRA  is  actually  a  substitute  for  the 
unpractical institution, the VGM. Although in theory the VGM is supposed to be the 
supreme institution for decision-making in a village and all important village issues 
should  be  discussed  and  decided  by  it,  in  fact  it  is  simply  impractical  in  reality. 
Considered to be a form of “direct democracy” (Oi and Rozelle 2000: 515; Zhong 2003: 
168), the VGM largely fails to function in practice for two key reasons. First, it is very 
difficult to convene a VGM. Villagers are no longer been tied up on the farmland as 
they were during the commune era. Instead, they are engaged with various businesses, 
and may be working far away from their villages as migrant workers, or doing private 
businesses  outside  their  village  all  year  round.  This  makes  it  almost  impossible  to 
arrange  a  time  to  gather  the  legally-required  number  of  villagers  for  the  VGM.  In 
addition, in many Chinese village communities, it is difficult to find a proper meeting 
hall to accommodate a VGM. Second, the size of the VGM makes it difficult to hold a 
meaningful discussion of village affairs. A VGM in Chinese villages might mean several 
hundreds to over a thousand people gathering together. Such a big size is too difficult to 
carry  through  meaningful  discussion  (Chen  2000:  156-160;  Wang  and  Bai  1996: 
130-131).   
 
Because of the impracticality of holding regular VGMs, the VRA, has been created and 
utilized as a representative body in most Chinese villages. Article 21 of the revised 
Organic Law stipulates: “in villages that are relatively populous or where villagers are 
scattered over a wide area, people can elect villagers’ representatives. Convened by the 
VC, the villagers’ representative assembly discusses and makes decisions on the issues 
as authorized by the village general meeting (VGM). Villagers’ representatives can be 
elected by two methods, either one for each 5 to 15 households or to several from within 
each villagers’ small group [cunmin xiaozu].”   158 
 
The VRA as a formal village institution was created together with the implementation of 
direct  VC  election  in  B  village  (and  other  villages  in  Xinjia  Township)  in  1999.  B 
village has a total of 20 villagers’ representatives. But the election of the representatives 
was carried out in a rather informal way compared to the VC elections. The election of 
the VRA followed shortly after the VC election and was organized by the newly elected 
VC cadres. B village has four villagers’ small groups and each group was to produce 
five  representatives.  The  newly  elected  VC  would  instruct  a  few  persons  to  take  a 
roving  ballot  box  to  each  household  and  each  household  (not  each  member  of  the 
household) could select five villagers within its villagers’ small group as representatives. 
The five villagers who got the highest number of votes within a villagers’ small group 
would become the representatives of the villagers’ small group (Interviews 47, 50 and 
55).   
 
According to the Longkou regulations (Longkoushi nongcun "liangwei" huanjie xuanju 
gongzuo  lingdao  xiaozu  bangongshi  2004),  the  VRAs  are  authorized  the  following 
rights:   
 
· · · ·to  decide  the  level  of  compensation  that  villagers  can  be  paid  for  undertaking 
collective duties;   
· · · ·to decide on how the income from the village collective economy is spent;   
· · · ·to decide on how the village public funds are raised and spent—for example to decide 
whether establishing village-owned schools or building village roads; 
· · · ·to  endorse  contracts  relating  to  the  village  collective  economy,  village  public 
construction as well as villagers’ contracts with village collective; 
· · · ·to work out plans for the use of plots of land for housing and family planning; 
· · · ·to appraise and supervise the work of VC members as well as to discuss and decide 
proposals for punishing VC cadres wrongdoings; 
· · · ·to create and amend rules and regulations for villagers’ self-governance; 
· · · ·to elect the village accountant and members of the VFST;   159 
· · · ·to repeal or change any improper decisions made by the VC. 
   
The rights of the VRA, however, must be “authorized” by the VGM according to the 
revised Organic Law (Article 21). In Xinjia Township, the authorization ceremony was 
held  as  the  last  stage  of  the  VC  electoral  meeting  and,  according  to  my  personal 
observation of the VC elections in B village on November 29, 2004, it was conducted 
largely in a formalistic way without substantial meaning to most villagers. After the 
electoral meeting finally produced a new session of VC cadres, the township official 
who presided the meeting then carry on with the authorization ceremony by announcing 
to villagers:   
 
According to the stipulation of the Organic Law, all important issues affecting villagers 
interests  should  be  referred  by  the  VC  to  the  VGM  for  discussing  and  resolution. 
However, being realistic about rural conditions, it is very difficult to hold a VGM with 
lawful attending figure and also it would be very inconvenient to discuss issues at the 
VGM,  which  would  do  harm  to  villagers’  interests.  Therefore,  the  Organic  Law 
stipulates that the VGM can authorize the VRA to discuss and decide on some key 
village issues. In order to occupy your time as little as possible, we would like to hold 
the authorization ceremony today. Now let’s take a vote for it. We need to complete two 
steps: first, villagers take a vote on whether to hold the authorization ceremony today; 
second, villagers take a vote on the authorized contents. 
 
The form of the vote for the authorization was conducted by a show of hands. The 
content of what the VRA is authorized to do (the above-mentioned nine items) had been 
prepared by the government in advance and were actually not a matter of villagers’ 
concern. All the words and procedures of the authorization ceremony have been written 
in advance in the government operational manual (Longkouxian nongcun "liangwei" 
huanjie xuanju gongzuo lingdao xiaozu bangongshi 2004) and the township official who   160 
presided over the electoral meeting simply read it through quickly.
32  According to my 
personal observation, few villagers were serious about the authorization ceremony, let 
alone tried to make sense of what the exact meaning of each authorized item. Many 
villagers did not bother to raise their hands when the presiding township official asked 
them if they “agreed”, “disagreed” or “abstained” on the question of whether or not to 
give the VRA authorization—note that villagers voted once on the whole raft of VRA 
powers, not on each one separately. The township officials apparently did not care that 
the villagers were paying no attention. They went through the formalities as quickly as 
possible and ended the ritual by announcing with relief “it has passed unanimously”.
33     
   
In addition to B village, I also observed VC elections in 14 other villages in Xinjia 
Township  in  2004,  and  in  12  of  them  the  authorization  ceremony  procedures  was 
conducted in exactly the same way. In two cases, the township cadres even simply gave 
up the authorization ceremony because it rained, which made the villagers extremely 
impatient. 
 
The authorization ceremony process for VRAs is not taken at all seriously by either 
township officials or villagers. It is not initiated by villagers or the VGM but arranged 
by  the  local  government  in  a  top-down  style.  Villagers  are  still  largely  passive 
participants.  All  these  formalities  or  rituals  have  to  be  done  simply  because  these 
“democratic”  rules  are  designed  by  higher-up  authorities  rather  than  peoples’  own 
initiative.     
 
The malfunctioning of the VRA in practice   
Despite the central government’s continuing efforts to emphasize the VRA’s functions 
as  a  representative  organ  of  the  villagers  and  a  crucial  body  for  “democratic” 
decision-making and supervision over the village governance (Zhonggong zhongyang 
bangongting and Guowuyuan bangongting 2004), in most villages across rural China, 
                                                        
32  Personal observation of 8
th session of VC electoral meeting of B village. 2004-11-29.     
33  Ibid.   161 
the  VRA  is  either  rarely  convened  and  utilized,  or  it  is  held  as  a  formality  in  a 
meaningless fashion used merely as a legitimizing body to rubber stamp the decisions 
already made by the village cadres or the higher ups (Cao 2006; Zhong 2003: 169). 
Only in some villages where there is strong pressure from the higher authorities to make 
the VRA work and sufficient support and cooperation from the VPB, may the VRA 
probably be able to play a meaningful role in village governance (For such examples, 
see Lawrence 1994; Oi and Rozelle 2000: 516-519). As far as B village is concerned, 
the role of the VRA has been largely that of a rubber-stamp. Institutional deficiencies 
and informal clientelist influences are perhaps two most important factors that account 
for the mere formality of the VRA in reality.                     
 
Institutional deficiencies 
Institutionally speaking, the VRA system has two major deficiencies, which contribute 
to its malfunction in reality. First, although the most important responsibilities of the 
VRA is to make decisions on crucial village affairs and supervise and check VC’s work 
(Longkoushi nongcun "liangwei" huanjie xuanju gongzuo lingdao xiaozu bangongshi 
2004), the VRA has to be convened and presided by the VC. The revised Organic Law 
stipulates that “the VRA is convened by the VC to discuss and decide issues authorized 
by the VGM” (Article 21). In addition, the Longkou government regulations further 
stipulate that “the VRA is convened and presided by the VC under the leadership of the 
VPB” (Zhonggong Longkou shiwei zuzhibu 2002: 12). In practice, this makes the VRA 
subordinate to the VC and the VPB. This is rather as if a cabinet convenes and presides 
over the Parliament in the UK. Although the Longkou regulations stipulate that the VRA 
must be convened at least once a quarter or “with the proposal of either the VC and the 
VPB or more than one third of village representatives” (ibid.). In fact the VRA in B 
village has failed to meet so regularly (Interviews 50, 53 and 54). When to convene it 
largely depends on the will of the village cadres and the requirement of the township 
government. So, as Chen has pointed out: if the VRA is convened and chaired by the 
VC, which means the VRA does not have its own leader, the VC chair actually becomes 
the de facto VRA leader. Therefore in case the village cadres foresee that to convene the   162 
VRA  may  cause  trouble  or  be  counter  to  their  interests,  they  will  simply  refuse  to 
convene it (Chen 2000: 163; 178-179). In B village, under most circumstances the VRA 
is  called  by  village  cadres  at  the  request  of  the  township  government  to  pass  on 
government instructions (Interviews 47 and 50). Therefore, the VRA is not at all an 
independent standing body that has detailed and specific work procedures to carry out 
its function of so-called democratic decision-making and supervision. Such institutional 
arrangement simply enables township officials and village cadres to set the agenda or 
manipulate the VRA.   
 
Another key institutional deficiency causing the VRA’s malfunction is that the working 
and  maintaining  of  such  an  organization  is  not  economically  feasible  to  the 
overwhelming majority of villages. Although the VRA is supposed to play a crucial and 
long standing role as the locus of both decision-making and supervision in the village 
governance, its institutional design is largely impractical for the village community, at 
least economically speaking. According the local regulations, VRA representatives are 
obliged  to  perform  a  number  of  duties  in  relation  to  village  governance,  such  as 
participating in VRA meetings regularly, discussing and deciding on various important 
village affairs, soliciting their constituents’ opinion and requirements, supervising and 
appraising the VC’s performance, and so on (Longkoushi nongcun "liangwei" huanjie 
xuanju gongzuo lingdao xiaozu bangongshi 2004; also see Article 9 of the Shandong 
Measures). However, acting as  a VRA representative is almost an unpaid job.  In B 
village,  a  VRA  representative  is  paid  only  5  yuan  for  attending  a  meeting  (this  is 
“compensation for lose of working time”, wugong butie)
34, while in a lot of villages 
elsewhere  VRA  representatives  do  not  receive  any  payment  at  all  because  of  their 
village’s poor economic situation (Oi and Rozelle 2000: 522). Therefore, the time and 
energy spent on being a VRA representative outweighs the material benefits gained, 
particularly  in  (even  relatively  economically  developed  areas  of)  rural  China  where 
people’s economic situation is still poor. As a result, the representatives are not serious 
                                                        
34  In most of the villages of Xinjia Township, the compensation standard for VRA representatives is 5 yuan for 
attending each meeting. In only a few wealthy villages, the standard is 10 yuan (Interview 3).       163 
about their job and many of them often miss the VRA meetings (Interviews 3, 50 and 
55), let alone take time to study or sufficiently investigate important village affairs (if 
there are some) as required by the regulations. The multiple and crucial functions that 
the VRA is supposed to perform in theory are not attainable in practice.                           
 
The influence of clientelism 
As  indicated  previously,  in  principle,  the  VRA  is  an  independent  body  in  village 
governance  that  is  supposed  to  have  supervisory  and  decision-making  powers,  and 
representatives  must  represent  the  interests  of  their  fellow  villagers.  In  practice, 
however, because the VRA is convened and chaired by the village cadres who have 
already reached a consensus beforehand on solving the particular problems facing the 
village,
35  VRA  representatives  are  only  expected  to  approve  or  rubber-stamp  the 
decisions that have already been made. The VRA representatives are well aware of this 
informal rule and are unwilling to raise divergent opinions in meetings so as to offend 
the village cadres who are their patrons (or potential patrons). The VRA representatives, 
the  same  to  ordinary  villagers,  are  also  dependent  upon  the  goodwill  of  the  village 
cadres and the township officials to get access to various clientelist benefits. Therefore, 
showing deference and avoiding “making trouble” is one of the ways to win favour with 
the cadres (Unger 2000). As one VRA representative commented:                 
 
The VRA meeting is completely useless. It’s merely formalistic. They [the village cadres] 
would not tell you the content of the meeting until it starts. Under most circumstances, 
the  [VPB]  secretary  simply  announces  the  tasks  assigned  by  the  government  or  the 
decisions having been made by the village cadres. After the announcement, the secretary 
would ask “so, does anyone of you have any different opinion on it?” Usually no one 
responds. Then the secretary would say immediately, “OK, since there is no objection, 
this issue is then determined! The meeting is over and you are dismissed!” The typical 
thinking of the representatives is this: since it is no use at all to object to the cadres’ 
                                                        
35  According to the Longkou County regulation, unless the VC and VPB having reached a consensus on the plan of 
solving the particular problems facing the village, the VRA should not be convened. See Zhonggong longkou shiwei 
zuzhibu (2002): 12-13.             164 
decision, as long as others agree, I agree. Furthermore, even if I oppose the cadres’ 
decision in the interests of the village collective, I cannot directly benefit. However, if I 
offend the cadres or anyone else, I am the one to be hated by those persons. You know, in 
a small village, people deal with each other so frequently that your life won’t be easy if 
you make enemies, particularly if you offend cadres and able persons. So, why not be a 
“nice” person (Interview 45)? 
 
Thus VRA representatives also tend to behave like clients, not offending the village 
cadres, showing deference to them, giving them “face” and most importantly, avoiding 
speaking  out  publicly  against  them  in  the  VRA  meetings.  The  village  cadres,  in 
exchange,  can  make  use  of  the  resources  under  their  control  to  buy  off  the  VRA 
representatives. For example, the village cadres of B village would spend the collective 
funds  on  distributing  “Spring  Festival  goods”  to  the VRA  representatives  each  year 
before the Spring Festival, while ordinary villagers, even the poor and vulnerable ones 
who were most in need, were denied such benefits (Interviews 48 and 49). Similarly, in 
villages elsewhere, it is also reported that village cadres offer particularistic benefits to 
VRA representatives, such as eating and drinking, decreasing their levies, or increasing 
their allowances (He 2003). In short, the VRA representatives’ dependence upon the 
village cadres has largely made the VRA toothless.   
 
Due to both institutional deficiencies and the informal clientelist system, the VRA has 
largely  failed  to  function  as  a  representative  organization  and  embody  so-called 
“democratic”  village  governance.  On  the  one  hand,  the  VRA  meetings  were  rarely 
convened. For example, from 2002 to 2005 (during Jiazhi’s tenure as VC chair) only a 
total of seven VRA meetings were convened in B village. On the other hand, if the 
village cadres and township officials did bother to convene a VRA meeting, it was to a 
large degree used to legitimize (rubber stamp) the decisions already made by the cadres 
and to facilitate the implementation. For instance, according to B village’s VRA meeting   165 
minute
36,  almost  all  the  issues  discussed  in  the  VRA  meetings  were  “passed 
unanimously”.   
 
Interestingly,  the  exception  was  a  decision  on  one  issue,  which  was  passed  with  3 
abstentions  (see  B  village  VRA  meeting  minute  13/3/2005).  This  issue  was  about 
whether the village collective should lower the rent for Qu Jiaqi, a villager who leased a 
collective-owned  building  for  his  hennery  business.  Qu  Jiaqi  had  signed  a  15  year 
contract with the village collective, under which he was obliged to pay 90,000 yuan a 
year to rent the collective-owned building. However, in 2005, 8 years after the fulfilling 
the contract, he asked the village collective to lower the rent from 90,000 to 65,000 in 
the remaining seven years, claiming that he could not afford the original rent any more 
due to the serious loss of his hennery business caused by bird flu. The issue was referred 
to the VRA by the village cadres. Three VRA representatives showed their disapproval 
by abstention. According to my villager interviewees, these three representatives were 
all  members  of  the  New  Faction,  while  Qu  Jiaqi  belonged  to  the  OLT  Faction 
(Interviews 28 and 42). In this rare case, it seems that factional conflict sometime can 
also manifest in the VRA.         
 
Conclusion 
 
As far as post-election village governance is concerned, the formal institutions supposed 
to embody the “villagers’ self-governance” or the so-called “village democracy” have 
largely failed to function properly. The failure is caused not only by the confusion, 
self-contradiction  and  deficiency  of  formal  institutions  but  also  by  the  factional  or 
clientelist struggles, which are largely the extension of the factional/clientelist contest 
triggered by the VC elections. First of all, after the direct VC elections, the VC-VPB 
relationship  became  very  tense  and  problematic.  Although  the  formal  rules  still 
confirmed the VPB’s status as the “leading core”, a clear institutional division of duties 
                                                        
36  The meeting minute of B village is a hand-written notebook distributed by Xinjia Township government to record 
the content of each meeting held in B village. During my fieldwork in B village in 2004, I was able to get access to it.   166 
and power between the VPB and the VC was absent (and under the existing system, a 
clear  division  between  the  two  organizations  is  almost  impossible).  Therefore,  the 
confusion and self-contraction of the formal institutions further contributes to severe 
factional  conflict,  which  often  manifests  itself  in  tense  VC-VPB  relation  in  village 
governance. 
 
Second,  the  institutional  arrangements  for  the  “democratic  supervision”  are  either 
undermined by clientelism/factionalism or simply not exercisable in reality. The VFST, 
whose function is supposed to be to oversee the village financial affairs independently, 
cannot work properly due to institutional deficiency, factional conflict and the clientelist 
influence.  Although  it  is  supposed  to  make  village  affairs  subject  to  the  villagers’ 
supervision,  regulations  on  transparency  in  village  affairs  is  only  carried  out  in  a 
formalistic way by the village cadres to satisfy formal rules. Likewise, the regulations 
on villagers’ rights to recall and impeach VC cadres is not implemented largely due to 
impracticality and the constraints of clientelism. .   
 
Finally,  the  VRA,  which  is  supposed  to  be  a  representative  organ  of  “democratic” 
decision-making and supervision in village governance, to a great extent only functions 
as a rubber stamp for decisions that have already been made by the village cadres or 
local state officials. The unrealistic institutional arrangements of the VRA system are 
the reason for its failure. But more importantly, it is the VRA representatives’ clientelist 
dependence upon the village cadres that makes the VRA lose its supposed independence 
and become toothless.     
 
The case of B village has shown that the so-called villagers’ “self-governance” or the 
institutional  arrangements  of  “village  democracy”  have  largely  failed  to  function  in 
reality or functions only with distorted formalities serving to satisfy the letter of the 
various rules and regulations. All these formal institutions are actually arranged for the 
people  by  a  top-down  government  rather  than  initiated  by  the  people  in  a  way  of 
genuine  self-governance.  Furthermore,  the  formal  institutional  arrangements  for   167 
“self-governance or “village democracy” have been undermined by informal clientelism 
within the village community and failed to function. Therefore, from the local state’s 
perspective, measures need to be taken to fix the malfunctioning village governance and 
guarantee its proper operation within the wider top-down system. In next chapter, I will 
discuss how local state officials have tackled the malfunctioning village governance and 
managed to retain the state’s authoritarian dominance after the introduction of direct VC 
elections and self-governance.           
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7 The local state’s sustained control of village governance 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I have shown that so-called village self-governance has failed to 
function as set out in the Organic Law. The institutions of village self-governance have 
either  failed  to  be  implemented  or  have  been  distorted  largely  due  to  institutional 
impracticality,  factionalism,  and  clientelism.  Unless  this  is  tackled,  village 
administration may become either paralyzed or villages may become less willing to 
cooperate with state authorities and implement unpopular state policies (Zhong 2003: 
181-182). Local state officials, however, have not been bound by the institutions of 
self-governance or so-called grassroots “democracy” in reality. Instead they have taken 
actions to wrest back control of village administration. 
 
Some scholars who take the authoritarian approach have argued that the post-election 
village governance has been still under the authoritarian control of the local state. These 
scholars  have  been  well  aware  that  the  wider  political  structure  of  China  is  still 
authoritarian in nature and the state has to maintain its control over villages so as to 
have  its  various  polices  enforced  effectively.  So,  they  argue  that  with  the 
implementation of direct VC elections and villagers’ self-governance, the local state has 
still been able to exert its authoritarian control over villages largely because local state 
officials simply can choose to neglect or violate the formal rules and institutions on 
villagers’ self-governance—a policy that is often difficult for higher level authorities to 
assess or supervise (Alpermann 2001; Bernstein 2006; Louie 2001; Mao 1998; Zhong 
2003: 169-182). Although, based on my following analysis on B village, I would agree 
with these scholars’ view that the post-election village governance is still under local 
state’s dominance and control, I will demonstrate in this chapter that local state officials, 
rather  than  simply  violating  the  formal  rules  and  institutions  on  villagers’ 
self-governance,  wrest  back  control  of  village  governance  by  using  both  formal   169 
institutional control and, notably, informal clientelist control.                                     
 
This  chapter  will  discuss  how  the  township  government  continues  to  control  and 
dominate village administration following the introduction of direct VC elections. Three 
measures that ensure the local state’s continuing control over village politics will be 
examined in detail. The first section will concentrate on the village guarantee cadre 
system, through which township officials directly intervene in village governance. The 
second  section  will  explore  how  the  township  government  directly  controls  village 
finance. Going beyond these two formal institutional constraints, in the third section, I 
will focus on the informal but no less powerful method employed by local state officials 
to  ensure  village  cadres’  compliance—clientelist  control.  In  the  end,  this  chapter 
concludes that as a result of using both formal and informal/clientelist methods, the 
township government actually retains its dominance over village governance. Villagers’ 
“self-governance” or village “democracy” is far from real.                   
 
The village guarantee cadre system 
 
The introduction of village guarantee cadre system 
The village guarantee cadre system actually dates back to the commune era, when it was 
one of the major methods by which commune authorities monitored the activities of 
brigades and teams (it was called the “brigade guarantee cadre” system at that time). 
Under  that  system,  a  commune  cadre,  in  addition  to  his  or  her  duties,  was  usually 
assigned one subordinate brigade for which he or she took responsibility. A guarantee 
cadre  paid  regular  inspection  visits  to  his/her  guaranteed  brigade  to  ensure  that 
commune  policies  were  effectively  implemented  (Burns  1988:  48;  Potter  and  Potter 
1990: 25). Since the collapse of the commune system, the guarantee cadre system has 
persisted,  however.  When  a  township  government  assigns  a  government  cadre  to 
“guarantee” and assist a village’s work, it is called “guaranteeing” a village (baocun), 
and when the government assigns a few cadres or sets up a special agency to coordinate   170 
and manage the work of several villages in an area, this is called “area management” 
(guan pian) or “district management” (guanli qu) (Wang 1996). This system is still been 
widely employed by township governments across rural China to guarantee the effective 
control of villages affairs (Alpermann 2001; Zhao 2006). 
 
The village guarantee cadre system is used in Xinjia Township. Under this system, all 
28 villages in Xinjia Township are divided into four areas with each area composed of 
seven villages. Every village is assigned a village guarantee cadre and every area is 
assigned an area management director (pian zhang). All the village guarantee cadres and 
area  directors  are  township  government  officials.  In  Xinjia  Township,  the  village 
guarantee cadres are usually ordinary township cadres, while the positions of the area 
directors are assumed by the township leaders. For the four district directors of Xinjia 
Township, two are the deputy township mayors and the other two are the township Party 
committee members. To be a village guarantee cadre or area director is usually township 
officials’ concurrent posts rather than their main official job.   
 
The main purpose of assigning village guarantee cadres is to strengthen the supervision 
and  vertical  management  of  village  governance  through  the  direct  penetration  of 
administrative  power.  The  village  guarantee  cadre  system  constitutes  an  effective 
administrative channel between the township government and the village community. 
Even before direct VC elections, the village guarantee cadre system was a necessary 
method for township government to carry out management. But since the introduction 
of direct VC elections, government officials have realized that they have to rely much 
more on this system to discipline village cadres, mobilize villagers and even directly 
intervene village government (Interviews 1 and 2). Since 1999 (shortly after the first 
round of direct village elections), the village guarantee cadre system has been stressed 
repeatedly and paid greater attention by Longkou County government. This system, also 
called  “the  work  of  guaranteeing  villages  and  staying  at  grassroots  units”  (baocun 
dundian gongzuo) or “the front line working method” (yixian gongsuo fa), is regarded 
as  a  “crucial  measure”  to  “suit  the  new  situation”  after  direct  village  elections   171 
(Zhonggong  Longkou  shiwei,  Longkoushi  renmin  zhengfu  2002:  1;  Zhonggong 
Longkou shiwei banggongshi 2004: 1; Zhonggong Longkou shiwei zuzhibu 2006: 1-2).   
 
Under  this  system,  the  Xinjia  Township  officials  have  become  fully  involved  in  all 
village  matters,  which  means,  in  the  words  of  the  Longkou  government  document, 
village  guarantee  cadres  “participate  in  the  whole  course  of  village  government” 
(Zhonggong Longkou shiwei bangongshi 2004: 2). There are a number of tasks and 
requirements for village guarantee cadres. First of all, they are required to penetrate into 
village communities and “offer services” to villagers directly. According to the 2004 
Longkou government document, “three fixeds and one open” must be applied in the 
village guarantee work, which are “fixed person, fixed time, fixed venue and doing 
work openly” (See 1-2). “Fixed person” means there must be a village guarantee cadre 
appointed  in  every  village;  “fixed  time”  means  village  guarantee  cadres  must  have 
specific  working  time  in  their  guaranteed  villages.  For  example,  Xinjia  Township 
government  stipulates  that  village  guarantee  cadres  must  work  at  their  guarantee 
villages for at least four days a week and during special periods, such as farming busy 
time or emergent affairs happening, village guarantee cadres must stay in their villages 
day and night (Zhonggong Xinjiazhen dangwei bangongshi 2002). Fixed venue means 
village guarantee cadres must have fixed office in their guaranteed villages. “One open” 
means information like village guarantee cadre’s name, post, duties, working disciplines, 
working time, working place and contact methods must be open to villagers so as to 
facilitate villagers’ contact and problem solving. Going deep into village communities, 
village guarantee cadres are required to directly offer villagers guidance and service on 
various issues of their life. To use the terms of the Longkou government, “the village 
guarantee cadre’s office of each village should become the window of serving villagers. 
Village guarantee cadres should work on the spot, directly handling the affairs that the 
masses need them to do” (Ibid.: 2). Unlike village cadres, village guarantee cadres, who 
are  township  government  officials,  are  considered  to  be  more  intelligent  and  better 
equipped with market information, and more knowledgeable about laws and policies 
and  are  therefore  considered  to  be  in  a  better  position  than  village  cadres  to  serve   172 
villagers and get things done.   
 
Second,  village  guarantee  cadres  are  required  to  guide,  supervise  and  directly  get 
involved and participate in village governance. According to the regulations, they must 
participate  “the  whole  course”  of  village  level  decision-making  and  management, 
attending each relevant meeting held at village level (including meetings of VC, VPB, 
VRA, VGM and so on). Before making decisions on village affairs, village guarantee 
cadres must censor the content of the affairs concerned according to laws, policies and 
relevant regulations of the government, directing village cadres to report and ask for 
instructions from responsible township government departments; in the course of the 
decision-making,  village  guarantee  cadres  must  guide  village  cadres  to  go  through 
stipulated procedures and processes; after decisions have been made, village guarantee 
cadres must supervise and guarantee the implementation of the decisions (Ibid.). In the 
words  of  the  Xinjia  Township  government,  village  guarantee  cadres  must  “ask  for 
instructions  [from  the  gownship  government]  in  advance,  participate  the  course  of 
decision-making,  and  oversee  implementations  afterwards”  (Zhonggong  Xinjiazhen 
dangwei;  Xinjiazhen  zhengfu  2004).  As  discussed  in  Chapter  6,  after  direct  VC 
elections, factional and clientelist conflicts, particularly conflicts between the VC and 
the  VPB,  have  made  the  village  administration  increasingly  problematic  and  even 
undermined its proper  functioning. Village  guarantee cadres therefore can intervene, 
mediate and even assume the duties of village leaders whenever necessary. For example, 
during my field visit in 2004, there were three villages in Xinjia Township that had 
village guarantee cadres directly act as VPB secretaries due to the “incompetence” of 
the village cadres (Interview 3). 
 
Finally,  and  also  most  importantly,  village  guarantee  cadres  must  assure  that 
government  tasks  and  targets  are  fulfilled  in  their  guaranteed  villages.  Stability, 
economic development as well as family planning are the three most crucial issues for 
government (Zhong 2003: 132; Interviews 1 and 3). Apart from these three issues, there 
are  also  various  government  tasks,  targets  or  assigned  quotas  for  tasks  like  land   173 
expropriation, tree planting, environmental protection, subscriptions to newspapers and 
periodicals,  enrolment  in  collective  health  insurance  schemes  and  so  on.  These 
government tasks are often quantified with specific numerical targets and assigned to 
each  village.  The  village  guarantee  cadres  are  responsible  for  assuring  that  those 
government  targets  are  met  in  their  guaranteed  villages  (Xinjiazhen  dangzheng 
bangongshi 2002). 
 
As local state officials, village guarantee cadres’ performances are directly evaluated by 
their superiors within the “pressurized system” (Rong 1998). The evaluation, however, 
is mainly based on the implementation and achievement of government tasks. The result 
of  evaluation  is  linked  directly  with  village  guarantee  cadres’  career  achievements, 
which may affect both their promotion and income. For example, to evaluate village 
guarantee  cadres’  performance,  the  Xinjia  Township  set  up  a  quantified  evaluation 
system based on the achievement of government targets. Any village guarantee cadres 
who fail to achieve government targets or whose guarantee villages encounter serious 
problems  (such  as  a  production  accident,  villagers’  lodging  collective  complaints  to 
higher-level  government  or  other  affairs  that  bring  “disgrace”  on  the  township 
government)  will  lose  both  his/her  qualification  for  award  of  a  merit  for  work 
performance in that year and 50 percent of his/her annual bonus.
37  Meanwhile, he/she 
will also be demoted or politically punished due to his/her incompetence (Xinjiazhen 
dangzheng bangongshi 2002).
38   
 
The village guarantee cadre system facilitates the local state’s penetration into village 
communities  and  actually  attempts  to  strengthen  the  state’s  control  of  village 
governance. As a result, the distinction between “self-governance affairs” and “official 
(state) affairs” is blurred. The Organic Law defines the content of VC’s self-governance 
mainly  as  managing  public  affairs,  undertaking  village  welfare,  mediating  disputes 
                                                        
37  All cadres are awarded merits as ‘xianjin’ if their work performance has been at a good level across a range of 
indicators. Village guarantee cadres are assessed on the indicators relating to their village as well as on other aspects 
of their work. 
38  Some scholars have discussed cadre evaluation systems in Chinese county and township/town governments but 
not in relation to village guarantee cadres. See Whiting (2001), Edin (2003) and Zhong (2003).   174 
among villagers, reflecting the villagers’ opinions and demands to the government, and 
managing village collective economy and properties (Articles 2 and 5). However, all 
these issues, which in theory should fall into the scope of self-governance, are under the 
control of the state as official affairs through the village guarantee cadre system.   
 
B village’s guarantee cadre   
The village guarantee cadre of B village is Wang Shixian. Shixian is in his 40s. He has 
been working in Xinjia Township government for more than 20  years since he was 
recruited as a government official through the civil servant examinations in the early 
1980s. He is one of the few officials who have worked in Xinjia Township for such a 
long time. Shixian’s official position in Xinjia Township government is Finance and 
Trade Assistant, whose duty is supposedly to assist the township mayor in handling 
issues related to financing and trade. However, Shixian told me that actually this post 
was just a nominal one and he usually had few affairs to “assist” with. Without his 
village guarantee job, he would be very likely to idle away most of his time in his 
government office. Shixian was appointed as village guarantee cadre of B village in 
2000. He has an office in B village. On the wall outside his office hangs a sign showing 
his name, post (village guarantee cadre), ID photo as well as his mobile phone number. 
According to his normal working schedule, Shixian usually goes to B village to work 
twice a week (Monday and Thursday mornings). But actually he keeps close contact 
with B village and if there are issues that need his attention, he is expected to appear at 
any time.     
 
As  the  village  guarantee  cadre,  Shixian  takes  “full  responsibility”  for  his  village’s 
governance on behalf of the township government. He is fully involved in all village 
matters, particularly supervising and directing village cadres to complete the tasks and 
targets  assigned  by  the  township  government.  In  fact,  the  scope  of  the  work  and 
administrative  tasks  assigned  by  the  local  state  are  very  broad:  checking  women  of 
childbearing age regularly to ensure that they are practicing family planning, collecting 
taxes and fees from villagers, developing the village economy, helping villagers prevent   175 
infectious  diseases  (such  as  SARS  and  bird  flu),  requisitioning  village  farmland, 
constructing and improving village communal facilities (like paving or repairing village 
roads, improving environmental sanitation and planting trees) and so on (Interview 55; 
also see the meeting minute of B village). All these state tasks are assigned to the village 
cadres  of  B  village  through  Shixian,  who  also  must  take  the  lead  in  doing  these 
government tasks in B village. To complete these government tasks, Shixian needs the 
cooperation of the village cadres, who are still largely treated as “implementing arms” 
of the local state (Zhong 2003: 158-182).   
 
In  addition  to  government  tasks,  however,  village  affairs  that  should  belong  to  the 
sphere of “self-governance” and the duties of  VC cadres, such as managing village 
collective assets, providing village public services, spending money on village public 
issues, can only be done with the approval of Shixian. Shixian described his job as 
village guarantee cadre: 
 
As village guarantee cadre, I am responsible for the work of my guarantee village. I was 
assigned  to  B  village  by  the  [township]  government  and  I  work  on  behalf  of  the 
government.  To  put  it  simply,  as  a  village  guarantee  cadre,  my  job is  to  discipline, 
supervise and lead village cadres to do their work properly, particularly to make sure the 
tasks assigned from above be completed. After direct village elections, some village 
cadres, especially some elected VC cadres, thought that villagers’ self-governance meant 
that they could do whatever they wanted, ignoring the leadership of the government. 
This is ridiculous. If that’s the case, how could the government carry out its policies at 
village  level?  If  the  government  policies  from  above  could  not  be  implemented  in 
villages,  how  could  we  township  officials  answer  to  the  higher  up  governments 
(Interview 55)?                           
 
If  Shixian  conceives  his  village  guarantee  job  as  “to  discipline,  supervise  and  lead 
village cadres to do their jobs properly”, he clearly acts as the most powerful boss of the 
village.  And  there  is  no  clear  division  of  responsibility  at  all  between  the  village   176 
guarantee  cadre  and  the  village  leaders.  Just  as  Jiamao  commented  on  the  relation 
between the village cadres and the township government: “self-governance just stays on 
paper and is for lip-service only. In face, every little move initiated by the village cadres 
must get the approval from the village guarantee cadres and the township government” 
(Interview 50).               
 
Village guarantee cadre system: fixing the disconnection between the local state and the 
village community 
As  discussed  previously,  along  with  the  implementation  of  direct  VC  elections  and 
villagers’  self-governance,  the  problems  with  village  administration  have  been  more 
acute, while, the local state realizes that its capacity to implement state policies and 
accomplish state tasks is further reduced at the village level (Zhong 2003: 158-182). As 
Zhao  argues,  there  has  been  a  “disconnection”  between  local  state  and  village 
communities (Zhao 2006). On the one hand, in the perception of the local state officials 
at least, direct VC elections have led to frequent changes of village cadre teams and 
serious factional conflicts, which have had negative effects on village governance. As 
have discussed in Chapter 6, before direct VC elections were introduced, village cadres 
(both VC and VPB cadres) had been appointed by the township government, which had 
enabled  the  government  to  keep  a  “stable”  (wending)  village  leading  team.  Though 
village cadres are not formally government officials, they have played the role of foot 
solders of local state, implementing many government tasks and policies (Zhong 2003: 
159). Work experience and appropriate skills are actually crucial if village cadres are to 
implement these government tasks and policies satisfactorily. It may take a long time for 
newly-elected cadres to get familiar with all aspects of village governance. As the case 
of B village has shown, the direct VC elections have led to frequent changes of village 
cadres—there have been changes in the composition of the VC approximately every 
three years—and for the township officials this means repeatedly having to deal with 
new and inexperienced village leaders. This is a contrast with the situation before direct 
elections,  when  leaders  were  sometimes  in  place  for  decades.  A  Xinjia  government 
official once complained to me, “Because many newly-elected VC cadres have no work   177 
experience and lack appropriate skills as village cadres and know nothing about their 
jobs, we village guarantee cadres have to make great efforts to train them on how to do 
their jobs. But when they are only just becoming familiar with their jobs, there will be a 
new round of elections and the cadres may change again” (Interview 10). As a result of 
this, village guarantee cadres are seen as necessary to the “normal” operation of village 
governance by training and supervising “unstable” (bu wending) village cadre teams.   
 
At the same time, the malfunctioning of the “democratic” or self-governance institutions 
makes the village guarantee cadres’ intervention and arbitration indispensable. As I have 
examined  in  the  previous  chapter,  since  the  introduction  of  direct  village  elections, 
village  “self-governance”  institutions  have  been  either  seriously  influenced  by 
clientelism and factionalism or have not been implemented at all so that the village 
management has been in a state of malfunction. The conflicts between the VC and the 
VPB, the factional struggles within the VFST as well as the clientelist behaviour of the 
VRA representatives, have all put the village administration at risk of paralysis. The 
malfunctioning of village administration can seriously damage the capacity of the local 
state  to  implement  state  policies.  As  a  result,  it  tries  to  more  frequently  intervene, 
arbitrate and even directly get involved in village governance than it did before direct 
VC elections were introduced so as to maintain its policy-implementation capacity.     
 
The village guarantee cadre system is actually an effort made by the local state aiming 
to  re-confirm  its  top-down  administrative  control  over  villages  and  fix  the 
“disconnection”  between  the  township  government  and  villages  after  direct  village 
elections  (Zhao  2006;  Zhong  2003:  158-182).  Almost  all  the  state  policies  and 
government tasks have been delivered down to the villages through this system, with the 
local state retaining dominance over the village governance. Although according to the 
revised  Organic  Law,  the  relationship  between  the  township  government  and  the 
villages is supposed to be “guidance” rather than leadership (Article 4), in the eyes of 
the  village  cadres,  the  village  guarantee  cadres  who  are  the  agents  of  the  township 
government, are their de facto bosses (He 2002a).   178 
 
Direct control over village finance   
 
The dual proxy management system 
During  the  first  decade  reform  in  1980s,  village  level  administration  had  enjoyed 
relatively  independent  finances—both  village  accounts  and  village  collective  money 
was directly managed by village cadres (Zhao 2006: 77). Throughout rural China, since 
1990, the degree of control by township governments over village-level finances has 
constantly  increased.  Initially  “single  proxy  management”  was  introduced  in  middle 
1990s, whereby the township government only took charge of village account ledgers 
and did not directly manage cash.   
 
In the late 1990s, particularly following the introduction of villagers’ self-governance, 
the  “single  proxy  management”  developed  into  the  widespread  use  of  “dual  proxy 
management”  (shuang  dai  guan),  whereby  both  account  ledgers  and  cash  were  put 
under the “proxy management” of the township governments, who therefore assumed 
full  control  over  village  finances  (Cui  2005;  Wu  2002:  144-146;  Zhao  2006).  In 
Shandong province, for example, dual proxy management had been applied in 60 per 
cent of townships across the province by 1998 (Zhonggong shandong shengwei zhengce 
yanjiushi 1998). In Xinjia Township, soon after the first direct VC elections in 1999, 
this system was extended to all its 28 villages (Interview 2). In B village, for instance, 
after  Jiamao  was  elected  as  VC  chair  in  1999,  he  found  he  was  unable  to  see  the 
previous  village  accounts  because  all  account  ledgers  had  been  taken  over  by  the 
township government just before he started to work as VC chair. Jiamao’s request to 
check the previous village account ledgers was refused by the township government 
officials  (Interview  50  and  53).  It  was  not  only  the  ledgers,  but  also  the  village 
collective funds that were taken over by the township government. As the elected VC 
chair,  whenever  he  used  village  collective  money,  Jiamao  had  to  report  to  and  get 
approval from the township government (Interview 50).   179 
 
Under the dual proxy  management system, both village account ledgers and village 
collective funds are managed by the township government. The Economic Management 
Station (jingji guanli zhan) of Xinjia Township government sets up a special file for 
each village’s accounts and is responsible for the “unified management” (tongyi guanli) 
of the accounting ledgers as well as the related economic documents of each village. 
The accountant of each village must go to the Economic Management Station to make 
accounts at the end of each month. The receipts or invoices submitted by the village 
accountant  and  cashier  are  subject  to  the  scrutiny  and  audit  of  the  Economic 
Management Station (Xinjia zhen remin zhengfu 2003).   
 
Meanwhile, village collective funds (cash) are also kept and managed by the Economic 
Management  Station.  In  order  to  control  daily  expenditures,  Xinjia  Township 
government only allows each village to retain some petty cash each month for daily use. 
Villages with less than 500 people, 501-1000 people and more than 1000 can retain 
1,000 yuan, 2,000 yuan and 3,000 yuan respectively.  If more money is needed, the 
village must apply from the township government and can only withdrew money after 
getting approval. Sums under 5,000 yuan can be withdrawn only with the endorsement 
of area management director; sums over 5,000 yuan can be withdrawn only with the 
signature of township mayor. The Economic Management Station is responsible for the 
supervision of village funds and villages that are found violate these rules will face 
punishment like being forbidden to get money from the township government (Xinjia 
zhen renmin zhengfu 2003). 
 
The purpose of this system is to manage and supervise village economic affairs through 
top-down administrative effort. The main reasons given by the township government for 
doing  so  were  the  “chaotic”  management  of  village  finances  and  the  presence  of 
financial  loopholes,  which  aroused  discontent  among  villagers.  According  to  Xinjia 
Township’s officials, the advantages of this system are that: 1) it lessens confusion over 
village  finance  for  villagers  and  standardizes  the  management  of  it;  2)  it  reduces   180 
disputes  among  village  cadres  and  villagers;  and  3)  it  enables  them  to  control 
unreasonable  expenditures  and  reduce  village  cadres’  opportunities  for  corruption 
(Interviews 1 and 3; also see Zhao 2006). 
 
However, the dual proxy management system, which puts village finance under strict 
control  of  the  township  government,  seems  to  contradict  the  principle  of  villagers’ 
self-governance. Article 5 of the Organic Law specifically stipulates that it is the VC 
that “manages lands and other properties that belong to the village collective”. Even the 
Party  secretary  of  Xinjia  Township  admitted,  “strictly  speaking,  this  way  [the  dual 
proxy  management]  does  not  accord  with  the  spirit  of  the  Organic  Law,  which  is 
supposed to let villagers to manage their own affairs by themselves.” “But”, he added, 
“if we really let village cadres manage things by themselves without the government’s 
strict control, it would be a shambles” (Interview 3).   
 
In fact, the township government also adopted a subtle tactic to take over village finance 
without  boldly  violating  the  Organic  Law  and  villagers’  self-governance  policy:  the 
township government’s proxy management of village finance was claimed to have had 
the mandate of each subordinate village. According to the Xinjia Township government 
leaders, the township government’s proxy management was “approved and authorized” 
by each village’s VRA and the VC chair of each village had signed an instrument of 
authorization  to  commission  the  township  government’s  dual  proxy  management  of 
village finance (Interviews 1 and 3). Claiming to have the villages’ “authorization”, the 
township government can not only realize its control over village finance but also avoid 
being  accused  of  violating  the  Organic  Law  and  villagers’  self-governance  policy. 
However,  I  failed  to  get  any  substantial  evidence  on  how  such  “authorization”  was 
conducted.  I  asked  Jiamao  if  it  was  the  VRA’s  decision  to  authorize  the  township 
government to direct control B village’s finance. He told me: “Both the village account 
and the collective money were taken over by the township government shortly before I 
became VC Chair in 1999. As far as I know, no such authorization took place in our 
village at all” (Interview 50).   181 
 
Controlling village cadres’ pay   
In  addition  to  directly  controlling  the  village  purse,  the  township  government  also 
decides on village cadres’ level of pay. In fact, since village cadres are not formally state 
employees,  they  are  not  on  the  state  payroll.  However,  because  key  village  cadres, 
including both the VPB and VC cadres, as indicated earlier, do invest considerable time, 
energy and responsibility in their jobs–in the majority of villages in Xinjia Township, 
village cadres virtually work on full time (Interviews 1 and 3)—they are paid in the 
form of a “stipend” or “compensation” for doing their village work. But instead of being 
financed by the state finance, village cadres’ pay comes from the village collective purse, 
namely, from fees collected from the villagers, income from village-owned enterprises, 
payments from letting village land or properties, and so forth.   
 
According to the Organic Law, it should be the VGM that “discusses and decides on” 
“the  number  of  persons  who  are  entitled  to  claim  the  compensation  and  the 
compensation standards” (Article 19). As indicated previously, since it is not easy to 
convene  the  VGM  regularly,  the  VGM  (when  convening  for  the  VC  elections) 
empowers the VRA to discuss and decide some crucial issues, the first of which is “the 
number of persons who are entitled to claim the compensation and the compensation 
standards”  (Longkoushi  nongcun  liangwei  huanjie  xuanju  gongzuo  lingdao  xiaozu 
bangongshi 2004: 48). Thus, according to the law, it is clear that, as the village cadre’s 
pay  comes  from  the  village  collective  purse,  it  therefore  should  be  decided  by  the 
village collective (either by the VGM or the VRA).   
 
But contrary to the law, it is the township government rather than the village collective 
that has the final authority over the financial compensation (salary) of village officials. 
So how is the monetary compensation of the village cadres decided and worked out by 
the township government? According to one Xinjia Township official, the decision is 
made on the basis of the strength of the village collective economy and the performance 
of the VC cadres as evaluated by the township:     182 
 
Village cadres’ pay mainly depends on two factors. One is the economic level of the 
village collective concerned. In other words, if the village collective concerned has a 
heavy purse, the cadres of that village may accordingly enjoy higher pay; otherwise, they 
may only have a basic or even poor payment. The other factor is the performance of a 
village  cadre,  namely,  whether  the  village  cadre  is  able  to  fulfill  his/her  duties 
satisfactorily, particularly, to carry out the tasks assigned by the government. The village 
cadres’ pay is not made monthly. Rather, at the end of each year, the village cadres first 
need to make a request to the township government, setting out how much pay they 
think they deserve and it is up to the township leaders to judge and decide how much 
each village cadres truly deserves based on the two factors before finally paying them 
(Interview 13). 
 
Thus the amount of monetary compensation for village cadres is not decided by the 
villagers who contribute the money but rather by the township government. This system 
has a twofold advantage for the local state. On the one hand, it is said to prevent the 
possible abuse of collective funds by village officials (Interview 3); on the other, since 
village cadres’ pay is based on their “performance” in fulfilling government tasks and is 
ultimately judged by the township government, it increases village cadres’ incentives to 
do the local government’s bidding and therefore strengthens the township government’s 
control.       
 
Ensuring obedience through clientelist control   
 
The village guarantee cadre system and the financial control system are two formal 
administrative  institutions  created  and  used  by  the  local  state  to  repair  the 
township-village  “disconnection” and to retain control over the post election village 
governance. However, these formal institutional arrangements, although appear to be 
quite  controlling,  may  still  have  limitations.  From  the  perspective  of  the  township   183 
government, they provide no guarantee of the elected village cadres’ active cooperation 
with  the  township  government  particularly  in  implementing  unpopular  government 
policies. They take no account of the fact that the township government constantly need 
the village cadres to work overtime without proper compensation to faithfully carry out 
government tasks. Under the self-governance policy and the Organic Law, the township 
government  has  no  legal  basis  to  treat  the  elected  village  cadres  as  its  “legs”  or 
implementing arms. Village cadres, especially VC cadres are not obliged, in terms of 
formal  rules  and  institutions,  to  respond  to  the  township  government  as  actively  as 
before, and some may even choose to defy or resist government’s tasks that they dislike 
or  which  are  unpopular  with  their  followers  (Li  and  O'Brien  1996;  O'Brien  1996). 
Therefore to ensure effective control over village governance and village cadres and to 
remedy the inadequacies of the formal institutions, local state officials have reinforced 
their power through informal clientelist relations with village cadres. Just as the theory 
of clientelism suggest, patron-client relationships often appear as addenda to institutions 
whose  deficiencies  and  inadequacies  they  remedy  (Lande  1977:  xxi-xxii).  The 
relationship between the local state officials and the village cadres is exactly such a case 
in point. In order to deploy clientelist controls over village cadres, local officials have 
used  four  methods:  cultivation  of  good  relations,  benefit/patronage  exchange, 
intimidation, and mediation of factional conflicts.       
   
The cultivation of good relations 
As  theories  of  clientelism  have  pointed  out,  although  the  very  purpose  of  the 
patron-client  associations  is  the  exchange  of  instrumental  benefits  for  both  parties, 
sentiment or affection is often invested and created in the patron-client relationship, 
which, in turn, can strengthen such relationship (Scott 1972b: 94-95; 99). In the Chinese 
context, while guanxi relations are instrumental, affection or sentiment (gangqing) is 
considered to be an indispensable to them (Fried 1953; Gold, Guthrie, and Wank 2002a: 
7-8; Kipnis 2002). Kipnis, for instance, states that “practices of guanxi production rely 
on strategic and more or less successful attempts to generate ganqing and manipulate 
obligations”  (Kipnis  2002:  28).  Accordingly,  the  government  officials  of  the  Xinjia   184 
Township do have paid special attention to cultivate sentiment (peiyang ganqing) or 
cultivate good relations (peiyang guanxi) with the village officials in daily intercourse 
so as to “manipulate obligations” in time of need. As the mayor of the Xinjia Township 
told me: 
 
Following the introduction of direct elections, it has become quite difficult for us to 
discipline village cadres. We have lost the power to sack incompetent VC cadres or 
those who dare to resist doing government work. In order to make them obedient and 
work actively for the government, we government officials have depended more on 
personal friendships or sentiment. We cannot expect their cooperation or obedience 
by  simply  ordering  them  around  now.  We  need  to  make  friends  and  cultivate 
sentiment (peiyang guanqing) with them so that they would work for us actively for 
the sake of giving us face. We treat VPB cadres the same way. Though we still can 
remove an unsatisfactory VPB secretary or member, it is usually not easy to find an 
ideal replacement. You know, human beings are creatures with sentiment. Personal 
friendship and sentiment with the village cadres have become more and more crucial 
for us to gain village cadres’ cooperation (Interview 2). 
 
My field observations in Xinjia Township in 2004 and 2005 also confirmed this. The 
township  government  officials  seem  to  pay  special  attention  to  establishing  and 
developing  good  relationship  with  village  cadres  in  daily  life.  For  example,  the 
township officials would attend weddings, funerals or other important occasions relating 
to village cadres’ families; they would visit village cadres who are sick and take them 
with gifts; they also often dine, drink with and entertain village cadres. Through these 
sorts of social intercourse, the township officials are able to generate sentiment and 
create  close  relationships  with  village  cadres.  On  the  basis  of  close  personal 
relationships and sentiments, the township officials can expect the village cadres to be 
more responsive and obedient.   
 
Village cadres are also willing or eager to associate with the township officials through   185 
patron-client  relationships,  and  become  clients.  On  the  one  hand,  associating  with 
township  officials  can  add  to  their  prestige,  reputation  and  authority  in  the  village 
community; on the other hand, and most importantly, they do expect to gain benefits 
from it. As discussed previously, the village cadres are not people who seek offices 
because they merely have noble ideas about “doing good and substantial things for the 
villagers and to lead the masses get rich together” (Interview 50). Even though they are 
usually considered to be village elites, who may be better off than their average fellow 
villagers, they are still in need of protection, valuable goods and opportunities as well as 
help of different kinds in their lives. Township officials are clearly aware of this and are 
willing  to  offer  village  cadres  “carrots”  in  exchange  for  their  obedience  (Wu  2002: 
129-130).               
 
Benefit/patronage exchange 
As Scott suggests, one of the qualities of patron-client ties, is that they are “diffuse, 
‘whole-person’  relationships  rather  than  explicit,  impersonal-contract  bonds”  (Scott 
1972: 95). Namely, once a patron-client relationship is created, the benefits or services 
exchanged  between  the  two  parties  may  be  very  diffused.  So  what  kinds  of 
benefits/patronage do the local state officials (the patrons) offer the village cadres (their 
clients) in B village? The answer is very varied and diffused ones. However, generally 
speaking,  these  benefits  offered  by  the  state  officials  can  be  divided  into  two  main 
categories. 
 
First, the township officials can connive in village cadres’ efforts at gaining improper 
benefits by taking advantage of their public positions. I have mentioned previously that 
the  village  cadres  tend  to  get  private  benefits  from  their  posts,  for  example  from 
excessively  dining,  drinking  and  entertaining  on  public  money,  embezzling  public 
finances and other corrupt acts or misdemeanours. The government officials can choose 
to turn a blind eye to these things if they want to. For example, during Jiazhi’s tenure, 
money  spent  on  entertainment  had  been  considered  “excessive”  by  the  villagers’ 
financing small team (Interview 53). Though the members of the villagers’ financing   186 
small  team  had  refused  to  endorse  many  receipts  relating  to  village  cadres’ 
entertainment,  the  expenditure  was  finally  accepted  and  entered  into  the  village 
accounts  by  the  township  government  (Interview  53).  It  is  also  said  that  Sifa  has 
occupied a collective-owned workshop for private use without paying  money to the 
village collective for a long time, but the township officials simply chose to ignore it 
(Interview 37 and 38). According to another source, Jiawan had claimed reimbursement 
many times from the village public fund in the name of traveling on village business. 
However, it was found out later that a lot of the money he claimed had been spent on 
private  travel  rather  than  public  business.  When  this  was  reported  to  the  township 
officials concerned, they did nothing about it (Interview 50).   
 
Second, in addition to conniving in village cadres’ improper gains from their posts, 
township officials are also able to offer various advantages and privileges. The scope of 
these advantages and privileges is very broad. It may include helping arrange jobs for 
village cadres’ family members, favouring them (and their relatives, friends or clients) 
in legal and administrative processes such as applying for various business licenses, 
supporting their private-owned businesses (for example by giving them tax breaks or 
offering them government contracts), and so on. The government may be unable (or 
unwilling) to offer such benefits to all villagers, but its officials can always favour a few 
people  if  they  want  to.  For  example,  in  Xinjia  Township  government,  a  number  of 
government  posts  are  filled  by  the  children  of  village  cadres.  The  Xinjia  Township 
deputy Party secretary commented: “Many village cadres have worked very hard for the 
government under difficult circumstances. You know, their work is very tough but their 
pay is usually not good. The government does need to reward them for their hard work. 
So  when  there  are  vacancies  in  the  government,  we  of  course  will  give  prior 
consideration to village cadres’ family members or kin” (Interview 1). The mayor of 
Xinjia Township put it more frankly: “We do need to try our best to solve some practical 
difficulties  for  village  cadres  so  as  to  enhance  their  enthusiasm  of  working  for  the 
government” (Interview 2). There is also a telling example from B village. After Sixu 
was elected the VC chair in 2004, the township officials who dealt with him knew that   187 
he did a transportation business. So the government officials since then, by making use 
of their connections and resources, have introduced quite some business for Sixu in 
order to make him obliged to the government. In return, Sixu is said to have been very 
responsive and cooperative with the government (Interview 35 and 50).       
 
These various special benefits offered by government officials are far from unappealing 
to  the  village  cadres.  Like  their  fellow  villagers,  village  cadres  also  face  various 
“practical difficulties” in their own life and are largely dependent upon the goodwill of 
local state officials to get access to various resources and scarce opportunities so as to 
make their own life better (Unger 2002: 143-146). And government officials are happy 
to offer them these particularistic benefits (patronage) as long as they are willing to 
follow their lead.                 
 
The use of sanctions 
As Scott indicates, in a patron-client bond, there is also a degree of coercion involved. 
Particularly, as he points out, “a patron in a strong position is more likely to employ 
sanctions—threats to punish the client or to withdraw benefits he currently enjoys” and 
“the use of sanctions indicates a higher order of power than the use of inducements” 
(Scott 1972b: 100). As far as the Chinese local state officials are concerned, they are 
actually  patrons  in  a  very  strong  position  when  dealing  with  those  village  cadres 
because, as pointed out earlier, the local state officials’ services and benefits are vital 
and, more importantly, they actually monopolize a broad range of governmental powers, 
which are wielded in a discretionary way by them. All these have made village cadres 
vulnerable and therefore largely dependent to their government patrons. As a result, 
local state officials are very likely to punish or threaten to punish indocile village cadres 
through sanctions.         
 
For instance, I once asked the Party secretary of Xinjia Township how the government 
dealt  with  elected  VC  cadres  who  refused  to  cooperate  with  or  even  confront  the 
government. The secretary said, “Although we cannot simply dismiss them according to   188 
the law, it is not difficult for us to find other methods to discipline those who dare to 
confront the government. For example, we can go to check their accounts if the person 
or their family runs their own business. Once we find evidence of tax evasion, we will 
hold their pigtail” (Interview 3). 
 
Here, power intimidation or sanctions are applied by the government to punish those 
elected  VC  cadres,  who  may  defy  the  township  government.  Though  the  township 
government has lost the power to appoint or dismiss VC cadres, but it retains significant 
other  powers  over  many  aspects  of  village  cadres’  (and  ordinary  villagers’)  lives. 
Activities like applying for a license for doing business, applying for a residence permit 
or  marriage  registration,  paying  taxes  and  registering  household  registration  are  all 
under the control of local government. In democratic countries, maybe there are also 
many bureaucratic local government powers, but the difference is that the checks and 
balances on such power are largely absent in China. With such widespread discretionary 
state power, it is not difficult for state officials to intimidate or punish those defiant 
troublemakers.               
 
Mediation of factional conflicts 
As discussed in Chapter 6, with the implementation of direct VC elections and villagers’ 
self-governance,  factional  conflicts  in  B  village  have  been  so  acute  as  to  seriously 
undermine  the  normal  function  of  the  village  administration.  However,  township 
officials, who act as patrons of the rival leaders of both factions, are able to use their 
control of resources and patronage power to effectively mediate factional conflicts and 
make sure factionalism within the village community is under control and rival factions 
cooperate for the implementation of crucial state policies. Just as the clientelist theory 
has suggested, in a complex vertical patron-client structure, rival patrons with separate 
followings (or competing factional leaders) may still be linked as clients to a same 
higher-level patron, who can engage his subordinate clients in coordinated activities to 
pursue the interests of the whole network (Nathan 1973: 42-45; Scott 1972b: 104). As 
far  as  B  village  is  concerned,  core  members  of  both  factions  are  keen  to  establish   189 
clientelist relations with the township officials to secure special favours, or at least, 
avoid confrontation with them. As Shixian, the village guarantee cadre of B village, said, 
“although rival factional members may fight fiercely with each other in the village, few 
would choose to confront us government officials. Usually, members of both sides are 
well aware that to cooperation with, rather than confront the government, is the wise 
choice for them. You know, as the village guarantee cadre, I often need to mediate in 
factional conflicts and let village cadres of both factions work together to get the work 
down” (Interview 55).                     
 
Although B village is rent by factionalism after the implementation of the direct VC 
elections and villagers’ self-governance, the local state officials, who sit on top of the 
village  clientelist/factionalist  networks,  can  still  keep  the  competing  factions  under 
control and direct the coordinated activities of rival factional members for the village 
government and the implementation of the state tasks and policies. This is similar to 
what Lerman found in Taiwanese local politics during 1970s, which he calls a “boss 
machine” system. Under this system, the national elite, acting as the boss and sitting on 
the top of the local factional system, skillfully kept the local factions under control by 
using its control over resources to induce rival local faction leaders to join the machine 
(Lerman 1977).   
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, factional conflicts after direct VC elections are very likely to 
manifest themselves in the form of a tense VC-VPB relation, which has posed a serous 
problem for village governance. To some scholars, this seems to be an embarrassment 
that has no easy solution under the existing institutional context. For example, based on 
their recent empirical study of 12 villages in Anhui Province, Qingshan Tan and Xin 
Qiushui, predicts that “if our data reveal a pattern, and if villagers’ committees continue 
to gain popularity among villagers and village Party branches try to hold on to power, 
we may be observing a trend of rising tensions between the two village organizations 
spreading  throughout  the  countryside.  There  is  no  easy  way  to  solve  this  problem, 
particularly in the light of a lack of formal rules defining the role and function of village   190 
Party branches” (Tan and Xin 2007: 597). However, the rising tensions between VCs 
and  VPBs,  which  is  difficult  to  solve  from  scholars’  perspective,  in  fact  have  been 
largely eased by local state officials through deploying clientelism. Despite the lack of 
formal rules to coordinate the operation of the two village bodies, with the addendum of 
informal  clientelism,  local  state  officials,  as  powerful  patrons,  can  still  acquire 
compliance and coordination from members of both village bodies (or members of both 
factions) who, although in conflict with each other, may all act as clients of the local 
state officials. This is why the tensions between VCs and VPBs in post-election village 
governance is largely under control by the local state and do not seem to be “rising”. 
According to the estimated national figures in 2002, there were only 5% to 10% villages 
throughout China that had overtly tense VC-VPB relations (Guo 2002: 106). Similarly, 
in Xinjia Township, for example, although township officials admitted in general that 
after direct elections VC-VPB relations were potentially problematic, according to them, 
the villages that had overtly tense VC-VPB relations in Xinjia Township were “very 
limited”  and  even  in  these  “very  limited”  number  of  villages,  contradictions  and 
conflicts between the two bodies could be mediated and solved with township officials’ 
“intensive  work”  (Interviews  1  and  3).  Here,  without  referring  to  clientelism  or 
patron-client relationships between local state officials and village (both VC and VPB) 
cadres (or competing village faction members), it would be difficult to understand why 
the predicted rising tensions between VCs and VPBs are largely eased in reality.   
 
In short, by skillfully employing their powers of patronage, the local state officials have 
been  able  to  add  another  informal  but  powerful  constraint  and  control  over  village 
cadres. On the part of the village cadres, being clients of the local state officials is also 
an appealing strategy for the protection and promotion of their own interests. In other 
word, they have been very likely to choose to serve the local state officials, namely their 
patrons, of their own accord. 
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Conclusion   
 
This chapter has discussed how, largely in order to remedy the problems caused by the 
villagers’  self-governance  policy  and  fix  the  “disconnection”  between  the  township 
government  and  the  village  community,  local  state  officials  have  managed  to  retain 
control over and dominate village governance. By stressing and relying on the village 
guarantee cadre system, the local state extends its administrative controls down to the 
village community so as to fully involve in and take control of village governance. 
Under the village guarantee cadre system, the village guarantee cadre, who acts as a 
government agent, is the de facto boss of the village. Through the system of “dual proxy 
management”  and  the  direct  control  of  village  cadres’  pay,  the  local  state  further 
tightens up its administrative control over the village cadres and the village government.                           
 
Despite  the  local  state’s  efforts  to  retain  its  administrative  control  over  the  village 
government,  such  formal  intervention  and  control  is  insufficient  to  guarantee  the 
obedience  and  active  cooperation  of  the  village  cadres  (particularly  the  elected  VC 
cadres)  after  the  implementation  of  villagers’  self-governance.  Therefore,  informal 
clientelism is employed by the local state officials as what Lande calls an “addendum” 
(Lande 1977: xxi) to the formal administrative control to make the village cadres (and 
the village government) responsive, cooperative and coordinated in implementing the 
state  tasks.  As  indicated  above,  it  seems  that  since  the  introduction  of  villagers’ 
self-governance, the Xinjia Township officials have relied to a greater extent than before 
on the informal clientelist system to further put village cadres (particularly the elected 
VC cadres) under their control. “Self-governance” or “village democracy” has been to a 
large  degree  supplanted  by  the  top-down  administrative  structure  that  is  further 
supplemented by and intertwined with the vertical patron-client structure. The supposed 
“self-governance”  is  largely  nominal  in  practice.  As  one  Chinese  researcher  has 
observed: in terms of villagers’ self-governance, there are “wide discrepancies between 
theoretical assumptions and actual operations” (Zhao 2006: 74).       192 
 
Although the administrative and clientelist control of the local state runs counter to the 
supposed  logic  of  villagers’  self-governance  (village  democracy),  such  control  is 
consistent with and fits in the general authoritarian political structure of the Chinese 
state.  The  village  governmental  administration  has  long  functioned  as  a 
policy-implementing arm of the Chinese state at various levels and village cadres have 
been treated and perceived of foot solders of the state in implementing policies from 
above  in  rural  China  (Zhong  2003:  158-182).  It  remains  so  even  after  the 
implementation of the direct VC elections and villagers’ self-governance. In other words, 
although  village  governance  is  defined  as  “self-governance”,  within  the  existing 
Chinese political structure it remains a (semi-)administrative unit for implementing state 
policies  and  tasks.  As  Wu  points  out,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  VC’s  “administrative 
functions actually have overwhelmed its ‘self-governing functions’ and the VC virtually 
becomes  a  subordinate  agency  of  the  township  government  or  a  semi-regime 
organization”  (Wu  2002:  149).  Without  effective  higher  level  government  control, 
villagers’ self-governance may result in a “disconnection” between the local state and 
the village level, which may reduce the state’s policy-implementation capacity. Local 
state officials, who are shaped and driven by a “pressurized system” due to the wider 
authoritarian political environment, have no choices but to exert varied forms of control 
(formal/administrative or informal/clientelist) over the village administration and village 
cadres so as to guarantee the implementation of state policies, especially unpopular ones 
such as family planning or tax collecting. Such control has re-confirmed the top-down 
authoritarian state’s penetration into the village community.                                         
 
Under such circumstances, the elected VC, although supposed to be a self-governing 
organization, cannot operate independently without the intervention of the local state’s 
administrative  power.  The  strong  administrative  power  intertwined  with  informal 
clientelist  structure  enables  the  local  state  to  retain  its  control  over  the  village 
organizations and implement its policies successfully. The village cadres, even though 
being elected directly through “free and fair” elections, cannot bargain with the local   193 
state on behalf of the whole village community since they themselves are largely clients 
dependent to the local state officials, who are actually patrons in a strong position.   
 
From the perspective of democracy, “democratization” has in fact been overwhelmed 
and supplanted by the “administratization” in the village community. However, in terms 
of  community  management,  administratization  and  clientelism  seem  to  be  not  only 
efficient  but  also  inevitable.  The  current  “villagers’  self-governance”  as  well  as  its 
impractical institutional designs has either remained unimplemented or caused “disputes 
over trifles”. This is why some people, especially those local government officials who 
are familiar with the whole operation, call self-governance an “utter show” (Luo 2006; 
interview 11 and 19).   
 
It is clear that the local state’s efforts to intervene, control and manage village affairs go 
against  the  spirit  of  the  Organic  Law  and  the  supposed  democratic  principles  of 
villagers’  self-governance.  But  the  reason  is  in  part  that  the  Organic  Law  and  the 
villagers’  self-governance  system  are  themselves  problematic.  This  is  why  the  local 
government has to ostensibly carry out self-governance on the one hand but basically 
depend on the combination of its formal administrative power and informal clientelism 
to control village affairs and administration on the other.           
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8 Conclusion 
 
 
 
Village elections and self-governance, as one of the most eye-catching political reforms 
undertaken in contemporary China, have attracted much attention both domestically and 
internationally.  Particularly  in  the  past  decade,  scholarly  work  on  this  topic,  often 
discussed  under  the  rubric  “Chinese  grassroots/village  democracy”,  or  “democracy, 
Chinese  style”,  is  booming.  While  these  academic  efforts  have  contributed  to  the 
understanding of such political reform in rural China, solid and intensive investigation 
to reveal the working of informal rules in village community has been largely lacking. 
But as far as Chinese village politics is concerned, without fully understanding and 
taking into account the operation of informal clientelist networks, analysts may risk 
drawing inaccurate conclusions.   
 
Based on an in-depth case study of B village, this thesis argues that clientelism remains 
an important underlying phenomenon in contemporary Chinese village politics. Despite 
being formally “democratic”, both the village elections and post-election governance 
are  heavily  influenced  by  clientelist  networks  that  have  helped  to  reaffirm  the 
domination of local state in the village community. The findings of this thesis defy the 
prevailing optimism about so-called “village/grassroots democracy”, which holds that 
direct village elections and villagers’ self-governance in village China are approaching a 
real liberal-democratic direction and may even significantly contribute to the further 
democratization of the authoritarian party-state in China. This thesis also reveals what 
the authoritarian model fails to explain: why  and how the local state can still exert 
authoritarian  control  upon  village  affairs  while  “free  and  fair”  village  elections  and 
“self-governance” are implemented. It shows that, relying largely on informal clientelist 
control, the Chinese local state retain capacity to successfully control “democracy” and 
“democratically” elected cadres.                         195 
 
Village elections: “free and fair” or subject to clientelist control? 
 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have discussed direct village elections in B village by focusing on 
three categories of key actors respectively: the voters, the candidates and the local state 
officials. They reveal that these three types of key actors under examination fit well in a 
clientelist structure. Ordinary voters/villagers still largely need and depend on patrons 
for  access  to  scarce  resources  today.  To  enhance  their  security  and  maximize  their 
opportunities, ordinary villagers, aware of the informal rules of the clientelist system, 
are willing to behave like clients by creating and cultivating relations with potential 
patrons around them. The villagers’ dependence on their patrons’ scarce resources make 
them largely subject to the patrons’ control and reduces their freedom to elect village 
cadres. In village elections, villagers’ votes are therefore to a large degree captured by 
clientelist networks.   
 
Candidates in village elections most commonly arise from the village  elite who are 
usually in the position of village patrons or middlemen. As patrons or middlemen, they 
combine and are able to offer their fellow villagers various scarce resources, like skills, 
knowledge,  wealth,  job  opportunities,  or,  perhaps  more  importantly,  useful  outside 
connections. Taking advantage of the patronage resources and the clientelist networks, 
candidates  are  therefore  relatively  free  to  demand  villagers’  votes.  Direct  village 
elections have produced competition between candidates, as we have seen in B village. 
However,  such  competition  has  triggered  a  factional  contest  based  on  different 
clientelist  affiliations.  In  B  village,  elections  have  largely  become  factional  contests 
based on opposing clientelist networks rather than optional policies, issues or platforms.                         
 
Local state officials, who are supposed to implement and facilitate the village electoral 
policy,  actually  exert  strong  influence  upon  the  election  results.  As  the  policy 
implementers of higher-level authorities, local state officials have to rely on the “right”   196 
village  cadres  to  implement,  facilitate  and  enforce  various  state  policies  (especially 
those unpopular ones) in each village community. It is therefore crucial for local state 
officials to get the “right” person elected. Even the so-called “free and fair” village 
elections cannot evade intervention and influence by the local state. Local officials, who 
are also in an ideal position as powerful patrons, are able to make use of clientelist 
exchange with village elites so as to strongly influence village elections and get their 
favoured results.                     
 
In  sum,  as  long  as  the  clientelist  structure  remains,  actors’  behaviour  and  strategies 
largely continue to follow the clientelist line. As the case of B village shows, the village 
elections, although in terms of laws and regulations are “free and fair”, are actually still 
subject to the control of the patron-client networks.     
 
Village governance: self-governance or overwhelmed by the 
administrative-clientelist dominance   
 
It is held, particularly by those taking the liberal-democratic approach, that the directly 
elected  VC  has  real  power  and  autonomy,  and  therefore  can  make  a  substantial 
difference to villagers’ lives in the post-election village governance (Li 2003; O'Brien 
2001;  O'Brien  and  Li  2000;  Wang  1997).  For  example,  O’Brien  believes  that 
“[villagers’] committees have broad powers and limited but real autonomy from the 
township governments that sit above them” and they “control things people care about” 
(O'Brien 2001: 416). However, what I have found in B village challenges this view.   
 
In chapters 6 and 7 that focus on the post-election governance, this thesis has revealed 
that the so-called “democratic” institutions designed for villagers’ self-governance have 
failed to function properly. Above all, in terms of village governance, the elected VC at 
best can only share power with, if not be completely subject to, the VPB, which is still 
largely appointed by and responsive to the local party-state. Power sharing, however, is   197 
very likely to be problematic due to the personal or factional conflicts between members 
of the two bodies. Consequently, the malfunction of the power sharing or cooperation 
system justifies the intervention of the local state. Although institutions designed to 
deliver  for  “democratic”  supervision,  “democratic”  decision  making  or  so  called 
“checks and balances” in village governance, they have either not been implemented 
(for example the villagers’ right to recall or impeach the incumbent cadres) or have 
malfunctioned due to the factional conflicts (such as the villagers’ financing small team) 
and clientelist control (such as the villagers’ representative assembly).               
 
In  fact,  villagers’  self-governance  or  village  “democracy”  has  failed  to  function  in 
reality (although some formal institutions are put in place to satisfy the letter of relevant 
laws and regulations) and the post-election village governance has remained under the 
control of the local state. This thesis shows that, through the formal institutions (the 
village guarantee cadre system and the system for controlling village finance), local 
state administrative power has managed to penetrate into the village community and 
exert significant authoritarian influence over village affairs. Rather than self-governing, 
village  governance  is  still  dominated  by  the  authoritiarian  local  state.  Villagers’ 
self-governance is far from real. As Bernstein correctly points out, “even when village 
elections work well, the power of elected village committees is limited because they 
necessarily function within an authoritarian political environment that is not structured 
to respond to the demands of constituents. Solutions to problems of the greatest concern 
that face rural China are largely beyond the capacity of village committees to solve” 
(Bernstein 2006: 30). Likewise, Shen argues that although VCs are claimed to have 
most  direct  effect  on  villagers’  life,  in  reality  the  principal  function  of  VCs  is  to 
implement  the  higher-level  authorities’  administrative  directives  (Shen  2003a).  This 
view is particularly typical among those taking authoritarian approach. Although I am 
more sympathetic to this view than to the “liberal-democratic” one, my analysis does 
not stop here.   
 
This  thesis  further  reveals  that  after  the  implementation  of  direct  VC  elections  and   198 
policy to promote self-governance, the local state’s formal institutional mechanisms are 
legally constrained and may not be sufficient to guarantee a compliant and responsive 
village  regime,  without  which  the  local  state  is  not  able  to  accomplish  its  tasks. 
However, by relying on the informal power and resources under their control, local state 
officials are able to act as patrons and take advantage of clientelism to strengthen their 
control  over  members  of  the  village  elite,  especially  directly  elected  village  cadres. 
These village cadres then tend to behave much more like clients of the local state than 
representatives of the villagers’ interests. As a result, the village self-governance has 
been infiltrated and subverted by the local state’s informal control. 
 
“Grassroots democracy”? 
 
As reviewed in Chapter one, mainstream wisdom (e.g. liberal-democratic approach and 
the  developmentalist  approach)  generally  takes  direct  village  elections  and  so-called 
self-governance  in  present  rural  China  as  a  move  toward  “democracy”,  although  a 
number  of  different  “democracy”  related  terms  are  used  in  their  study,  including 
“grassroots  democracy”,  “village  democracy”,  “village  electoral  democracy”,  and 
“village democratic elections”. These mainstream scholars may realize the limit of such 
“grassroots democracy”, however, it does not prevent them from optimistically arguing 
that “village democracy” may grow bottom-up and even herald China’s unique path 
toward democratization. Unfortunately, although widely using democracy theories to 
explore this topic, few have made serious efforts to clarify theoretically why village 
elections and governance in China should be considered (grassroots) “democracy”. The 
careless use of the term “democracy” in the study of contemporary rural China may lead 
to  an  incorrect  understanding  of  both  the  nature  of  Chinese  village  politics  and 
“democracy” itself.   
 
As Cohen defines, “Democracy is that system of community government in which, by 
and  large,  the  members  of  a  community  participate,  or  may  participate,  directly  or   199 
indirectly, in the making of decisions which affect them all” (Cohen 1971: 7). In terms 
of the “community” where democracy functions, Cohen further clarifies:   
 
In reflecting upon the communities in which democracy can subsist, it is most important 
that  one  not  focus  exclusively  upon  national  states.  These  are  very  important 
communities, and we are understandably very much interested in the way democracy 
functions in them. But a satisfactory theory of democracy must be applicable to a range 
of community types and sizes far exceeding national states. Communities of greatly 
different kinds and sizes may be governed democratically (Cohen 1971: 6). 
 
As far as China is concerned, it is obvious that, at the national state level, democracy as 
a system of government does not exist at all. The question raised here, however, is 
whether the system of government in Chinese village communities can be referred to as 
“village democracy”? According to Cohen’s definition, if the term “village democracy” 
is employed, it should mean that in a specific village community there must be a system 
of  government  in  which  the  villagers  “participate,  or  may  participate,  directly  or 
indirectly, in the making of decisions which affect them all”. Unfortunately, as the case 
of B village indicates, such a system of government in fact does not really exist in the 
village community at all. At best, the villagers are allowed to directly elect a few VC 
members among very limited candidates. Even such supposedly “free and fair” elections 
are largely subject to informal clientelist control. In terms of village governance, the 
case of B village shows that it is not the villagers who participate “in the making of 
decisions which affect them all” but still the local state which dominates and controls 
the  village  government  through  both  formal/administrative  institutions  and 
informal/clientelist  ones.  In  short,  the  system  of  government  in  the  Chinese  village 
community is still nothing but an authoritarian one, which is a governing form for rather 
than by the people (Cao 2005; Murphy 2006).  It is therefore mistaken to take it as 
genuine “village democracy”. Obviously, if the system of village government is not 
democracy at all, the liberal-democratic approach and the developmentalist approach, 
both of which have attempted to examine Chinese village elections and governance by   200 
applying democracy theories, may lose their analytical teeth.   
 
Even if accepting that such “village democracy” is not really democracy at all, one may 
still argue that direct village elections and the rules and practices of self-governance 
may help promote the realization of democracy in a process of democratization. As 
Howell  puts  it:  “Whilst  it  is  easy  to  criticize  the  standard  of  the  elections  and  the 
motives  of  the  Chinese  government,  it  is  important  nevertheless  to  think  more 
strategically about how these new structures and practices could play a role in furthering 
democratic  values  and  ideals  within  China.”  Li  shares  similar  view,  argues  that  the 
practices  of  village  elections  and  villagers  self-governance  may  “gradually  cultivate 
peasants’ democratic consciousness and make them realize the importance of democracy, 
which  can  further  develop  their  democratic  values  and  lead  to  more  in-depth 
development of democracy as well as wider institutional change” (Li 2002: 6). Such a 
view is actually widely echoed among many China scholars. I defy such a viewpoint, 
arguing that this fake “village democracy” may have more negative effects than positive 
ones on the prospects for democratization.                           
 
In terms of village governance, as indicated earlier, village elections have triggered and 
aggravated  conflicts  within  the  B  village  community,  as  manifest  through 
clientelist/factional  struggles.  Such  internal  clientelist/factional  struggles  further 
manifest  themselves  in  the  process  of  post-election  governance.  The  so-called 
“democratic” governance has been so problematic that the village administration cannot 
function without the authoritarian intervention and control from authorities outside the 
village  community.  In  addition,  the  changing  of  village  cadres  along  with  village 
elections  has  made  the  village  administrative  team  subject  to  frequent  change  of 
personnel, which has led to inefficiency in the management of village affairs and the 
state policy implementation.                 
 
If such growing problems in village administration are the price that has to be paid for 
the  wider  democratization  of  China  or  the  enhancement  of  Chinese  peasants’   201 
“democratic values and ideals”, it may be well worth it. However, can such institutional 
design  for  “village  democracy”  really  have  any  substantial  effects  on  China’s 
democratization as mainstream scholars have optimistically suggested?  I doubt it. If 
democracy is really intended to be practiced and developed in smaller scale in China, 
there can be no worse places than Chinese village communities.   
 
First  of  all,  it  is  not  realistic  to  create  a  set  of  such  complicated  “democratic” 
mechanism in a village community that has very limited resources. In order to install a 
“democratic” system in village communities, numerous details must be attended to. In 
terms of “free and fair” village elections, each stage is required to be conducted in a 
strict and standardized way: election workers must be trained; voting booths should be 
made and secret voting must be guaranteed; election records should be kept carefully; 
specific rules for vote soliciting or campaigning also need to be worked out carefully. In 
terms of village democratic governance, VC, villagers’ representative assembly (VRA), 
villagers’  financing  small  team  (VFST)  as  well  as  various  VC  subcommittees  are 
required  to  be  created;  personnel  of  these  institutions  must  be  paid;  a complex  and 
detailed  working  regulations  must  be  worked  out  for  the  so-called  “checks  and 
balances” among VC, VPB, VFST and VRA, so on an so forth. To establish and sustain 
such a set of “democratic” system obviously requires an enormous amount of time, 
efforts, and resources. As government system, a complicated and elaborately designed 
democratic mechanism perhaps is desirable and necessary in a community of a much 
larger scale (for example city, county or at least at township level) with relatively more 
resources. However, in  a Chinese village community where resources  are extremely 
limited,  a  complicated  machinery  like  that  can  only  be  found  unrealistic  and 
unsustainable at least at China’s current level of development. 
 
Secondly, Chinese villages communities (or VCs) are more of administrative units than 
voluntary  autonomous  organizations.  According  to  the  law,  the  township/town 
government is the most basic level of government and at the village level the VC is 
considered to be a “grassroots mass autonomous organization”. However, in fact the VC   202 
is not a free association that villagers can voluntarily form. It can only established on an 
administrative basis defined by the local government. What is more, the VC actually 
plays a role as a policy implementing arm of the higher level government, whose most 
important function is to carry out various assigned administrative tasks from above, like 
collecting tax, enforcing family planning policy measures, maintaining social stability, 
protecting environment and so on. As long as the authoritarian government structure 
(pressurized  system)  remains  unchanged,  the  local  state  will  seek  ways  of  putting 
village cadres under its control so as to get state policies implemented. As Alpermann 
has  found  in  his  research,  the  directly  elected  VCs  in  practice  “are  treated  like 
line-organs  of  the  Chinese  government  and  have  to  carry  out  orders  from  above” 
(Alpermann  2001:  46).  The  so-called  village  democracy  cannot  at  all  resist  the 
infringement imposed upon villagers by the outside authoritarian system. The survival 
and  development  of  local  democracy  must  be  matched  with  necessary  outside 
environment, composed of an independent legal system, rule of law, a democratic and 
transparent government and so on. This is to say, local government and its officials 
actually are just the composition of the whole party-state authoritarian machine which 
should be blamed for the embarrassment of grassroots democracy in rural China. As 
long  as  the  authoritarian  nature  of  Chinese  party-state  remains,  the  predicament  is 
unlikely to be broken. Even in terms of village affairs which are supposed to be done 
through  “self-governance”,  particularly  with  the  collapse  of  the  collective  economy, 
there have been fewer and fewer things that actually require “self-governance”. Some 
community public affairs like repairing the village streets, raising fund primary school, 
managing the village sanitation and so on are almost all dependent on the direction, 
support and organization of the local state. As Shen correctly points out: “the major 
advantage of the people’s self-governance is that the people are able to do their own 
things by themselves. Theoretically speaking, this is irreproachable.” However, “within 
an excessively small community, many people’s own affairs usually can not be done or 
be conducted appropriately (Shen 2004: part 2)”. 
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are  heavily  influenced  by  clientelism.  A  Chinese  village  community  is  largely  a 
face-to-face society where villagers are bound together by dense personal relationships 
and networks and a broad commitment to one another in time of need. The greater 
insecurity and inequality brought by decollectivization and marketization has made it 
more necessary for villagers to cultivate and rely on patron-client relationship to make 
life better. As a result, clientelism or a clientelist system is predominant in village China 
and the village regime is largely manipulated by a few village patrons. With clientelist 
control dominant, so-called “village democracy” or any specially designed “democratic” 
institutions can only be used to serve the appearance rather the substance of democracy. 
As  Hong  suggests,  the  essence  of  democracy,  namely,  the  villagers’  awareness  and 
appreciation of democratic ideas and principles, is actually absent in Chinese village 
politics despite the highly stylised election procedure (Hong 2006: 31). The appearance 
of “village democracy” may look dazzling, but the essence of village government is still 
nothing but authoritarian rule underpinned by a clientelist system, namely, just like the 
old wine in a new bottle. 
 
The mainstream view often holds that, no matter how many flaws and disadvantages 
there  are,  village  democracy  should  be  considered  a  positive  thing  any  way.  By 
democratic participation, Chinese farmers can learn democracy, practise democracy in 
democratic process and improve political efficacy. They even optimistically announce 
that village democracy will become “an irresistible force to reconstitute the state from 
below” (Wang 1997: 1440). I argue that on the evidence from B village, this is unlikely. 
Rather than having been encouraged or inspired, villagers in B village have apparently 
become more cynical about such “democracy” bestowed from above over time through 
three rounds of elections and increasingly voted on clientelist line. To villagers of B 
village, such “democracy” not only has had very little effect on their everyday life, but 
also has been likely to embarrass them and even damage part of their social networks 
(for example, when being solicited for votes by two different factions; for details, see 
Chapter  3).  In  addition,  when  the  elected  VC  cadres  failed  to  deliver  their  public 
promises,  when  they  are  still  responsive  to  the  township  government  instead  of  the   204 
villagers whom they are supposed to represent, and when all the most important issues 
in  village  governance  are  still  decided  by  the  township  government  despite  of  such 
village democracy, how could villagers get excited and remain a feeling of “higher level 
of  political  efficacy”  (Li  2003)  or  the  benefits  of  democracy?  On  the  contrary,  the 
malfunctioning  of  such  “village  democracy”  has  largely  failed  to  improve  people’s 
enthusiasm  or  other  conditions  that  democracy  needs.  Particularly,  clientelism,  in 
perverting the formal democratic institutions, may even lead to people’s loss of faith in 
democratic systems, further entrench clientelism and authoritarianism and in this way 
prevent democratisation.       
 
It is far beyond the capacity of this thesis to discuss what the prospect and approaches of 
China’s democratization would be. Nonetheless, it is suggested that without the further 
liberalization and democratization of China’s general political structure, democracy in 
local level will have little chance to survive. As far as political reform in rural China is 
concerned, it probably would be more important to give and guarantee Chinese peasants 
greater  political  freedom  (particularly  the  freedom  of  association)  than  “grassroots 
democracy”. Only when the atomizing peasants are able to get incorporated by various 
horizontal  voluntary  social  organizations  and  groups,  which  are  based  on  common 
socio-economic interests and are truly independent from the state administrative control, 
can  peasants  have  much  more  bargaining  power  when  dealing  with  the  state.  And 
perhaps only based on this can the Chinese civil society develop and democratization 
happen. Village elections and self-governance, which are by and large formalistic within 
current  Chinese  political  structure  and  are  described  by  Louie  as  an  “odd  kind  of 
administration” (Louie 2001: 151), do not even empower villagers to bargain with the 
local state, let alone “restructure” the whole political system. Rather, the operation and 
running of various “democratic” institutions within village China is in fact a “losing 
proposition”. 
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An  authoritarian  system  supplemented  with  informal  clientelist 
structure   
 
As the case of B village has indicated, despite the “free and fair” VC elections and the 
institutions  for  self-governance  (or  “village  democracy”),  the  context  of  the  village 
community in which different  actors find themselves remains authoritarian.  In other 
words, although the formal institutions of village government may look “democratic”, 
the nature of the village politics is still authoritarian. The Chinese party-state designed 
and implemented such a system at the village level largely to increase mass support for 
the Party, to consolidate the current regime and to enhance its international image, as 
well  as  to  improve  policy  implementation  (Kelliher  1997;  O'Brien  and  Li  2000). 
So-called self-governance or “grassroots democracy” is best considered a supplement 
rather  than  a  substitute  for  the  party-state’s  authoritarian  control.  In  this  sense, 
authoritarian  approach  appears  a  more  appropriate  perspective  in  terms  of  the 
state-society  relationship  in  rural  China  than  the  liberal-democratic  one  although  it 
overstates the authoritarian and coercive aspect of state power.  In this thesis I have 
shown that there has been a partial retreat and decline in some of the local state’s formal 
institutional controls over the village. But I have also attempted to illuminate the state’s 
continuing  efforts  to  retain  authoritarian  control  by  taking  advantage  of  informal 
clientelist structure on the other hand.   
 
The  generalization  drawn  from  this  case  study  of  a  single  village  in  a  province  in 
economically developed eastern coastal China must, of course, be treated with caution 
and remain tentative. The nature of the qualitative case study based on an individual 
case  and  the  huge  regional  variation  across  the  vast  territory  of  China  rasie  the 
possibility of over-generalization from the above findings. Nonetheless, I believe the 
macro-structural features that underpin clientelism remain not only in B village but also 
in the vast rural China. Namely, as long as the authoritarian political structure prevails; 
the voluntary horizontal associations are not allowed; a basic social security system is   206 
absent;  prominent  inequalities  exist  among  people  and  a  rule  of  law  is  weakly 
developed, vertical clientelist patterns of dependence and domination may persist in 
rural China. Oi’s verdict that “village politics in China is best described as clientelist” 
(Oi 1989: 7) is still relevant today. Therefore, I believe, without fully revealing and 
understanding  how  such  invisible  clientelist  networks  work  in  village  China,  it  is 
difficult to fully understand how authoritarianism has adapted to accommodate village 
elections.  And  it  is  also  foreseeable  that  clientelism,  as  a  pattern  of  state-peasant 
interaction through which the authoritarian state exerts control at the grassroots level 
and individual peasants participate in the political process to seek their particularistic 
interests,  will  persist  in  rural  China.  However,  it  is  worth  noting  that,  although 
clientelism may  widely  exist in rural china, the forms and degree of it can vary in 
different villages with different characteristics. In a given village, factors such as lineage 
structure, village economic structure, villager migration, local state capacity as well as 
village history can all play a role in shaping the form and degree of clientelism in the 
given village community. As a result, how clientelism influences the process of village 
elections and governance may also vary. What forms and degree clientelism takes and 
how  clientemism  manifests  itself  and  chape  the  process  of  villag  elections  and 
governance in other villages and other places of rural China can be a topic for further 
study.   
 
Clientelism, developmentalism and Chinese rural society under 
transition   
 
Apart form above findings, this thesis also attempts to add some tentative suggestions 
on the development of clientelism in contemporary rural China. The very definition of 
clientelism points towards poverty of the clients. Literature on clientelism has indicated 
that it is a feature disproportionately of poor countries or peasant (rural) societies (e.g., 
Lande 1977; Lemarchand 1977; Powell 1970; Scott 1972b; Silverman 1967). Clientelist 
theorists, such as Scott and Powell, suggest that peasants, who live at subsistence level   207 
and  lack  effective  safety  nets,  are  risk-averse  and  hence  would  actively  engage  in 
clientelist exchange with those patrons, with whom they are personally familiar. As far 
as China is concerned, clientelism has been considered a important feature of traditional 
Chinese  rural  society  before  communism  (Duara  1988).  However,  after  rural  China 
came under communist rule after 1949, when Chinese peasants have no longer been 
living at subsistence level and have had basic collective safety nets under the collective 
system, clientelism, according to Oi (1989), persisted because of the very structural 
characteristics of the communist system, including a scarcity of goods, a centralized 
distribution system, and unequal access to and personalized control over allocation of 
goods and opportunities. This underpinned peasants’ dependence on local cadres and 
therefore encouraged the prevalence of clientelism. Based on her observation of rural 
China  till  the  late  1980s,  Oi  further  argues  that,  although  the  post-1978  reforms 
transformed the  rural  economy and  resulted in  significant  economic development in 
rural  China,  the  nature  of  village  politics  was  still  clientelist  as  long  as  “the  state 
remains only semicommitted to a market economy, maintains a hierarchy of prices, and 
does not solve the problem of scarcity” (1989: 226).     
 
After two more decades of reform, the above conditions that Oi has identified as the 
underpinnings  of  clientelism  in  rural  China  have  largely  changed.  The  Chinese 
party-state  has  committed  itself  to  the  market  economy  and  largely  abandoned  the 
hierarchy  of  prices.  The  problem  of  scarcity  at  least  may  not  be  a  prominent 
phenomenon in some affluent villages. But as find in B village, which is a quite affluent 
village  in  the  developed  eastern  coastal  area  of  China,  clientelism  remains  to  be 
pervasive and continues to shape village politics. This seems to indicate that, in contrast 
to the conventional clientelist theory, poverty and scarcity per se may not necessarily be 
the basis of or the reason for clientelism.   
 
This is why I believe that the developmentalist approach has failed to interpret Chinese 
village elections and governance properly because economic development alone may 
not necessarily eliminate the unequal social relations between clients and patrons. In   208 
other words, clientelism may remain an influential institution and shape village politics 
in Chinese villages regardless of their economic development level or villagers’ income 
per capita. As the contradicting evidence obtained from the developmentalist literature 
has  revealed,  “free  and  fair”  elections  or  formal  “democratic”  institutions  can  be 
implemented in villages with varied economic  development level. The key  point is, 
however, as long as informal clientelism is present and plays a role of “brake”, “free and 
fair” elections or the so-called “village democracy” can be subject to and compatible 
with the authoritarian control of the Chinese party-state.                 
 
We may hypothesize that, even though Chinese rural dwellers are generally better off 
and are no longer concerned about subsistence, as long as the factors, including income 
inequality  (wealth  gap),  absence  of  social  security  nets,  personalized  use  of  public 
power and lack of the rule of law, exist, clientelism may adapt and manifest itself. How 
clientelism in rural China evolves with continuing urbanization and durative economic 
and political reform may still be open-ended questions     
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Appendix 1: Interviewee List 
 
1.  Xinjia Township deputy party secretary—2/3/2004, 30/11/2004 
2.  Xinjia Township mayor—3/3/2004, 14/11/2004 
3.  Xinjia Township Party secretary—7/4/2004, 20/11/2004, 10/11/2005 
4.  Xinjia Township official—24/3/2004 
5.  Xinjia Township official—29/2/2004 
6.  Xinjia Township official—16/4/2004 
7.  Xinjia Township official—20/4/2004 
8.  Xinjia Township official—25/4/2004 
9.  Xinjia Township official—29/4/2004, 13/11/2005 
10. Xinjia Township official—2/5/2004 
11. Xinjia Township official—3/5/2004 
12. Xinjia Township official—5/5/2004 
13. Xinjia Township official—14/11/2004, 9/11/2005 
14. Xinjia Township official—18/11/2004 
15. Xinjia Township official—20/11/2004   
16. Xinjia Township official—26/11/2004   
17. Xinjia Township official—2/12/2004 
18. Xinjia Township official—10/12/2004 
19. Xinjia Township official—26/12/2004 
20. B village villager—1/4/2004 
21. B village villager—5/4/2004 
22. B village villager—9/4/2004 
23. B village villager—11/4/2004 
24. B village villager—14/4/2004 
25. B village villager—16/4/2004 
26. B village villager—17/4/2004 
27. B village villager—18/4/2004   210 
28. B village villager—20/4/2004 
29. B village villager—21/4/2004 
30. B village villager—23/4/2004 
31. B village villager—25/4/2004 
32. B village villager—28/4/2004 
33. B Village villager----2/5/2004 
34. B village villager—13/11/2004, 12/12/2004 
35. B village villager—16/11/2004 
36. B village villager—19/11/2004   
37. B village villager—22/11/2004 
38. B village villager—27/11/2004 
39. B village villager—2/12/2004   
40. B village villager—6/12/2004   
41. B village villager—10/12/2004 
42. B village villager—16/12/2004 
43. B village villager—20/12/2004 
44. B village villager—25/12/2004 
45. B village villager—4/1/2005 
46. B village villager—6/1/2005   
47. Qu  Jiazhi  (VC  chair  of  B  village:  May  2002-  November  2004)—8/3/2004, 
4/12/2004 
48. Qu Jiawan (VPB secretary of B village: July 2000 to January  2005)—8/3/2004, 
3/12/2004 
49. Qu Sixiang (VPB secretary of B village: 1970s to July 2000)—12/3/2004 
50. Qu Jiamao (VC chair of B village: May 1999 to May 2002)—20/3/2004, 29/3/2004, 
30/11/2004 
51. Qu  Jiaji  (VC  member  of  B  village:  May  1999  to  May  2002  and  May  2002  to 
November 2004; VPB member: January 2005 till now)—20/3/2004, 6/12/2004 
52. Qu Sifa (VC deputy chair: May 2002 to November 2004; VC member: November 
2004 till now; VPB secretary January 2005 till now.)—22/3/2004   211 
53. Qu Jiaxian (VC deputy chair: May 1999 to May 2002)—14/4/2004, 30/11/2004 
54. Qu Siyi (B village villager and member of villagers’ financing small team of B 
village—23/3/2004 
55. Wang Shixian (Xinjia Township official and B village guarantee cadre)—24/3/2004, 
2/5/2004, 3/1/2005, 12/11/2005 
56. Yantai City government official—4/5/2004, 16/11/2005 
57. VC chair of C village of Xinjia Township—11/4/2004, 28/11/2005 
58. VC chair of Z village of Xinjia Township—30/11/2004 
59. Villager of T village of Xinjia Township—26/12/2004 
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Appendix 2: Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committee of the 
People’s Republic of China (Provisional) 
 
（Adopted  at  the  23rd  Meeting  of  the  Standing  Committee  of  the  Sixth  National 
People's Congress on November 24, 1987, and promulgated by Order No. 59 of the 
President  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China  on  November  24,  1987  for  trial 
implementation as of June 1, 1988） 
    Article 1. This Law is formulated in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Constitution of the People's Republic of China with a view to ensuring self-governance 
by the villagers in the countryside, who will administer their own affairs in accordance 
with  the  law,  and  promoting  socialist  democracy  at  the  grassroots  level,  socialist 
material development, and the building of an advanced socialist culture and ideology in 
the rural areas. 
    Article  2.  The  villagers’  committee  shall  be  the  primary  mass  organization  of 
self-governance, in which the villagers manage their own affairs, educate themselves, 
and serve their own needs. It shall manage the public affairs and public welfare services 
of the village, mediate disputes among the villagers, help maintain public order, and 
convey  the  villages'  opinions  and  demands  and  make  suggestions  to  the  people's 
government. 
    Article 3. The people's government of a township, a nationality township or a town 
shall give guidance, support and help to the villagers committees in their work. The 
villagers committees, on their part, shall assist the above people's government in its 
work. 
    Article  4.  The  villagers  committee  shall  support  and  organize  the  villagers  in 
co-operative  economic  undertakings  in  various  forms,  such  as  those  for  production, 
supply  and  marketing,  credit  or  consumption,  provide  services  and  coordination  for 
production  in  the  village,  and  promote  the  development  of  socialist  production  and 
construction and the socialist commodity economy in the countryside. 
    The  villagers  committee  shall  respect  the  decision-making  power  of  collective   213 
economic  organizations  in  conducting  their  economic  activities  independently  as 
prescribed by law, and safeguard the lawful right of property and other lawful rights and 
interests  of  collective  economic  organizations,  villagers,  households  operating  under 
contract, associated households or partnerships. 
    The  villagers  committee  shall,  in  accordance  with  the  law,  administer  affairs 
concerning  the  land  and  other  property  owned  collectively  by  the  villagers  and 
disseminate knowledge among the villagers about a rational utilization of the natural 
resources and the protection and improvement of the ecological environment. 
    Article 5. The villagers committee shall publicize the Constitution and the laws, 
regulations  and  state  policies  among  the  villagers;  persuade  them  to  perform  their 
obligations as prescribed by law and to take good care of public property; safeguard the 
villagers' lawful rights and interests; promote unity and mutual assistance with other 
villages;  and  carry  out  various  forms  of  activities  conducive  to  the  building  of  an 
advanced socialist culture and ideology. 
    Article  6.  In  villages  where  people  from  more  than  one  nationality  live,  the 
villagers committees shall persuade the villagers to enhance the unity, mutual assistance 
and mutual respect between different nationalities. 
    Article 7. Villagers committees shall be established on the basis of the distribution 
of  the  villagers  and  the  sizes  of  the  population  and  on  the  principle  of  facilitating 
self-governance by the masses. 
    Villagers  committees  shall  generally  be  established  in  natural  villages;  several 
natural villages may jointly establish a villagers committee; a large natural village may 
establish several villagers committees. 
    The establishment or dissolution of a villagers committee or a readjustment in the 
area governed by it shall be proposed by the people 's government of a township, a 
nationality township or a town and reported to a people's government at the county level 
for approval after it is discussed and agreed to by a villagers assembly. 
    Article 8. A villagers committee shall be composed of 3-7 members, including the 
chair, the deputy-chair  （deputy-chairs）  and the members. 
    The  members  of  a  villagers  committee  shall  include  an  appropriate  number  of   214 
women. In villages where people from more than one nationality live, they shall include 
a member or members from the nationality or nationalities with a smaller population. 
    Members of a villagers committee shall not be divorced from production and may 
be provided with appropriate subsidies in certain circumstances. 
    Article  9.  The  chair,  deputy-chair  or  deputy-chairs  and  members  of  a  villagers 
committee shall be elected directly by the villagers. The term of office for a villagers 
committee shall be three  years,  and its members may  continue to hold office  when 
reelected. 
    Any villager who has reached the age of 18 shall have the right to elect and stand 
for election, regardless of his ethnic status, race, sex, occupation, family background, 
religious belief, education, property status and length of residence, with the exception of 
persons who have been deprived of political rights in accordance with the law. 
    Article 10. The villagers assembly shall be composed of villagers at or above the 
age of 18. 
    The villagers assembly may be attended by villagers at or above the age of 18 or by 
a representative or representatives of each household. 
    When necessary, representatives of enterprises, institutions and mass organizations 
located in the village may be invited to attend the assembly. 
    Decisions of the villagers assembly shall be made by a simple majority,either of the 
villagers at or above the age of 18 or of the representatives of the households. 
    Article 11. The villagers committee shall be responsible to the villagers assembly 
and report on its work to the latter. 
    The  villagers  assembly  shall  be  convened  and  presided  over  by  the  villagers 
committee. When proposed by over one-fifth of the villagers, the villagers assembly 
shall be convened. When matters involving the interests of all the villagers arise, the 
villagers  committee  shall  refer  them  to  the  villagers  assembly  for  decision  through 
discussion. 
    The villagers assembly shall have the power to recall members of the villagers 
committee and hold a by-election. 
    Article 12. In making decisions, a villagers committee shall apply the principle   215 
whereby the minority is subordinate to the majority. 
    In its work the villagers committee shall persist in the mass line, give full play to 
democracy,  carefully  heed  dissenting  opinions  and  shall  not  resort  to  coercion  and 
commandism or retaliation. 
    Article 13. Members of a villagers committee shall observe the Constitution, the 
laws, regulations and state policies, be fair in handling affairs and serve the villagers 
warmheartedly. 
    Article  14.  The  villagers  committee  shall,  when  necessary,  establish 
sub-committees for people's mediation, public security, public health and other matters. 
Members  of  the  villagers  committee  may  concurrently  be  members  of  the 
sub-committees. 
    The villagers committee of a village with a small population may dispense with the 
sub-committees; instead, members of the villagers committee shall have a division of 
responsibilities with respect to people's mediation, public security, public health and 
other work. 
    Article  15.  The  villagers  committee  may  set  up  villagers  groups,  the  heads  of 
which shall be elected at group meetings. 
    Article 16. Rules and regulations for a village and villagers pledges shall be drawn 
up by the villagers assembly through discussion, reported to the people's government of 
a township, nationality township or town for the record, and implemented under the 
supervision of the villagers committee. 
    The rules and regulations for a village and villagers pledges shall not contravene 
the Constitution, the laws or the regulations. 
    Article  17.  The  funds  needed  by  the  villagers  committee  for  managing  public 
affairs and public welfare services of the village shall be decided on by the villagers 
assembly through discussion and may be raised from local economic organizations and 
the villagers. 
    The  accounts  of  revenues  and  expenditures  shall  be  made  public  regularly  for 
supervision by the villagers and local economic organizations. 
    Article 18. Persons who have been deprived of political rights in accordance with   216 
the law shall be included in villagers groups. The villagers committee shall exercise 
supervision over them and give them ideological education and help. 
    Article 19. Personnel of government organs, mass organizations, units of the armed 
forces, and enterprises and institutions owned by the whole people, which are located in 
the countryside, shall not join the organizations of the villagers committees;personnel of 
collectively-owned enterprises and institutions that are not run by the villages may not 
join the organizations of the villagers committees. However, all the above personnel 
shall abide by the rules and regulations for the villages and the villagers pledges. When 
the villagers committees of the villages where these units are located discuss problems 
related  to  them  and  their  presence  becomes  necessary,  these  units  shall  send 
representatives to the meetings. 
    Article  20.  The  standing  committees  of  the  people's  congresses  of  provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government shall, in 
accordance with this Law and in the light of their local conditions, define the steps and 
formulate the measures for the implementation of this Law. 
    Article 21. Provisional implementation of this Law shall begin as of June 1, 1988. 
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Appendix 3: Organic Law of the Villagers Committee of the 
People’s Republic of China 
     
(Adopted at the 5th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth  National 
People's Congress on November 4, 1998) 
    Article 1 This Law is enacted in accordance with the Constitution with a view to 
ensuring self-governance by the villagers in the countryside, who will administer their 
own  affairs  according  to  law,  developing  democracy  at  the  grassroots  level  in  the 
countryside, and promoting the building of a socialist countryside which is materially 
and ethically advanced. 
    Article  2  The  villagers  committee  is  the  primary  mass  organization  of 
self-governance, in which the villagers manage their own affairs, educate themselves 
and  serve  their  own  needs.  The  villagers  committee  applies  democratic  elections, 
democratic decision-making, democratic management and democratic supervision.   
    The  villagers  committee  shall  manage  the  public  affairs  and  public  welfare 
undertakings of the village, mediate disputes among the villagers, help maintain public 
order, and convey the villagers' opinions and demands and make suggestions to the 
people's government. 
    Article  3  The  primary  organization  of  the  Communist  Party  of  China  in  the 
countryside  shall  carry  out  its  work  in  accordance  with  the  Constitution  of  the 
Communist Party of China, playing its role as a leading nucleus; and, in accordance 
with the Constitution and laws, support the villagers and  ensure that they  carry out 
self-governance activities and exercise their democratic rights directly. 
    Article 4 The people's government of a township, a nationality township or a town 
shall  guide,  support  and  help  the  villagers  committees  in  their  work,  but  may  not 
interfere  with  the  affairs  that  lawfully  fall  within  the  scope  of  the  villagers 
self-governance. 
    The villagers committees, on their part, shall assist the said people's government in 
its work.   218 
    Article 5 The villagers committee shall support the villagers and assist them in 
their efforts to set up various forms of co-operative and other economic undertakings in 
accordance with law, provide services and coordination for production in the village, 
and  promote  the  development  of  rural  production  and  construction  and  the  socialist 
market economy. 
    The villagers committee shall respect the decision-making power of the collective 
economic organizations in conducting their economic activities independently according 
to  law,  safeguard  the  dual  operation  system  characterized  by  the  combination  of 
centralized  operation  with  decentralized  operation  on  the  basis  of  operation  by 
households under a contract, and ensure the lawful property right and other lawful rights 
and interests of the collective economic organizations, villagers, households operating 
under a contract, associated households, and partnerships. 
    The  villagers  committee  shall,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  laws, 
administer the affairs concerning the land and other property owned collectively by the 
peasants of the village and disseminate knowledge among the villagers about rational 
utilization of the natural resources and protection and improvement of the ecological 
environment. 
    Article  6  The  villagers  committee  shall  publicize  the  Constitution,  laws, 
regulations and State policies among the villagers; help them understand the importance 
of performing their obligation as proscribed by law and cherishing public property and 
encourage them to do so; safeguard the villagers' lawful rights and interests; develop 
culture and education, and disseminate scientific and technological knowledge among 
the  villagers;  promote  unity  and  mutual  assistance  between  villages;  and  carry  out 
various forms of activities for the building of advanced socialist ethics. 
    Article 7  In a village  where people from  more than one ethnic  group live, the 
villagers  committee  shall  help  the  villagers  understand  the  importance  of  enhancing 
unity, mutual respect and mutual assistance among the ethnic groups and give them 
guidance in this respect. 
    Article 8 The villagers committee shall be established on the basis of the residential 
areas of the villagers and the size of the population and on the principle of facilitating   219 
self-governance by the masses. 
    The establishment or dissolution of a villagers committee or a readjustment in the 
area  governed by it shall be proposed by the people's government of a township, a 
nationality township or a town and submitted to a people's government at the county 
level for approval after it is discussed and agreed to by a villagers assembly. 
    Article 9 A villagers committee shall be composed of three to seven members, 
including the chair, the deputy-chair (deputy-chairs) and the members. 
    The  members  of  a  villagers  committee  shall  include  an  appropriate  number  of 
women. In a village where people from more than one ethnic group live, they shall 
include  a  member  or  members  from  the  ethnic  group  or  groups  with  a  smaller 
population. Members of a villagers committee shall not be divorced from production but 
may be provided with appropriate subsidies, where necessary. 
    Article 10 A villagers committee may, on the basis of the residential areas of the 
villagers, establish a number of villagers groups, the leaders of which shall be elected at 
the meetings of the groups. 
    Article 11 The chair, deputy-chair(s) and members of a villagers committee shall 
be  elected  directly  by  the  villagers.  No  organization  or  individual  may  designate, 
appoint or replace any member of a villagers committee. 
    The term of office for a villagers committee is three years; a new committee shall 
be elected at the expiration of the three years without delay. Members of a villagers 
committee may continue to hold office when reelected. 
    Article 12 Any villager who has reached the age of 18 shall have the right to elect 
and  stand  for  election,  regardless  of  his  ethnic  status,  race,  sex,  occupation,  family 
background, religious belief, education, property status and length of residence, with the 
exception of persons who have been deprived of political rights in accordance with law. 
    The name list of the villagers who have the right to elect and stand for election 
shall be made public 20 days prior to the date of election. 
    Article 13 Election of a villagers committee shall be presided over by a villagers 
electoral committee. Members of the electoral committee shall be elected by a villagers 
assembly or by all the villagers groups.   220 
    Article 14 For election of a villagers committee, the villagers who have the right to 
elect in the village shall nominate candidates directly. 
    The  number  of  candidates  shall  be  greater  than  the  number  of  persons  to  be 
elected. 
    The  election  of  a  villagers  committee  shall  be  valid  if  more  than  half  of  the 
villagers who have the right to elect cast their votes; a candidate shall be elected only if 
he wins more than half of the votes cast by the villagers. 
    The election shall be by secret ballot and open vote-counting; the outcome of the 
election shall be announced on the spot. During election, booths shall be installed for 
voters to write their ballots in private. 
    Specific electoral measures shall be prescribed by the standing committees of the 
people's congresses of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under 
the Central Government. 
    Article 15 If a person, by threatening, bribing, forging ballots or other illegitimate 
means, interferes with the villagers in the exercise of their rights to elect and to stand for 
election, thus disrupting the election of a villagers committee, the villagers shall have 
the right to report against him to the people's congress, the people's government of the 
township, nationality township or town, or to the standing committee of the people's 
congress and the people's government at the county level or the competent department 
under the latter, which shall be responsible for investigating the matter and handling it 
in accordance with law. If a person is elected by threatening, bribing, forging ballots or 
other illegitimate means, his election shall be invalid. 
    Article  16  If  more  than  one-fifth  of  eligible  voters  in  a  village  jointly  sign  a 
proposal to recall VC members then this can be processed. Reasons for the recall should 
be put forward. The targeted VC members are entitled to make a defence. The VC 
should convene a villagers’ meeting without delay to vote on the recall proposal. The 
recall proposal can only be passed with the support of more than half the eligible voters 
in the village.   
    Article 17 A villagers assembly shall be composed of villagers at or above the age 
of 18 in a village.   221 
    The villagers assembly shall be convened with a simple majority participation of 
the villagers at or above the age of 18 or with the participation of the representatives 
from at least two-thirds of the households in the village, and every decision shall be 
adopted  by  a  simple  majority  vote  of  the  villagers  present.  When  necessary, 
representatives  of  the  enterprises,  institutions  and  mass  organizations  located  in  the 
village may be invited to attend the villagers assembly without the right to vote. 
    Article 18 The villagers committee shall be responsible to the villagers assembly 
and report on its work to the latter. The villagers assembly shall deliberate on the work 
report  of  the  villagers  committee  every  year  and  appraise  the  performance  of  its 
members. 
    The  villagers  assembly  shall  be  convened  by  the  villagers  committee.  When 
proposed by one-tenth of the villagers, the villagers assembly shall be convened. Article 
19  When  the  following  matters  that  involve  the  interests  of  the  villagers  arise,  the 
villagers  committee  shall  refer  them  to  the  villagers  assembly  for  decision  through 
discussion before dealing with them: 
    (1) measures for pooling funds for the township, and the percentage of the funds 
raised by the village to be retained and used by it; 
    (2) the number of persons who enjoy subsidies for work delayed and the rates for 
such subsidies; 
    (3)  use  of  the  profits  gained  by  the  collective  economic  organizations  of  the 
village; 
    (4) proposals for raising funds for running schools, building roads and managing 
other public welfare undertakings in the village; 
    (5) decision on projects to be launched by the collective economic organizations of 
the village and the contracts proposed for the projects as well as contracts proposed for 
building public welfare undertakings in the village; 
    (6) villagers' proposals for operation under a contract; 
    (7) proposals for the use of house sites; and 
    (8)  other  matters  that  involve  the  interests  of  the  villagers  and  on  which  the 
villagers assembly considers it necessary to make decisions through discussion.   222 
    Article 20 A villagers assembly may formulate and revise the villagers charter of 
self-governance, rules and regulations for the village and villagers pledges, and submit 
them to the people's government of the township, nationality township or town for the 
record. 
    No  villagers  charter  of  self-governance,  rules  and  regulations  for  the  village, 
villagers pledges or matters decided through discussion by a villagers assembly or by 
representatives of villagers may contravene the Constitution, laws, regulations, or State 
policies, or contain such contents as infringing upon villagers' rights of the person, their 
democratic rights or lawful property rights. 
    Article 21 In a village with a larger population or with the inhabitants scattered 
here and there, villagers representatives may be elected, and the villagers committee 
shall convene a meeting of the villagers representatives to decide on matters through 
discussion with the authorization of the villagers assembly. One villagers representative 
shall be elected by every five to fifteen households, or a certain 
    number of villagers representatives shall be elected by all the villagers groups. 
    Article 22 The villagers committee shall apply the system of open administration 
of village affairs. 
    The  villagers  committee  shall  accept  supervision  by  the  villagers  through 
publicizing  the  following  matters  without  delay,  of  which  the  matters  involving 
financial affairs shall be publicized every six months at least: 
    (1) matters decided on through discussion by the villagers assembly as provided for 
in Article 19 of this Law, and implementation of the decisions; 
    (2) plans for implementing the State policy for family planning; 
    (3) handing out of relief funds and goods; and 
    (4) collection of charges for the supply of water and electricity, and other matters 
that involve the interests of the villagers and that all the villagers are concerned about. 
    The villagers committee shall guarantee the truthfulness of what is publicized and 
subject itself to inquiry by the villagers. Where a villagers committee fails to publicize 
the matters as is required to without delay or if the matters it publicizes are not true to 
facts, the villagers shall have the right to report the matter to the people's government of   223 
the township, nationality township or town or the people's government at the county 
level  and  the  competent  departments  under  it,  which  shall  be  responsible  for 
investigation and verification and order that the matters be publicized; where unlawful 
acts  are  verified  through  investigation,  the  members  concerned  shall  bear  the 
responsibility according to law. 
    Article 23 The villagers committee and its members shall observe the Constitution, 
laws,  regulations  and  State  policies,  and  they  shall  be  impartial  in  handling  affairs, 
honest in performing their duties and warmhearted in serving the villagers. 
    Article 24  In making decisions, a villagers committee shall apply  the principle 
whereby the minority is subordinate to the majority. 
    In its work the villagers committee shall adhere to the mass line, give full play to 
democracy, carefully heed dissenting opinions, and unremittingly exercise persuasion; it 
may not resort to coercion, commandism or retaliation. 
    Article 25 A villagers committee shall, when necessary, establish sub- committees 
for  people's  mediation,  public  security,  public  health,  etc.  Members  of  the  villagers 
committee  may  concurrently  be  members  of  the  sub-committees.  The  villagers 
committee of a village with a small population may dispense with the sub-committees; 
instead, members of the villagers committee shall have a division of responsibilities 
with respect to people's mediation, public security, public health, etc. 
    Article 26 A villagers committee shall assist the relevant departments in giving 
ideological education and help to and exercising supervision over the  villagers  who 
have been deprived of political rights in accordance with law. 
    Article 27 Members of government departments, public organizations, units of the 
armed forces, and enterprises and institutions owned by the whole people, which are 
located  in  the  countryside,  shall  not  join  organizations  of  the  villagers  committees; 
members of collectively-owned entities that are not run by the villages may choose not 
to join the organizations of the villagers committees. However, all of them shall abide 
by the rules and regulations for the villages and the villagers pledges related to them. 
When the villagers committees, villagers assemblies or villagers representatives of the 
villages, where these units are located, discuss and deal with problems related to the   224 
units, they shall solve the problems through consultation with them. 
    Article 28 The local people's congresses at all levels and the standing committees 
of the local people's congresses at or above the county level shall see that this Law is 
implemented  within  their  administrative  regions  and  guarantee  that  the  villagers 
exercise their right of self- government in accordance with law. 
    Article  29  The  standing  committees  of  the  people's  congresses  of  provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government may, in 
accordance with this Law and in light of the conditions in their own administrative 
regions, formulate measures for the implementation of this Law. 
    Article  30  This  Law  shall  go  into  effect  as  of  the  date  of  promulgation.  The 
Organic Law of the Villagers Committees of the People's Republic of China (for Trial 
Implementation) shall be annulled at the same time. 
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Appendix 4: VC election results of B village in 1999, 2002 and 2004 
 
Table A: The 1999 VC election result (election Date: 29/04/1999) 
Electoral Results  Name  Positio
n Won 
Gender  Age  Previous 
Position 
Political 
Affiliation 
Education 
Level 
Total 
Number 
of 
Voters 
Number 
of 
Voters 
casting 
votes 
Participation 
Rate 
Chair 
Votes 
Deputy 
Chair 
Votes 
Member 
Votes 
Total 
Votes 
Qu 
Jiamao 
VC 
Chair 
Male  49          Communist 
Party 
Member 
High 
School 
700  691  98.7%  219  215  77  511 
Qu 
Jiaxian 
VC 
Deputy 
Chair 
Male  48      Primary 
School 
700  691  98.7%  212  212  78  502 
Qu Jiaji  VC 
Memb
er 
Male  35      Junior 
Middle 
School 
700  691  98.7%  16  76  345  437 
Scource: Xinjia Township government: VC elections report sheets (1999).   226
Table B: The 2002 VC election result (election date: 03/04/2002) 
Electoral Results  Name  Position 
Won 
Gender  Age  Previous 
Position 
Political 
Affiliation 
Education 
Level 
Total 
Number 
of 
Voters 
Number 
of 
Voters 
casting 
votes 
Participa
tion 
Rate  Chair 
Votes 
Deputy 
Chair 
Votes 
Member 
Votes 
Total 
Votes 
Qu 
Jiazhi 
VC 
Chair 
Male  66          Communist 
Party 
Member 
Primary 
School 
693  681  97.8%  256  124  63  443 
Qu 
Sifa 
VC 
Deputy 
Chair 
Male  53    Communist 
Party 
Member 
Primary 
School 
693  681  97.8%  99  243  194  536 
Qu 
Jiaji 
VC 
Member 
Male  38  VC 
Member 
  Junior 
Middle 
School 
693  681  97.8%  173  167  189  529 
Scource: Xinjia Township government: VC elections report sheets (2002). 
 
   227
Table C: The 2004 VC election result (election date: 30/11/2004) 
Electoral Results  Name  Position 
Won 
Gender  Age  Previous 
Position 
Political 
Affiliation 
Education 
Level 
Total 
Number 
of 
Voters 
Number 
of 
Voters 
casting 
votes 
Participation 
Rate 
Chair 
Votes 
Deputy 
Chair 
Votes 
Member 
Votes 
Total 
Votes 
Qu 
Sixu 
VC 
Chair 
Male  38            Junior 
Middle 
School 
706        704  99.7%  348  33  54  435 
Qu 
Sichun 
VC 
Deputy 
Chair 
Male  42      Junior 
Middle 
School 
706  704  99.7%  16  344  76  436 
Qu 
Sifa 
VC 
Member 
Male  55  VC 
Deputy 
Chair 
Communist 
Party 
Member 
Junior 
Middle 
School 
706  704  99.7%  304  50  80  434 
Scource: Xinjia Township government: VC elections report sheets (2004)  228 
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